United States v. Michael Sartin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: July 2, 2020
• Docket: 19-2131
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 19-2131 ___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Michael Charles Sartin

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville ____________

Submitted: June 29, 2020 Filed: July 2, 2020 [Unpublished] ____________

Before ERICKSON, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

Michael Sartin pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), and received a within-Guidelines-range prison sentence. In an Anders brief, Sartin’s counsel asks to withdraw and raises four issues. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Two arise out of statements the district court 1 made at sentencing, the first a remark about a hand grenade in Sartin’s possession and the second a reference to the seriousness of his drug- distribution offense. The third and fourth claims are that the court deprived him of the right to speak at sentencing and that trial counsel was ineffective. After considering each issue, we conclude that none entitles him to relief.

The district court did not plainly err when, relying on an uncontested fact from the presentence investigation report, it stated that Sartin possessed a hand grenade. See United States v. Lee, 570 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2009). Nor did the court somehow “double count” his drug distribution by characterizing the offense as “serious.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (requiring district courts to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense).

Sartin also had an opportunity to speak in his own defense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii); United States v. Hoffman, 707 F.3d 929, 937 (8th Cir. 2013). And to the extent he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we will not consider this issue now. See United States v. Ramirez–Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826–27 (8th Cir. 2006) (explaining that ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims “are usually best litigated in collateral proceedings”).

Finally, we have independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988), and conclude that there are no other non-frivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and grant counsel permission to withdraw. ______________________________

1 The Honorable Timothy L. Brooks, United States District Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. -2-