United States v. Mendoza-Benitez

119 F. Supp. 2d 48, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16191, 2000 WL 1683209
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJuly 31, 2000
DocketCRIM. 98-287CCC
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 119 F. Supp. 2d 48 (United States v. Mendoza-Benitez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Mendoza-Benitez, 119 F. Supp. 2d 48, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16191, 2000 WL 1683209 (prd 2000).

Opinion

ORDER

CEREZO, District Judge.

On April 3, 2000, the government filed its Objections to the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) of defendant Félix Mendoza-Benitez (docket entry 97), seeking 1) that the calculation of the amount of loss be based on the adulterated milk delivered to the processing plant’s silos, instead of the tankers, 2) that defendant be awarded a four (4) level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a) for being an organizer or leader, 3) that defendant be ordered to pay full restitution, and 4) that the fine to be imposed be based on the alternative fines statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d). In a Second Motion Submitting Objections filed on April 4, 2000 (docket entry 98), the government also requested that the PSR be amended to reflect that defendant had been administratively charged for milk adulteration in 1997.

On April 30, 2000, defendant filed his objections to the PSR (docket entry 100), claiming 1) that the amount of loss should be determined based on the net loss to the victim, 2) that no adjustment to defendant’s offense level is warranted for the abuse of a position of public trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, 3) that defendant did not have an aggravating role in the offense as alleged by the government meriting an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, 4) and expressing his willingness to pay a fine of $5,000.00.

In order to clarify some of the arguments raised by the parties, the Court ordered them to submit additional memo-randa (docket entry 105). The government complied (docket entry 106), but not defendant. ‘In any event, we are now in position to resolve the sentencing issues raised.

I. Adjustment for loss under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1).

In previous cases dealing with the same offense at issue here, we have established that the amount of loss must be calculated based on the amount of water added to the milk, multiplied by the cost of a liter of milk to the consumers. We did so after determining that the defendants involved in the acts of adulterating milk never intended to cause a total loss to the processing plant and/or the consumers of the milk adulterated, as they also added salt to the adulterated milk in order to mask the adulteration and to pass off the *50 milk as Grade A milk. Their intentions proved to be successful since all of the adulterated milk was sold in the market. Thus, the actual loss to the consumers was the actual amount of water added to each liter of milk bought by them, which obviously reduced the amount of Grade A milk that they would otherwise had obtained. As, in this case, the amount of water added to the milk was from 500 to 1,000 liters, and the cost of a liter to the consumers was $0.96 at the time of the commission of the offense, the amount of loss did not exceed $960.00. Accordingly, we find that no adjustment for loss is warranted under U.S.S.G. § 2Fl.l(b)(l).

II. Adjustments for role in the offense under U.S.S.G. §§ 3Bl.l(a) and 3B1.3.

After having reviewed all the evidence of the conspiratorial scheme, the Court FINDS that it is insufficient to establish that the scheme to defraud was “otherwise extensive” as required for an upward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(a). Except for the two year duration of the conspiracy, neither the specific number of instances in which milk was adulterated nor the relationship among the co-conspirators establish structured activity or a far-reaching complex web of criminal activity which would justify the four (4) levels enhancement for role in the offense under said section.

As to the adjustment for abuse of a position of public trust made under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, the PSR states as follows:

The defendant, as a farm owner, was trained and certified by the pertinent local regulatory agencies as to dairy industry regulations, and thereby abused a position of public trust by personally engaging in the adulteration of milk. In addition to having knowledge that others were committing the same offenses, and did not put a stop to such practices due to the expected financial profit.

PSR, docket entry 99, at p. 8, ¶ 31.

Mere training and knowledge of the industry’s regulations to which the defendant must abide in the operation of his business do not establish the existence of a position of public or private trust. In U.S. v. Broderson, 67 F.3d 452 (2nd Cir.1995), the district court concluded that defendant Broderson, a vice president of a company that had contracted with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to provide, among other things, supercomputer hardware and software, had abused a position of public trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 upon failing to disclose to NASA during the negotiation of the contract cost and pricing data as required by the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), 10 U.S.C. § 2306a, and its implementing regulations. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the district court’s determination, finding that Broderson did not occupy a position of trust vis-a-vis the government. The Court explained:

TINA and [its regulations] imposed specific legal obligations on Broderson that he failed to fulfill. But for those provisions, Broderson would not have been under any duty to inform the government of [the contractor’s] anticipated costs or to certify that such information had been accurately provided.
The government’s theory seems so far reaching that it might cause virtually anyone who is commanded by statute to make an accurate report to the government to be subject to a Section 3B1.3 enhancement. All taxpayers who file false tax returns, for example, might be included. We believe that it is fairly obvious that the Sentencing Commission harbored no intent that the enhancement be so sweeping.
Moreover, every example of an abuse of trust in the Commentary accompanying Section 3B1.3 also involves a victim entrusting an agent or employee with discretion. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 comment, (n.l) (examples of abuse of a position of trust are an attorney embezzling a client’s money, a bank executive execut *51 ing a fraudulent loan scheme, and a physician sexually abusing a patient during an examination).

Broderson, 67 F.3d at 455-56.

Certainly, the method of adulteration and the fact that this was undertaken in an isolated place by the farm owner and the milk truck drivers made the offense a difficult one to detect. The truck drivers, however, were as essential to the commission of the offense as was the owner. It was the intimacy of their relationship which allowed them to successfully continue during a period of time with the adulteration activity. However, no trust, public or private, was placed by anyone on the farm owner. He did not hold any position that facilitated the concealment.

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Bluebook (online)
119 F. Supp. 2d 48, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16191, 2000 WL 1683209, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mendoza-benitez-prd-2000.