United States v. Michael J. Austin

First Circuit

United States v. Michael J. Austin

957 F.2d 44, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3838, 1992 WL 42542

CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit

DecidedMarch 9, 1992

Docket91-2262

StatusPublished

This text of 957 F.2d 44 (United States v. Michael J. Austin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Michael J. Austin, 957 F.2d 44, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3838, 1992 WL 42542 (1st Cir. 1992).

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Opinion

ORDER OF COURT

This appeal presents one issue — whether the district court, under the Sentencing Guidelines, abused its discretion when it ordered that, as part of appellant’s supervised release, he remain “continuously employed for compensation to the satisfaction of his supervising officer throughout the period of supervised release_” Assuming, without deciding, that we have jurisdiction to hear such a guidelines appeal, we summarily affirm the judgment of the district court because the merits of the appeal do not present a substantial question. See Local Rule 27.1.

The Sentencing Guidelines specifically provide for the very release condition that appellant is challenging. U.S.S.G. *45 § 5B1.4(a) contains a list of standard conditions recommended for supervised release. One of these conditions is that “the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons_” § 5B1.4(a)(5). Given this, appellant’s argument that the continuous employment condition is contrary to the “policies and law explicitly articulated” by the Sentencing Commission is without merit.

So ordered.

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ORDER OF COURT

This appeal presents one issue — whether the district court, under the Sentencing Guidelines, abused its discretion when it ordered that, as part of appellant’s supervised release, he remain “continuously employed for compensation to the satisfaction of his supervising officer throughout the period of supervised release_” Assuming, without deciding, that we have jurisdiction to hear such a guidelines appeal, we summarily affirm the judgment of the district court because the merits of the appeal do not present a substantial question. See Local Rule 27.1.

The Sentencing Guidelines specifically provide for the very release condition that appellant is challenging. U.S.S.G. *45 § 5B1.4(a) contains a list of standard conditions recommended for supervised release. One of these conditions is that “the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation unless excused by the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons_” § 5B1.4(a)(5). Given this, appellant’s argument that the continuous employment condition is contrary to the “policies and law explicitly articulated” by the Sentencing Commission is without merit.

So ordered.

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Bluebook (online)

957 F.2d 44, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3838, 1992 WL 42542, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-michael-j-austin-ca1-1992.