United States v. Michael Bentley, III

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 16, 2025
• Docket: 24-5433
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0580n.06

No. 24-5433

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Dec 16, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE MICHAEL BENTLEY III, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )

Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Michael Bentley III appeals from his sentence for

Conspiracy to Distribute 50 Grams or More of Methamphetamine (Actual) under 21 U.S.C.

§§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A), Attempt to Possess with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or

More of Methamphetamine (Actual) under the same statutes, and Using, Carrying, and

Brandishing a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Offense under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM Bentley’s sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In 2020, law enforcement was investigating a drug trafficking organization supplying

methamphetamine and other drugs into the Eastern District of Tennessee. As part of that

investigation, agents monitored packages sent to the Eastern District of Tennessee from a certain

area in California. On February 28, 2022, agents intercepted a suspicious package from California

bound for Bentley’s grandparents’ home. They seized the package and found that it contained No. 24-5433, United States v. Bentley

nearly a kilogram of highly pure methamphetamine. Agents replaced the drugs with fake

methamphetamine and then sent the package along to its intended destination. They surveilled

Bentley’s grandparents’ house, and when they observed Bentley there with the package, they

attempted to arrest him. He fled, pulling a gun from his waistband in the process, and holding it

in the direction of the law enforcement agents. Bentley insists that he did not intentionally point

the gun at anyone and that at most he swept it in their general direction. The agents heard a gunshot

and returned fire as they continued to observe Bentley running away with the gun pointed in their

direction. Ultimately, the agents apprehended Bentley, and he admitted to trafficking

methamphetamine.

B. Procedural Background

A Second Superseding Indictment charged Bentley with Conspiracy to Distribute 50

Grams or More of Methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a), and 841(b)(1)(A), Attempt

to Possess with Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of Methamphetamine under the same

provisions, and Using, Carrying, and Brandishing a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug

Trafficking Crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Bentley refused to enter a plea, and the

district court granted the government’s motion to enter a plea of not guilty on his behalf.

Throughout the court proceedings, Bentley asserted in multiple filings and hearings that he

was subject to neither the criminal laws of the United States nor the jurisdiction of its courts and

that his case should be settled commercially. In at least one instance, the district court noted that

a submission by Bentley was reminiscent of “the sovereign citizen movement” and “warned

[Bentley] that any future filings premised on sovereign citizen lore . . . [would] be summarily

denied.” Order, R. 78, PageID #252–53. Bentley took issue with the district court’s reference to

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the sovereign citizen movement because it carried a negative connotation, but he continued to raise

the same substantive ideas. A jury found Bentley guilty of all counts.

Bentley continued his jurisdictional protest through sentencing. In his sentencing

memorandum, he stated that the judicial power of the United States is vested in the Supreme Court,

the common law is the supreme law of the land, and the district court is an Article I court with

authority to deal only with commerce and therefore lacking jurisdiction to adjudicate his case. He

requested a sentence of time served.

At Bentley’s sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged the advisory guidelines

custodial sentence range. For each of the drug trafficking counts, the guidelines range was 210 to

262 months with a 10-year mandatory minimum. The firearm count carried a statutory range of

seven years’ to life imprisonment. The total resulting advisory range was 294 to 346 months.

In his allocution, Bentley stated that the district court has “two criminal jurisdictions[:]

One . . . under the common law and the other . . . [by] contract under . . . admiralty maritime

jurisdiction.” Sentencing Tr., R. 245, PageID #3812–13. He argued that he had committed no

crime under common law because “no sworn injured party testified against” him and he had “not

consented to any contract with the United States giving over the authority to adjudicate [his]

rights . . . .” Id. at PageID #3813. Basically, according to Bentley, he was innocent of any

legitimate crime, and the government lacked jurisdiction over him. He added that the offense

conduct spanned only a few weeks and that a 20-year sentence for that limited participation in drug

trafficking would be unjust. He asked that the court impose his sentences concurrently, noted that

he wanted to return home to his daughter, and stated, “I know I made mistakes, but I’m a different

man, I’m a changed man.” Id. at PageID #3816.

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In response to Bentley’s jurisdictional arguments, the district court stated:

I have tried a number of cases involving defendants who held these sovereign citizen-type views, never turned out well for any of them, defendants who come into this court and espouse various antigovernment views or claim that the court has no jurisdiction over them, claim that they’re above the law and they can suffer no consequences at the hands of the court, and who more often than not end up representing themselves because lawyers will not in good faith make those arguments. . . . [Y]ou will not win in the Sixth Circuit or in the U.S. Supreme Court on a claim that this court has no jurisdiction over criminal cases. You will not win on the argument that the only jurisdiction this court has is over common law offenses and contracts. Those are senseless arguments. They’ve never prevailed and they will not prevail this time . . . .

Id. at PageID #3817, 19. Then the district court methodically and thoroughly discussed several of

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors: the seriousness of the offense, the need to promote

respect for the law, the need to protect the public, the need for adequate deterrence, the nature and

circumstances of Bentley’s involvement in the offense, and Bentley’s personal history and

characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Specifically, the district court reflected on the seriousness of the offense stemming from

the quantity of drugs for which Bentley was responsible, the increasing prevalence of

methamphetamine deaths, the threat of methamphetamine to people’s lives, families, livelihoods,

and physical and psychological wellbeing, and the aggravating involvement of a firearm that

Bentley had held in the direction of law enforcement officers and discharged.

In addition to Bentley’s holding a firearm toward uniformed police officers and running

away from them, the district court focused on Bentley’s “filings in this case and . . . views about

government[,]” Sentencing Tr., R. 245, PageID #3830, as evidence of Bentley’s lack of respect for

the law. Relatedly, Bentley’s views gave the district court concern about protecting the public

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from him and about the prospect of deterring him from reoffending. The court also noted the

significant need to deter the public from engaging in conduct like Bentley’s.

In terms of involvement in the crime, Bentley would be punished for his own actions and

was not subject to leadership or mitigating role adjustments.

On history and characteristics, the court discussed at length Bentley’s horrific childhood,

his “immatur[ity]” and “vulnerab[ility,]” id. at PageID #3837, and the apparent negative influence

of his mother, including the district court’s belief that Bentley’s antigovernment views originated

with her. The district court noted, however, that it did not see a causal link between Bentley’s

traumas and illegal conduct. It also acknowledged that Bentley has a young daughter, struggles

with addiction, and had attempted to cooperate in the government’s investigation.

In determining the sentence from the balance of those factors, the district court gave

Bentley “the full benefit of the doubt” and varied downward from the guideline range to 200

months, concurrently, on both of the drug trafficking counts and the minimum of 84 months, to be

served consecutively, on the gun count, for a total of 284 months. Id. at PageID #3844.

This appeal promptly followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Bentley asks that we vacate and remand his sentence on the grounds that the

district court unreasonably “consider[ed] and plac[ed] so much weight on his political beliefs.”

Appellant Br. 16. The government counters that Bentley’s sentence was reasonable because “[a]

sentencing court may consider a defendant’s otherwise-protected speech or conduct . . . as long as

that information relates to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors[,]” and Bentley’s below-

guidelines sentence fits his crimes. Appellee Br. 9.

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A. Standard of Review

Bentley concedes that because he did not object at sentencing, we must review his

procedural unreasonableness claim for plain error. See United States v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801,

808 (6th Cir. 2016). Under that standard, Bentley “must ‘show (1) error (2) that “was obvious or

clear,” (3) that “affected defendant’s substantial rights” and (4) that “affected the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”’” Id. (quoting United States v. Vonner,

516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

We review the substantive reasonableness of Bentley’s sentence, however, for abuse of

discretion, regardless of whether Bentley preserved that challenge with an objection at the time of

sentencing. See United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504, 530 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v.

Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 633–34 (6th Cir. 2013). The litigant’s “duty” with respect to substantive

reasonableness is only to “explain the grounds for leniency” at sentencing, and Bentley did so.

Peppel, 707 F.3d at 633 (quoting Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389).

B. Procedural Reasonableness

Bentley claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court

impermissibly considered his political beliefs when devising it. Because the district court properly

addressed Bentley’s political views as they related to legitimate statutory sentencing factors, we

disagree.

Procedural errors in sentencing are those that pertain to whether the district court took the

proper steps in determining the sentence. For example, procedural errors include failing to

properly calculate the advisory guidelines range, treating the guidelines as mandatory, not

considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, incorporating impermissible factors, relying on

clearly erroneous facts, or inadequately explaining the sentence. Gardner, 32 F.4th at 529; United

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States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007)); United States v. Adkins, 729 F.3d 559, 571 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51);

United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). A factor might be impermissible

if it “is neither enumerated in nor consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines or 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).” Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 808.

A sentencing court’s “inquiry is ‘broad in scope[]’ and . . . ‘largely unlimited . . . as to the

kind of information [it] may consider . . . .’” United States v. Graham-Wright, 715 F.3d 598, 601

(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972)). That scope extends

beyond the conduct underlying the conviction “or even illegal conduct[,]” as long as the

information “relate[s] to one of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d

723, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (first quoting United States v. Mull, 53 F.3d 332, 332 (6th Cir. 1995)

(unpublished table decision), and then citing United States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089, 1094 (6th

Cir. 2009)). Details of a defendant’s “life and characteristics” are “[h]ighly relevant . . . to [the]

selection of an appropriate sentence . . . .” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011)

(alterations in original) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)); see 18 U.S.C.

§ 3661.

Although courts may not punish defendants for their “abstract beliefs, however obnoxious

to most people,” Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court has

held that a defendant’s personal beliefs could be a proper factor where relevant to the proceeding.

See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1992). There is no “per se barrier to the

admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because

those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 165; see also Mitchell,

508 U.S. at 486. Such evidence can often “serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant

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represents a future danger to society.” Dawson, 503 U.S. at 166; see also Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 441

(holding that “the government may hold defendants to account for what they say if that speech and

related conduct reveals . . . a factor that aggravates a sentence” and that evidence “shed[s] light on

[the] sort of danger [defendant] presented to the public . . . and what kind of sentence would be

needed to deter other[s]”).

Courts of appeals for other circuits have permitted district courts to consider speech

protected by the First Amendment when clearly relevant to the statutory sentencing factors. See,

e.g., United States v. Brown, 26 F.4th 48, 66–68 (1st Cir. 2022) (holding that defendant’s “beliefs

about the authority of the government or the criminal laws” properly factored into the sentencing

court’s assessment of the need to promote respect for the law, to deter defendant and others, and

to protect the public); United States v. Serrapio, 754 F.3d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding

that considering defendant’s statements that were relevant to legitimate sentencing factors was

different from punishing defendant for abstract beliefs); United States v. Stewart, 686 F.3d 156,

167 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the sentencing court’s consideration of defendant’s public

statements trivializing the sentence and reflecting “lack of remorse” did not violate First

Amendment rights); United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1099 (10th Cir. 2012)

(holding that “[d]efendant’s statements that he would ‘continue to fight’ and his view that it was

‘fine to break the law’ were highly relevant to [the] sentencing factors[,] [s]o the district court did

not violate the First Amendment by considering [those] statements when imposing sentence”);

United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 417 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant’s belief that

tax laws were invalid “demonstrate[d] a likelihood of recidivism” and were properly considered

at sentencing); United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the

district court properly considered defendant’s views about district court’s lack of jurisdiction

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because they demonstrated lack of remorse and continuing threat to the public, which were relevant

to several sentencing factors); Kapadia v. Tally, 229 F.3d 641, 642, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2000)

(holding that defendant’s anti-Semitic statements were permissibly considered at sentencing for

burglary and arson of a Jewish community center as relevant to likelihood of rehabilitation and

amount of danger to community); see also United States v. Schmidt, 930 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir.

2019) (holding that defendant’s “white supremacist beliefs . . . were relevant to legitimate

sentencing considerations”).

The district court took all of the proper steps in arriving at Bentley’s sentence. Bentley

does not contest that the district court accurately calculated the advisory guidelines range. The

district court discussed the pertinent § 3553(a) factors at length and thoughtfully explained the

sentence.

To the extent that Bentley contends that the district court relied on the purportedly

erroneous fact that Bentley subscribed to a sovereign-citizen ideology, we disagree. First, that

characterization strikes us as reasonable, if not accurate. The sovereign citizen movement is

amorphous and decentralized, but those who have studied the movement describe one of its central

tenants as the belief that the modern federal government lacks jurisdiction over non-consenting

individuals. See Paige White, Sovereign Citizen Gurus: Inciting A Lawless World, 63 U.

Louisville L. Rev. 455, 455–56 (2025); Caesar Kalinowski IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign

Citizen Movement, 80 Mont. L. Rev. 153, 154–55 (2019); Michael N. Colacci, Sovereign Citizens:

A Cult Movement that Demands Legislative Resistance, 17 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 153, 153–55

(2015); Erica Goode, In Paper War, Flood of Liens Is the Weapon, N.Y. Times (Aug. 23, 2013),

https://perma.cc/2Z83-97EH. Bentley’s proclamations, including that he “follow[s] God’s law[,]”

echo that belief. Sentencing Tr., R. 245, PageID #3831. Second, the district court did not rely on

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the sovereign-citizen label for Bentley’s ideology in reaching its sentence. Rather, it dealt

substantively with Bentley’s underlying arguments when weighing the sentencing factors.

Bentley’s main argument is that the district court considered an impermissible factor: his

political beliefs. We need not decide whether Bentley’s comments about the authority of the

government were protected by the First Amendment. Even if they were, the district court’s

treatment of them was proper. Not only was consideration of Bentley’s antigovernment assertions

consistent with the § 3553(a) factors; those assertions were very relevant to those factors, as the

district court clearly explained. They revealed characteristics of Bentley that made promoting

respect for the law, deterrence, and protecting the public more difficult. Bentley’s insistence that

he had done nothing criminal and that the court could not hold him accountable plausibly increased

the likelihood that he would continue to break the law. Nothing in the court’s language at

sentencing suggested that the court was punishing Bentley for abstract beliefs. Rather, the court

considered how those beliefs related to Bentley’s criminal conduct and the expected results from

the array of available punishments.1 Therefore, Bentley’s statements regarding the United States’

legal system fell well within the broad purview of the sentencing court.

The district court did not commit error, let alone clear or obvious error, by considering

Bentley’s consistent rejection of government authority in imposing his sentence. As Bentley

1 Bentley relies on United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991), which he misattributes to the Eleventh Circuit. That case is not binding in the Sixth Circuit and is unpersuasive. In Bakker, the Court of Appeals vacated the defendant’s sentence based on the district court’s remark that “those of us who do have a religion are ridiculed as being saps from money-grubbing preachers or priests.” Id. at 740. The sentence “may have reflected the . . . court’s own sense of religious propriety . . . .” Id. at 741. In the present case, the district court expressed no personal sentiment, as occurred in Bakker, but rather discussed how the district court viewed Bentley’s political beliefs as contravening the statutory purposes of criminal sentencing. - 10 - No. 24-5433, United States v. Bentley

founders at the threshold, we need not address the effects on Bentley’s substantial rights or on the

judicial proceedings.

C. Substantive Reasonableness

Bentley argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court

placed too much weight on his political beliefs and the need to promote respect for the law.

Bentley fails, though, to overcome the presumption that his below-guidelines sentence is

reasonable.

A sentence may be substantively unreasonable if it is longer or shorter than necessary to

“advance” the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Ely, 468 F.3d 399, 403 (6th Cir.

2006). That outcome might occur if the sentencing court “selects a sentence arbitrarily . . . or gives

an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” Adkins, 729 F.3d at 571 (quoting

United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442.

When substantively reviewing a sentence, we consider the “totality of the circumstances” and

“give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify

the extent of [any] variance” from the guidelines range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We do not reverse

the district court merely because we “might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence

was appropriate . . . .” Id.

Bentley “bears a heavy burden in showing that his sentence . . . is unreasonable.”

Cunningham, 669 F.3d at 733. That burden is especially heavy because Bentley challenges a

below-guidelines sentence. See United States v. Fields, 763 F.3d 443, 455 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting

United States v. Taylor, 557 F. App’x 475, 475 (6th Cir. 2014)). We recognize a rebuttable

presumption of reasonableness for sentences within the advisory guidelines range. Adkins, 729

F.3d at 570–71; see also Cabrera, 811 F.3d at 808 (citing United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 337

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n.2, 339 (6th Cir. 2007)). A fortiori, we presume that a sentence below the guidelines range is not

unreasonably long. Bentley’s 284-month prison sentence is presumptively reasonable because it

falls below the guidelines range of 294 to 346 months.

Sentencing courts need not place equal weight on each of the § 3553(a) factors. The proper

degree of attention for each factor depends on the facts of the case. Gardner, 32 F.4th at 531

(holding that “‘[n]ot all’ § 3553(a) factors ‘are important in every sentencing’” and defendant’s

preference that district court weigh factors differently did not signal abuse of discretion (alteration

in original) (first quoting United States v. Bridgewater, 479 F.3d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 2007), and

then citing United States v. Robinson, 892 F.3d 209, 216 (6th Cir. 2018))); Adkins, 729 F.3d at 571

(citing Zobel, 696 F.3d at 571–72). The district court’s approach “to balanc[ing] the applicable

sentencing factors is beyond the scope of th[is] Court’s review.” Adkins, 729 F.3d at 571 (citing

United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2008), and Ely, 468 F.3d at 404); see also

Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442 (“[T]his is a matter of reasoned discretion, not math . . . .” (citing Gall,

552 U.S. at 51)). When the district court has “consider[ed] and weigh[ed] all pertinent factors, a

defendant clearly bears a much greater burden in arguing that the court has given an unreasonable

amount of weight to any particular one.” Adkins, 729 F.3d at 571 (quoting United States v.

Thomas, 437 F. App’x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2011)).

Bentley’s argument that the district court weighed any factor too heavily is unpersuasive.

We are not convinced that the district court placed greater weight on the need to promote respect

for the law or Bentley’s political beliefs than on the seriousness of the offense, the need to protect

the public, or Bentley’s personal history and characteristics. The district court spoke ardently

about the quantity of drugs driving the guideline range and the harms attributable to the

“methamphetamine epidemic in th[e] region.” Sentencing Tr., R. 245, PageID #3833. It also

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focused on the seriousness of the firearm offense and “the impact on th[e] officer” of Bentley’s

brandishing and discharging a gun, purposefully or not. Id. at PageID #3828. It gave ample time

to the need to protect the public, the need for adequate deterrence, the circumstances of Bentley’s

involvement, and Bentley’s personal history and characteristics. The district court’s contemplation

of all of those factors increases Bentley’s burden in showing any one factor received inappropriate

attention. Certainly, the district court scrutinized Bentley’s lack of respect for the law and

arguments about government authority, but the transcript does not reflect disproportionate

emphasis on those points.

Even if the district court had weighed respect for the law and Bentley’s political beliefs

more heavily than the other pertinent factors, it would have been within its discretion to do so. We

do not vacate a sentence as “substantively unreasonable because a court places greater weight on

some factors than others.” United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463, 478 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing United

States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 881 (6th Cir. 2020)). The importance of instilling respect for

the law is salient in this case, given that Bentley has freely and continuously disputed the authority

of the United States to discipline him for dangerous crimes and fled, armed, from law enforcement.

The circumstances of this case merit extra focus on that goal. See Zobel, 696 F.3d at 571–72 (“The

district court certainly attached significant weight to public safety concerns, but ‘[a] district court

does not commit reversible error simply by “attach[ing] great weight” to a single factor.’”

(alterations in original) (quoting Thomas, 437 F. App’x at 458)); Adkins, 729 F.3d at 572 (“[T]he

court acted within its discretion by placing more ‘weight on one factor’ because the particular facts

in this case warranted doing so.” (quoting Zobel, 696 F.3d at 571–72)).

Bentley cites the district court’s admonition at the sentencing hearing that he should not

“pass on to [his] daughter all these meritless views . . . [or] teach her to minimize and to blame

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others” as evidence that the court was more concerned about Bentley’s views than his criminal

conduct. Sentencing Tr., R. 245, PageID #3843. But that reproach does not evince

disproportionate focus on Bentley’s beliefs. Nor does it indicate that the court intended its sentence

to punish Bentley for his ideology or chill his expression. It merely reflects the district court’s

candid worries about Bentley’s refusal to recognize the seriousness of his crimes and the need to

deter and protect the public, in addition to instilling respect for the law.

Essentially, Bentley would like this Court to require the district court to weigh the factors

differently. See Sexton, 512 F.3d at 332 (“It is reasonable . . . for the district court to have given

significant weight to general deterrence and retribution . . . . [Defendant’s] argument . . . boils

down to an assertion that the district court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors

differently . . . .”). But the district court is far more familiar with the facts and evidence in this

case, and we are not at liberty to second-guess it, absent an abuse of discretion. The district court

did not abuse its discretion in finding that the § 3553(a) factors did not merit reducing Bentley’s

sentence further below the guideline range. See United States v. Sherrill, 972 F.3d 752, 771–72

(6th Cir. 2020).

III. CONCLUSION

The district court did not plainly err by considering the political views about the authority

of the United States’ criminal laws and courts that Bentley vocalized throughout the litigation and

at sentencing. Neither did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively

unreasonable sentence for Bentley’s drug trafficking and firearm offenses. Therefore, we

AFFIRM Bentley’s sentence.

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