United States v. Michael David, II

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: October 3, 2023
• Docket: 23-4221
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4221 Doc: 48 Filed: 10/03/2023 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4221

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ANTONIO DAVID, II,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Michael F. Urbanski, Chief District Judge. (7:17-cr-00078-MFU-1)

Submitted: September 28, 2023 Decided: October 3, 2023

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Juval O. Scott, Federal Public Defender, Charlottesville, Virginia, Benjamin Schiffelbein, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, S. Cagle Juhan, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4221 Doc: 48 Filed: 10/03/2023 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

The district court sentenced Michael Antonio David, II, to 18 months’ imprisonment

after finding that he violated a condition of his supervised release by possessing a firearm.

In his opening brief, David argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that he

was the individual depicted on surveillance videos removing an item from his waistband

and that the item was a firearm. In his reply brief, David concedes that the item was a

firearm but maintains that he was not the individual holding the firearm. We affirm.

To revoke a defendant’s term of supervised release, the district court need only find

that the defendant violated a supervised release condition by a preponderance of the

evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). “This standard requires only that the existence of a fact

be more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 374

(4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“We review a district court’s decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of

discretion. But we review the factual findings underlying a revocation for clear error.

Under the clear error standard, we will only reverse if left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Doctor, 958 F.3d 226, 234

(4th Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, “factual

findings are based on the credibility of witnesses, we give great deference to the district

court’s determinations,” and “[w]e typically only disturb credibility determinations when

objective evidence contradicts the witness’ story or the story is so internally inconsistent

or implausible that a reasonable finder of fact would not credit it.” Id.

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David argues that we should not defer to the district court’s findings because no

reasonable factfinder could positively identify the individual holding the firearm. After

reviewing the surveillance videos, we find no reason to disturb the district court’s decision

to credit the testimony of the officer who positively identified David as the individual

holding the firearm. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED