United States v. Meyers

601 F. Supp. 1072, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22596
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedOctober 22, 1984
DocketCrim. 83-60036-PA
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 601 F. Supp. 1072 (United States v. Meyers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Meyers, 601 F. Supp. 1072, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22596 (D. Or. 1984).

Opinion

OPINION

PANNER, Chief Judge.

On September 8,1983, the Federal Grand Jury for the District of Oregon filed a four-count indictment charging defendant Stanley A. Meyers with:

Count 1\ Conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846;
Count 2: Possessing approximately 17 ounces of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);
Count 3\ Possessing approximately 9 ounces of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and
Count 4: Possessing approximately 16 ounces of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844.

Beginning February 14, 1984, the case was tried to a jury, with Judge Earl H. Carroll presiding. The jury could not reach a verdict. After the trial, Judge Carroll denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal and defendant’s motion for a dismissal of the indictment. Defendant appealed, but the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The parties stipulated that the second trial would be tried to the court and waived a jury. Testimony was presented in the form of the transcript of the prior trial and one live witness. The parties retain their evidentiary objections made in the prior trial. I find the defendant guilty of the second and third counts, and not guilty of the first and fourth counts.

STATEMENT OF THE LAW

The first count against the defendant is for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The elements of a criminal conspiracy are:

(1) An object to be accomplished.
(2) A plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object.
(3) An agreement or understanding between two or more of the defendants *1074 whereby they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means.
(4) ... an overt act.

Pinkerton v. United States, 145 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 328 U.S. 640, 643, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1181, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946).

[A] conspiracy may be proved by evidence that is entirely circumstantial, and items of circumstantial evidence must be viewed collectively, not in isolation____ “An otherwise innocent act of ‘relatively slight moment,’ may, when viewed in the context of surrounding circumstances, justify an inference of complicity____”

United States v. Cutaway, 524 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967, 96 S.Ct. 1462, 47 L.Ed.2d 733 (1976).

Those knowingly participating in the conspiracy in any respect or to any degree are guilty of that crime ...

United States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d 348, 356 (9th Cir.1977) (emphasis in original).

Once the existence of a conspiracy is established, evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt a connection of a defendant with the conspiracy, even though the connection is slight, is sufficient to convict him with knowing participation in the conspiracy.

United States v. Dunn, 564 F.2d at 357 (emphasis in original).

The second and third counts against the defendant are for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

To convict for possessing drugs with the intent to distribute, the Government must show that a defendant knowingly possessed the drugs and that, at some point coincident with his possession, he intended to distribute them to another. See United States v. Gomez-Tostado, 597 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Vergara, 687 F.2d 57, 61 (5th Cir.1982). The concept of “distribution” includes sharing drugs with a third party, and is not limited to commercial ventures. United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir.1979).

Possession of drugs may be constructive as well as actual, may be joint among several individuals, and may be proven by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Riggins, 563 F.2d 1264, 1266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848, 99 S.Ct. 148, 58 L.Ed.2d 150 (1977).

The defendant’s intent to distribute a drug can be inferred from the purity, price, and quantity of the drug possessed. For example, the purer the drug, the more likely that it will be “cut” or diluted, and then resold before being consumed. United States v. Palmere, 578 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118, 99 S.Ct. 1026, 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1978); United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894, 898 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1977).

The fourth count against the defendant is for possession of marijuana. With regard to this offense, the government must show knowing or intentional possession. See 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1981). Possession of marijuana may be constructive rather than actual, and may be established by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Zumpano, 436 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir.1970).

The burden of proof is on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offenses. Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 22, 97 S.Ct. 29, 30, 50 L.Ed.2d 25 (1976). To meet this burden, the government may rely on circumstantial evidence.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
601 F. Supp. 1072, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22596, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-meyers-ord-1984.