United States v. Michael J. Muzio

663 F. App'x 845
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 18, 2016
Docket15-12312
StatusUnpublished

This text of 663 F. App'x 845 (United States v. Michael J. Muzio) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Michael J. Muzio, 663 F. App'x 845 (11th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Michael Muzio appeals pro se the denial of his counseled motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, based on two pieces of alleged newly discovered evidence: a letter from a co-conspirator and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 302 Reports of interviews with a key witness. He argues that the government suppressed the FBI reports in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and that this evidence establishes that the prosecutor knowingly allowed the witness to falsely testify against Muzio, in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Muzio contends that the district court failed to consider the FBI reports and should have held an evi-dentiary hearing. After careful review, we affirm the denial of Muzio’s motion for a new trial and the denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing.

I.

Muzio was indicted on charges of conspiracy. to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff(a) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). The charges arose of out Muzio’s efforts to improperly manipulate the market for shares of a public shell corporation, International Business Ventures Group (“IBVG”), by issuing false or misleading press releases and by buying and selling shares between companies under his control to artificially inflate and stabilize share prices. The case was heard by a jury, which found Muzio guilty on all charges that were submitted to it. 1 We affirmed Muzio’s convictions and sentences *847 on direct appeal, finding, among other things, sufficient evidence to support his various convictions. United States v. Muzio, 757 F.3d 1243, 1245 (11th Cir. 2014) (concluding that his “claims lack merit and do not warrant further discussion”).

A.

We begin by summarizing some of the key evidence adduced by the government at trial. In April 2008, Brian Taglieri, the government’s main witness, began working for HomePals with Ronnie Bass and Abner Alabre, among others. HomePals was a Ponzi scheme that targeted Haitian-Americans in South Florida, promising to double investments within 90 days through day trading on the stock market. In reality, investor funds were diverted at least in part for the use and benefit of Taglieri and others, and investors were repaid, if at all, out of an account into which new investor funds were deposited.

Taglieri met Muzio in July 2008, when Taglieri, Bass, Alabre, and Muzio discussed the potential investment of Home-Pals in Muzio’s cigar bar and a night club. In later discussions, and upon hearing Ho-mePals’s plan to double investments, Muz-io recommended that HomePals transfer its assets to a public company so that HomePals could pay off its investors with stock in the new company. HomePals agreed, so Muzio incorporated and registered IBVG as a Florida company and took the steps necessary to take the company public.

Muzio controlled most aspects of IBVG’s operations. Though Muzio designated Tag-lieri as the CEO, Muzio drafted the board minutes and corporate minutes for Taglieri to sign; controlled IBVG’s dealings with Pink Sheets, which lists lower-tier stocks; handled interactions with the stock transfer agent, which issued the stock certificates; and wrote press releases to generate new investments.

Muzio also handled the stock trades that were at the heart of the scheme. As Muzio explained to Taglieri, to maintain IBVG’s stock, in order to bring in new investments, HomePals needed to invest approximately $25,000 per month into stock trades. Muzio told Taglieri that he would trade the stock back and forth between companies under his control, which would inflate the share price and show the public that a market existed for the stock. Between July and November 2008, Muzio and Taglieri had numerous conversations about trading IBVG stock, and Muzio frequently asked Taglieri for money to trade IBVG stock. As of November 1, 2008, accounts controlled by Muzio owned 60 percent of IBVG shares. And from October 24, 2008, through January 5, 2009, Muzio was responsible for 73% of the trading volume in IBVG shares.

In addition, Muzio gave presentations to potential investors to entice them to purchase IBVG stock and to convert their HomePals notes to IBVG stock. Many did so. These presentations contained numerous factual inaccuracies about IBVG as a company and about the stock that investors would receive. For example, investors were promised stock that could be freely traded, but they actually received “restricted” stock that could not be sold or traded freely. At a presentation in December 2008, after HomePals began to have serious financial troubles, Muzio assured investors that things would work out because he was controlling and manipulating the market for IBVG stock.

Muzio also drafted several press releases containing false information to try to attract outside investors. The press releases falsely asserted that IBVG had completed deals with companies to provide credit cards, calling cards, and pre-paid electric *848 meters. While Muzio had taken steps to put the deals together, the deals had not been and never were consummated.

Taglieri began cooperating with law enforcement in February 2009. From that point on, he recorded his conversations with Muzio. On February 18, 2009, Muzio told Taglieri that he had “one trump card to play” to “to try walk away with eight or nine hundred thousand.” The proposal involved issuing “five press releases in a row” and “sell[ing] a million shares” at low cost, which would “obliviate the stock.” The next day, Muzio emailed Taglieri to terminate his supposed consulting contract with the company. The email stated, “recently I have discovered company activity which is very alarming and I must end any and all working matters with the company.”

After the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued a “trading suspension order” on IBVG stock in March 2009, Muzio called the SEC’s Miami office to ask why and then falsely told the SEC that he had never sold any shares of IBVG stock.

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Related

United States v. Schlei
122 F.3d 944 (Eleventh Circuit, 1997)
United States v. George A. Vallejo
297 F.3d 1154 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
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373 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1963)
Giglio v. United States
405 U.S. 150 (Supreme Court, 1972)
United States v. Agurs
427 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
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Willie Ross, Alias Willie Harrison v. State of Texas
474 F.2d 1150 (Fifth Circuit, 1973)
Larry Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama
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721 F.3d 1288 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)
United States v. Laurence Isaacson
752 F.3d 1291 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)
United States v. Michael J. Muzio
757 F.3d 1243 (Eleventh Circuit, 2014)

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Bluebook (online)
663 F. App'x 845, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-michael-j-muzio-ca11-2016.