United States v. Michael J. Randy

81 F.3d 65, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6852, 1996 WL 159818
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedApril 8, 1996
Docket95-2211
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 81 F.3d 65 (United States v. Michael J. Randy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Michael J. Randy, 81 F.3d 65, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6852, 1996 WL 159818 (7th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.

Michael Randy appeals from his sentence for mail fraud and RICO violations. He was sentenced to 189 months in prison, 5 years supervised release, a fine of $5,000; restitution of $500,000 was ordered in the event additional funds might be uncovered. In addition, the judge ordered a forfeiture of $1,628,171.74 in assets. As if that were not bad enough, prior to the verdict Randy was a debtor in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding. He claims to have lost all his assets in that forum.

In November 1988, Mr. Randy, a former Chicago police officer, purchased a “bank” licensed by the government of Montserrat, a tiny island in the British West Indies. The price was $29,500 and he called it the Canadian Trade Bank. It was sold by WFI Corporation, a company apparently in the business of selling “paper” banks which have no employees and no assets beyond the name and the *67 banking license. When he purchased the bank, Randy said he had assets in excess of $300,000 and had never been bankrupt. In fact, he was at that time in his third personal bankruptcy, and his assets, of course, were modest.

In an effort to eliminate this type of “bank,” Montserrat sent notices of revocation to a number of banks. It informed the local agent for the Canadian Trade Bank that its license would be revoked for failure to maintain a $300,000 minimum capital requirement. When the bank did not respond, Montserrat revoked the license. Shortly thereafter, Randy sent WFI an additional $10,000 for the purchase of an entity in Grenada that he named, once again, the Canadian Trade Bank. Grenada had no law authorizing the licensing of offshore banks, so the Canadian Trade Bank became a corporation which simply acted like a bank.

Then, however, Grenada began to tighten up its banking laws. In 1991 it required all companies acting like banks to become licensed. Canadian Trade Bank did not apply for a license and so it was struck from the rolls of registered corporations in December 1991. Needless to say, the bank never had an Illinois license.

From November 1990 through April 1992, Randy advertised in Broker World, a nationally circulated insurance industry trade publication. He offered brokers an opportunity to earn “big commissions” through the sale of high yield “domestic (FDIC-insured) CD’s and international bank CD’s.” Interested persons were to respond to an address which turned out to be a “Send it Anywhere” mail box rental facility. Through the ads, Randy developed a nationwide network of brokers who sold $16 million worth of Canadian Trade Bank certificates to more than 400 investors, many of whom were elderly.

Randy opened offices, first in Elk Grove Village and then in Oak Brook Terrace, Illinois. The offices were staffed by three assistants — Berry Maxwell, Cal Herring, and John Czech — and at least one clerical assistant.

In various ways, Randy made many, many misrepresentations to investors and brokers. He said, for instance, that the funds were insured 100 percent by companies such as Lloyds (which demanded that he stop saying this), and “Polaris,” which apparently did not exist. His sales material falsely represented that the Canadian Trade Bank purchased only major national government bonds and invested only in “better” corporations.

He said, among other things, that Grenada conducted several audits each year to ensure the bank’s safety and that the bank was regulated by every country it operated in. He told potential investors they could not verify the existence of the bank because it was private. He did not always keep his stories straight. Sometimes he said the bank was located in Grenada; other times that it was in various cities in Canada.. He also said that the bank could pay high interest rates and commissions because it had low overhead. Haying had about enough of all these misrepresentations, Canadian banking authorities issued a warning that despite its name, the Canadian Trade Bank was not licensed in Canada.

Randy spent most of the money people “invested” in his bank on himself. Approximately $1,277,000 was paid to investors as “interest” and brokers received $1,368,000 in commissions. He used $8,266,000 to make highly speculative investments. Among these were oil paintings, which he titled in his name and that of his wife and — to avoid sales tax — in the God Is Real Universal Life Church.

In September 1992, federal agents searched Randy’s home and office. His bank accounts were seized. Undeterred, he continued the operation of the bank, depositing investor checks to the tune of $1,900,000 into an account in a Bridgeport, Connecticut, bank and a Virginia bank. The former account was controlled by David Horowitz and the latter by Lee Coulson.

Randy was arrested in December 1992. At trial he testified that his goal was to help people get better returns on, their money. He also said he was the victim of a conspiracy involving the CIA the FBI, and the IRS. The jury didn’t buy his tale and so it convicted him on all 13 counts presented in a superseding indictment.

*68 Mr. Randy does not challenge his conviction. Instead, he raises a number of sentencing issues. First, he attacks the enhancement to his sentence under United States Sentencing Guideline § 3Bl.l(a). That section jacks a defendant up four levels for an “aggravating role” in the offense if he “was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive....” A participant is defined as a person who is “criminally responsible for the commission of the offense.” Mr. Randy says that he should not receive the enhancement because his criminal activity did not involve five or more participants; the government says that the activity was “otherwise extensive.” We review the interpretation of the guidelines, i.e., what does “otherwise extensive” mean, de novo. United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir.1995). We review for clear error a district court’s determination that a factual basis exists for a role in the offense enhancement. United States v. Michalek, 54 F.3d 325 (7th Cir.1995).

The phrase “otherwise extensive” is less certain of definition than is the phrase “five participants.” But there is guidance as to what “otherwise extensive” means. It is a basis for an enhancement in a limited number of cases where there may not be five criminally liable participants in the illegal activity. Application note 3 to § 3B1.1 of the guidelines states:

In assessing whether an organization is “otherwise extensive,” all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered. Thus, a fraud that involved only three participants but used the unknowing services of many outsiders could be considered extensive.

We have recently grappled with the imposition of an enhancement for otherwise extensive activity. In United States v. Briscoe, 65 F.3d 576 (7th Cir.1995), there were three direct participants in the criminal scheme, Briscoe himself and two others.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Michael Riolo v. United States
38 F.4th 956 (Eleventh Circuit, 2022)
United States v. Hoffecker
Third Circuit, 2008
United States v. Charles Harris
490 F.3d 589 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
United States v. Dale
374 F.3d 321 (Fifth Circuit, 2004)
United States v. Sirotina
318 F. Supp. 2d 43 (E.D. New York, 2004)
United States v. Richard J. Collins
361 F.3d 343 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
United States v. Mark P. Bigger
139 F.3d 902 (Seventh Circuit, 1998)
United States v. Larry L. Emerson
128 F.3d 557 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)
United States v. Arthur Barnes
117 F.3d 328 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)
United States v. Pedro Ramirez
94 F.3d 1095 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
United States v. Thomas Hightower
96 F.3d 211 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
81 F.3d 65, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 6852, 1996 WL 159818, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-michael-j-randy-ca7-1996.