United States v. Michael Dunbar

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Michael Dunbar

100 F. App'x 594

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedJune 8, 2004

Docket03-2986

StatusUnpublished

This text of 100 F. App'x 594 (United States v. Michael Dunbar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Michael Dunbar, 100 F. App'x 594 (8th Cir. 2004).

Pincite

Opinion

[UNPUBLISHED]

PER CURIAM.

Michael Dunbar (Dunbar) pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm transported in interstate commerce after he had been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); the district court 1 found that he was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment (15 years is the mandatory minimum) and 5 years supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that Dunbar should not have been sentenced as an armed career criminal because his prior robbery conviction was non-aggravated and thus not a predicate offense. Dunbar has filed a pro se supplemental brief, in which he argues that he was unable to take advantage of the plea agreement originally offered by the government because of problems with his former counsel, and that he possessed a firearm out of fear for his life.

We agree with the district court that Dunbar’s robbery conviction was a violent felony for purposes of section 924(e), see United States v. Leeper, 964 F.2d 751, 753 (8th Cir.1992), and Dunbar therefore qualified as an armed career criminal. Further, Dunbar does not have a remedy on direct appeal for the government’s with *595 drawal of a plea agreement, see United States v. Wessels, 12 F.3d 746, 752-53 (8th Cir.1993) (defendant not entitled to relief based on government’s withdrawal of consent to agreement, because either party-may withdraw consent until bargain is accepted by court), and his guilty plea forecloses any claim that he possessed the firearm in self-defense, see United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir.2001) (“valid guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects”) (quoting Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir.1997)).

Following our independent review, see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.

1

. The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

[UNPUBLISHED]

PER CURIAM.

Michael Dunbar (Dunbar) pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm transported in interstate commerce after he had been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); the district court 1 found that he was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and sentenced him to 180 months imprisonment (15 years is the mandatory minimum) and 5 years supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that Dunbar should not have been sentenced as an armed career criminal because his prior robbery conviction was non-aggravated and thus not a predicate offense. Dunbar has filed a pro se supplemental brief, in which he argues that he was unable to take advantage of the plea agreement originally offered by the government because of problems with his former counsel, and that he possessed a firearm out of fear for his life.

We agree with the district court that Dunbar’s robbery conviction was a violent felony for purposes of section 924(e), see United States v. Leeper, 964 F.2d 751, 753 (8th Cir.1992), and Dunbar therefore qualified as an armed career criminal. Further, Dunbar does not have a remedy on direct appeal for the government’s with *595 drawal of a plea agreement, see United States v. Wessels, 12 F.3d 746, 752-53 (8th Cir.1993) (defendant not entitled to relief based on government’s withdrawal of consent to agreement, because either party-may withdraw consent until bargain is accepted by court), and his guilty plea forecloses any claim that he possessed the firearm in self-defense, see United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir.2001) (“valid guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects”) (quoting Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir.1997)).

Following our independent review, see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.

1

. The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

100 F. App'x 594, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-michael-dunbar-ca8-2004.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack