United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 18-1732
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
KEVIN JONIEL MÉNDEZ-BÁEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge, Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Yassmin Gonzalez-Velez and Gonzalez Velez Law Offices, PSC on brief for appellant. Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, on brief for appellee.
June 17, 2019 HOWARD, Chief Judge. Appellant Kevin Joniel Méndez-Báez
appeals his incarcerative sentence of 60 months, 19 months above
the upper end of the advisory guidelines sentencing range. He
argues that the district court erred procedurally in not
considering all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and
substantively in imposing too harsh a sentence. After careful
review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 24, 2017, Puerto Rico police pulled over a car
after observing its apparently illegal window tint. The driver,
Méndez, produced a learner's driving permit and told an officer
that he did not have the car's registration information. While
inspecting the vehicle's registration window decal, an officer
observed an extended ammunition magazine attached to a firearm on
the floor of the passenger side of the car. The police ordered
Méndez and his passenger, Jorge Roberto Rivera-Báez, out of the
vehicle. Neither Méndez -- who had been serving a term of
probation for a prior felony conviction -- nor Rivera had a
firearms permit. The officers placed the two men under arrest and
searched the vehicle, discovering that the firearm was a .40
caliber Model 23 Glock pistol with an extended 29-round magazine
attached, loaded with 22 rounds of ammunition. The police also
found two fully loaded 13-round magazines. The pistol had a chip
that modified it to fire as a fully automatic weapon. After
- 2 - running the license plates through their database, the officers
learned that the car had been flagged as "disappeared" by a
financial institution. At the station, Rivera -- the passenger -
- stated that the pistol, the magazines, and the car belonged to
him.
A grand jury charged Méndez with being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). He pled guilty. The pre-sentence report (PSR) prepared
by the probation office determined that Méndez's total offense
level (TOL) was 19 and his criminal history category (CHC) was II,
because of his previous convictions for attempted murder and
related firearm offenses and because he committed the instant
offense while serving a term of probation. Méndez's guidelines
sentencing range (GSR) was calculated to be 33 to 41 months.
In his sentencing memorandum, Méndez argued for a
sentence at the low end of the GSR, noting that Rivera had admitted
ownership of the gun, ammunition, and the car, that he had long
suffered from an often-untreated psychological condition, and that
he was simply in the "wrong place with the wrong person at the
wrong time." The government, meanwhile, argued for a sentence at
the upper end of the GSR, highlighting that Méndez was the driver
of the car that had been flagged as disappeared, that he committed
the instant offense while on probation for attempted murder and
- 3 - related firearms offenses, and that his prior sentence of probation
had not deterred Méndez from criminal activity.
The district court accepted the PSR's calculated GSR.
The judge stated that he had considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors and the sentencing memorandum filed by Méndez. The court
focused particularly on the fact that the firearm was modified to
be fully automatic, explaining that "[s]hort of bombs, missiles,
and biochemical agents, we can conceive of few weapons that are
more dangerous than machine guns," and that such weapons "are not
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."
The court also noted Méndez's age, education, unemployment,
history of mental health treatment, and lack of substance abuse
history. The court concluded that an above-guidelines sentence
was warranted and sentenced Méndez to 60 months' imprisonment.
Méndez made no objection to his sentence at the time it was
imposed, but subsequently filed this appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
Méndez argues on appeal that the district court
committed procedural error by failing to consider critical factors
in sentencing. He further argues that his variant sentence was
substantively too harsh. Neither of these challenges is
meritorious.
- 4 - A.
A generous reading of Méndez's brief suggests a
procedural challenge to his sentence based on the district court's
alleged failure to consider certain salient factors, specifically:
(1) his early acceptance of responsibility for his actions and (2)
the fact that Rivera, the passenger, admitted to owning the
firearm, ammunition, and the car. Méndez failed to lodge these
objections below. When a party has not preserved the procedural
issues raised on appeal by objecting in the district court, we
review only for plain error. See United States v. González-
Barbosa, 920 F.3d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 2019). This requires that
Méndez show (1) that an error occurred, (2) which was clear or
obvious, and which not only (3) affected his substantial rights,
but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. Méndez has not made
such a showing.
Although the sentencing court must consider all the
§ 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92
(1st Cir. 2008), it need not verbalize its evaluation of each
factor, United States v. Reyes-Rivera, 812 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir.
2016). Moreover, "the fact that the court stated that it had
considered all the section 3553(a) factors is entitled to some
weight." United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st
Cir. 2010). Here, contrary to Méndez's implication, the district
- 5 - court explicitly considered his early acceptance of responsibility
and accordingly granted him a three-level reduction in his TOL on
that basis. Moreover, the district court stated that it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors and had considered Méndez's
sentencing memorandum. The sentencing memorandum detailed all of
the mitigating factors highlighted by Méndez, including Rivera's
admission of ownership of the firearm, ammunition, and the car.
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United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 18-1732
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
KEVIN JONIEL MÉNDEZ-BÁEZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge, Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges.
Yassmin Gonzalez-Velez and Gonzalez Velez Law Offices, PSC on brief for appellant. Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, on brief for appellee.
June 17, 2019 HOWARD, Chief Judge. Appellant Kevin Joniel Méndez-Báez
appeals his incarcerative sentence of 60 months, 19 months above
the upper end of the advisory guidelines sentencing range. He
argues that the district court erred procedurally in not
considering all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and
substantively in imposing too harsh a sentence. After careful
review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 24, 2017, Puerto Rico police pulled over a car
after observing its apparently illegal window tint. The driver,
Méndez, produced a learner's driving permit and told an officer
that he did not have the car's registration information. While
inspecting the vehicle's registration window decal, an officer
observed an extended ammunition magazine attached to a firearm on
the floor of the passenger side of the car. The police ordered
Méndez and his passenger, Jorge Roberto Rivera-Báez, out of the
vehicle. Neither Méndez -- who had been serving a term of
probation for a prior felony conviction -- nor Rivera had a
firearms permit. The officers placed the two men under arrest and
searched the vehicle, discovering that the firearm was a .40
caliber Model 23 Glock pistol with an extended 29-round magazine
attached, loaded with 22 rounds of ammunition. The police also
found two fully loaded 13-round magazines. The pistol had a chip
that modified it to fire as a fully automatic weapon. After
- 2 - running the license plates through their database, the officers
learned that the car had been flagged as "disappeared" by a
financial institution. At the station, Rivera -- the passenger -
- stated that the pistol, the magazines, and the car belonged to
him.
A grand jury charged Méndez with being a felon in
possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). He pled guilty. The pre-sentence report (PSR) prepared
by the probation office determined that Méndez's total offense
level (TOL) was 19 and his criminal history category (CHC) was II,
because of his previous convictions for attempted murder and
related firearm offenses and because he committed the instant
offense while serving a term of probation. Méndez's guidelines
sentencing range (GSR) was calculated to be 33 to 41 months.
In his sentencing memorandum, Méndez argued for a
sentence at the low end of the GSR, noting that Rivera had admitted
ownership of the gun, ammunition, and the car, that he had long
suffered from an often-untreated psychological condition, and that
he was simply in the "wrong place with the wrong person at the
wrong time." The government, meanwhile, argued for a sentence at
the upper end of the GSR, highlighting that Méndez was the driver
of the car that had been flagged as disappeared, that he committed
the instant offense while on probation for attempted murder and
- 3 - related firearms offenses, and that his prior sentence of probation
had not deterred Méndez from criminal activity.
The district court accepted the PSR's calculated GSR.
The judge stated that he had considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors and the sentencing memorandum filed by Méndez. The court
focused particularly on the fact that the firearm was modified to
be fully automatic, explaining that "[s]hort of bombs, missiles,
and biochemical agents, we can conceive of few weapons that are
more dangerous than machine guns," and that such weapons "are not
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes."
The court also noted Méndez's age, education, unemployment,
history of mental health treatment, and lack of substance abuse
history. The court concluded that an above-guidelines sentence
was warranted and sentenced Méndez to 60 months' imprisonment.
Méndez made no objection to his sentence at the time it was
imposed, but subsequently filed this appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
Méndez argues on appeal that the district court
committed procedural error by failing to consider critical factors
in sentencing. He further argues that his variant sentence was
substantively too harsh. Neither of these challenges is
meritorious.
- 4 - A.
A generous reading of Méndez's brief suggests a
procedural challenge to his sentence based on the district court's
alleged failure to consider certain salient factors, specifically:
(1) his early acceptance of responsibility for his actions and (2)
the fact that Rivera, the passenger, admitted to owning the
firearm, ammunition, and the car. Méndez failed to lodge these
objections below. When a party has not preserved the procedural
issues raised on appeal by objecting in the district court, we
review only for plain error. See United States v. González-
Barbosa, 920 F.3d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 2019). This requires that
Méndez show (1) that an error occurred, (2) which was clear or
obvious, and which not only (3) affected his substantial rights,
but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. Méndez has not made
such a showing.
Although the sentencing court must consider all the
§ 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 92
(1st Cir. 2008), it need not verbalize its evaluation of each
factor, United States v. Reyes-Rivera, 812 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir.
2016). Moreover, "the fact that the court stated that it had
considered all the section 3553(a) factors is entitled to some
weight." United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st
Cir. 2010). Here, contrary to Méndez's implication, the district
- 5 - court explicitly considered his early acceptance of responsibility
and accordingly granted him a three-level reduction in his TOL on
that basis. Moreover, the district court stated that it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors and had considered Méndez's
sentencing memorandum. The sentencing memorandum detailed all of
the mitigating factors highlighted by Méndez, including Rivera's
admission of ownership of the firearm, ammunition, and the car.
"A criminal defendant is entitled to a weighing of the section
3553(a) factors that are relevant to [his] case, not to a
particular result." Id. at 49 (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Carrasco-De-Jesús, 589 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir.
2009)). There being no clear or obvious error in the sentencing
court's explication of the factors that it considered, Méndez's
procedural challenge fails.
B.
Méndez also argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because it is too harsh given the totality of the
circumstances surrounding his offense and conviction. He urges us
to reconsider the weighing of various sentencing factors,
including those mentioned above, his tumultuous family life during
his childhood, his remorse, and the fact that his crime was
victimless.
Méndez did not preserve this challenge below. It remains
unclear whether we review unpreserved claims of substantive
- 6 - unreasonableness in sentencing for abuse of discretion or plain
error. See United States v. Reyes-Gomez, No. 17-1757, slip op. at
5-6, n.3 (1st Cir. June 11, 2019) (noting that the Supreme Court
recently granted certiorari on the issue in Holguin-Hernandez v.
United States, No. 18-7739 (June 3, 2019)). We find no occasion
to address this question, for even under the more favorable abuse
of discretion standard, see United States v. Rondón-García, 886
F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2018), Méndez's challenge fails.
Although the court imposed an upwardly variant sentence,
under abuse of discretion review the sentence "will survive a
challenge to its substantive reasonableness as long as it rests on
a 'plausible sentencing rationale' and reflects a 'defensible
result.'" United States v. Pérez, 819 F.3d 541, 547-48 (1st Cir.
2016) (quoting Martin, 520 F.3d at 96). The instant sentence
exceeded the top of the GSR by 19 months. "[W]e have recognized
that the greater the extent of a variance, 'the more compelling
the sentencing court's justification must be.'" United States v.
de Jesús, 831 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States
v. Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171, 177 (1st Cir. 2014)).
Here, the court adequately justified the sentence
through plausible reasoning, relying on various § 3553(a) factors
and Méndez's sentencing memorandum. The court specifically noted
the danger and destructive potential of automatic weapons. It
also relied on a need for heightened deterrence, given that Méndez
- 7 - committed the instant offense while on probation for other
offenses. In these situations, we afford "due deference to the
district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,
justify the extent of the variance." de Jesús, 831 F.3d at 42
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
Therefore, Méndez cannot show that the sentencing court abused its
discretion and we must reject his challenge.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the sentence imposed by the
district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
- 8 -