United States v. Mello

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: 24-1882
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Nos. 24-1881, 24-1882

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

MARCUS MELLO,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Howard and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.

Marie Theriault for appellant.

Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Craig M. Wolff, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for appellee.

January 7, 2026 HOWARD, Circuit Judge. In May 2021, Marcus Mello was

charged with several drug-related offenses, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and the possession of a firearm in furtherance

of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A). After failing to appear for trial, he was also

charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1). Mello pleaded

guilty to all charges. The district court calculated his aggregate

incarcerative sentencing range under the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (the "Guidelines" or "U.S.S.G.") to be 228 months to

270 months but varied below that range and selected a sentence of

181 months' imprisonment. Mello appeals his sentence on both

procedural and substantive grounds. We affirm.

I. Background

As this appeal follows Mello's guilty plea, we draw the

facts from the presentence investigation report ("PSR") and the

sentencing record. United States v. Diaz-Serrano, 77 F.4th 41, 44

(1st Cir. 2023).

A. Drug-Offense Conduct

Mello's drug-offense conduct stems from his distribution

of purported oxycodone pills containing fentanyl that he obtained

from a supplier known as "Chop." Mello made one such sale of

purported "percs" -- referring to Percocet, a brand name for a

prescription painkiller that contains oxycodone -- to customer

"A.K." on May 8, 2020. Earlier that day, A.K. texted Mello, asking

- 2 - whether she could "get 12 today" and, after Mello confirmed a few

hours later that he "just got em," arranged to meet with him in

South Portland, Maine. A.K.'s friend "C.C." drove with her to

meet with Mello, and the two women used some of the pills

purchased.

Shortly after A.K.'s meeting with Mello, law enforcement

officers responded to a report of an unconscious female in a car

parked at a gas station in Kennebunk, Maine. The officers found

C.C. conscious but lethargic in the driver's seat of the vehicle.

A.K. was unresponsive in the passenger seat and was soon pronounced

deceased. The Kennebunk Medical Examiner's Office issued a report

finding that A.K. died from acute toxicity from several substances,

including fentanyl. In performing its examination, the office

found a plastic bag of ten blue pills in A.K.'s possession. The

pills were tested and determined to contain fentanyl.

The day after A.K.'s death, C.C. messaged Mello to ask

what was in the pills he sold A.K. and told him that A.K. had "died

after doing 1 of your pills." After this conversation, Mello

continued to sell "percs," including to a confidential informant

("CI") working with law enforcement. During a monitored call with

the CI on July 15, 2020, Mello stated that he was out of cocaine

but had "percs" for sale. The CI subsequently purchased eight

blue pills from Mello. Law enforcement tested one of the pills

- 3 - purchased, finding that it weighed 0.113 grams and contained

fentanyl.

Two days later, Mello was arrested. At the time of his

arrest, he was wearing a backpack and had a cell phone in his

pocket. The phone was seized, and a search of the backpack

resulted in the seizure of $6,354 in cash, a loaded handgun, a

small amount of marijuana,1 ten white pills in a clear baggie, and

417 blue pills marked "M 30" divided into plastic baggies.

Laboratory results revealed that the 417 blue pills weighed

approximately 45.6 grams in total (approximately 0.10927 grams per

pill). Twenty-eight blue pills were randomly selected for testing

and were determined to contain fentanyl. One of the ten white

pills was also tested. It weighed approximately 0.38 grams and

was found to be oxycodone.

Mello's phone was searched pursuant to a federal search

warrant. This search led to the discovery of WhatsApp messages

between Chop and Mello, spanning from March 2020 to July 2020. In

these communications, Mello and Chop discussed the shipment of

"percs" to Mello's address, as well as Mello's successful sale of

the pills. On several occasions, the pair also made references to

"stick[s]," a slang term for fentanyl. The messages included

The marijuana found in Mello's possession was not considered 1

by the district court when calculating the total drug quantity attributable to Mello for sentencing purposes.

- 4 - photographs of FedEx tracking information, establishing that

packages of purported oxycodone were delivered to Mello's

residence on multiple dates between April 2020 and July 2020.

Relevant here, Chop messaged Mello in early May 2020

that he had "like 3k" pills coming Mello's way and shared a FedEx

tracking receipt showing shipment to Mello's residence in Maine.2

On May 8 -- around the same time that Mello had messaged A.K. that

he "just got" the pills she requested -- Mello confirmed that he

received the package from Chop. Chop asked Mello how many pills

he "could push today," to which Mello responded that he could "get

off 200 rn like I got someone waiting" and that he had other "small

plays" as well. Two weeks later, Chop messaged Mello that he had

"another 3k comin tomorrow" and sent the tracking receipt. Mello

confirmed receipt of the package on May 21, 2020. The two

discussed shipment of a third package of "perks" in June 2020.

After Mello received the package on June 23, 2020, he sent Chop a

picture of the large bag of blue pills that he had received. Mello

counted the pills and sent Chop a picture of the pills organized

into smaller plastic baggies, stating that he counted "5k an some

lik broken bits at the bottom of bag."

2 The messages between Mello and Chop have been reproduced as they appear in the record, without correction of any grammatical or spelling errors except where indicated.

- 5 - In July 2020, a few days before Mello sold the CI pills

containing fentanyl and was ultimately arrested, Chop sent a

message to Mello stating, "I don't wonna rush yu but how is

everything moving? Fast or slow[?]" Mello replied, "The perc

kind slowed down cause yk all these deaths an shit[.]" He

continued, "I'm trying to find more plays just slow cause no one

wanna die[.]"

B. Trial and Failure to Appear

In May 2021, Mello was charged in a superseding

indictment with: distribution of fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) based on his sale to A.K. on May 8, 2020 (Count One);

possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture

or substance containing fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) based on the 417 blue pills seized at the time of his

arrest (Count Two); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of

drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count

Three). In November 2020, he was released on bail directly to an

inpatient substance use disorder treatment program. Mello

remained there until he transitioned to a sober living house on

the facility's campus in October 2021.

A jury trial was scheduled for October 16, 2023. When

Mello failed to appear on that date, his counsel represented to

the court that Mello was running late. But when an hour passed

and Mello had still not arrived, that story changed, and defense

- 6 - counsel stated that Mello intended to plead guilty but could not

make it to court that day. At the government's behest, a warrant

was issued for Mello's arrest. The court dismissed the jury with

instructions to return the following day. When Mello again failed

to show, he was named in a one count indictment charging him with

failure to appear in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3146.

Law enforcement agents eventually located Mello at a

South Portland residence on November 3, 2023. Upon the agents'

arrival, Mello locked himself in the bathroom of the spare bedroom

until he was persuaded to surrender. During a search of the

bathroom, agents found a small plastic baggie with white powder.

Similar baggies with white powder were found in a shoebox in the

guest room and in the pocket of Mello's sweatshirt. Several months

after his arrest, Mello entered a guilty plea to the three charges

in the superseding indictment and to the subsequent charge of

failure to appear.

C. Sentencing

Prior to sentencing, the Probation Office prepared the

PSR with the suggested Guidelines calculation. Pursuant to

U.S.S.G. §3D1.2 and §2J1.6, Mello's two drug counts and

failure-to-appear count were grouped together ("Count Group One").

Mello's 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count, which carries a statutory minimum

sentence of five years that must run consecutively to any other

term of imprisonment, was not grouped with the other counts. In

- 7 - calculating the offense level assigned to Count Group One, the

Probation Office used the highest offense level among the three

counts -- in this case, the offense level for Count One,

distribution of fentanyl. The base offense level was determined

by calculating the total drug weight, in kilograms of converted

drug weight ("CDW"), attributable to Mello. The Probation Office

attributed 3,022.96 kg3 of CDW to Mello based on (1) the 6,000 fake

oxycodone pills containing fentanyl he received in May 2020

(amounting to 1,635 kg of CDW)4; (2) the 5,000 fake oxycodone pills

containing fentanyl he received in June 2020 (amounting to 1,362.50

kg of CDW); and (3) the ten oxycodone pills seized when Mello was

arrested (amounting to 25.46 kg of CDW).5

The Probation Office also recommended increasing Mello's

offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3C1.1 for obstruction of

3 While the PSR provided a chart explaining its 3,022.96 kg of CDW computation, a later section of the report listed the total CDW attributable to Mello to be 3,132.96 kg. The district court pointed out this discrepancy at a pre-sentencing conference and, at a later proceeding, the Probation Office confirmed that the correct amount was 3,022.96 kg as presented in the PSR's chart. 4 One gram of fentanyl is equivalent to 2.5 kg of CDW. U.S. Sent'g Guideline Manual §2D1.1 cmt. n.8(D) (U.S. Sent'g Comm'm 2023). This conversion ratio was multiplied by the estimated average pill weight (0.109 grams per pill) to determine the CDW for the fentanyl pills. 5 One gram of oxycodone is equivalent to 6.7 kg of CDW. U.S.S.G. §2D1.1 cmt. n.8(D). This conversion ratio was multiplied by the estimated average pill weight (0.38 grams per pill) to determine the CDW for the white oxycodone pills.

- 8 - justice based on Mello's failure to appear for trial, bringing his

total offense level to 34. Combined with a criminal history

category of II due to several prior juvenile adjudications

(including criminal mischief, criminal trespass, and violation of

probation), the Guidelines sentencing range ("GSR") for Count

Group One was 168 months to 210 months' imprisonment. Given that

Mello was subject to a mandatory 60-month consecutive sentence on

his § 924(c) count, the aggregate sentencing range was 228 months

to 270 months.

As relevant to this appeal, Mello challenged the PSR's

recommended Guidelines calculation on several fronts: (1) the drug

quantity calculation, (2) his entitlement to a downward departure

based on age, (3) the inclusion of his juvenile adjudications in

determining his criminal history score, and (4) the denial of a

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court

rejected each of these challenges.

First, rejecting Mello's argument that the drug quantity

calculation was erroneous because some of the 11,000 pills may not

have contained fentanyl, the court found that Mello "produced no

evidence that any of this is true in this case." In the absence

of any evidence to the contrary, the court noted, to "change the

probation office's drug assessment[, the court] would be required

to speculate as to the drug quantity." The court concluded that,

"based on the record before [it], there[] [was] no basis for [the

- 9 - court] to speculate." Relatedly, the court agreed with Mello that,

if he had held some of the pills for his personal use, the total

drug-quantity could be lower than the amount calculated in the

PSR. But the court stated that it did not find "that the defendant

was using either opiates or fentanyl from May 2020 through July

2020."

Second, the district court agreed with the government

that a downward departure due to Mello's age was not appropriate

because Mello's age was "not something that is presented in the

unusual degree or distinguishes [this case] from the typical case."

The court noted that it would "consider [Mello's] age in evaluating

what the appropriate sentence should be under [18 U.S.C.

§ ]3553(a)" but would not depart from the Guidelines.

Third, the court addressed Mello's arguments about the

scoring of his juvenile record, rejecting Mello's claim that the

absence of a right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings required

that such adjudications not be considered in fashioning an

appropriate sentence. The court also reasoned that, given the

seriousness of Mello's juvenile offenses, a criminal history

category of II did not overrepresent Mello's "past criminal history

and certainly d[id] not overrepresent his likelihood of

recidivism."

Finally, the court rejected Mello's argument that he was

entitled to a downward adjustment for acceptance of

- 10 - responsibility. The district court explained that an enhancement

for obstruction of justice was proper because Mello willingly

absconded prior to trial and, when such an enhancement is

appropriate, an acceptance-of-responsibility credit should only be

awarded in an "extraordinary case," of which this case was not

one.

The district court therefore adopted the GSR calculated

by the Probation Office. In selecting an appropriate sentence,

the court stated that it had considered the sentencing factors set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court noted that Mello had

suffered emotional trauma and abuse as a child, which led to him

"receiving mental health treatment and sustaining or incurring

mental health issues throughout the rest of his life." It

considered that Mello suffered from a variety of mental health

diagnoses and had substance abuse issues. But the court stated

that it must also consider the nature and circumstances of the

offense. In that regard, the court found it significant that Mello

continued to sell fentanyl even after he found out that the pills

that he had sold to A.K. led to her death, and that he was in

possession of a loaded firearm when arrested. The court further

explained that a significant sentence of imprisonment was

necessary as deterrence given that many in the local drug community

knew that a sale by Mello resulted in a death. Ultimately, the

court imposed a sentence of 115 months' imprisonment on Counts One

- 11 - and Two to be served concurrently with each other and six months

for the failure-to-appear conviction to be served consecutively.

Additionally, Mello was sentenced to a consecutive term of 60

months for the Count Three conviction. The total term of

imprisonment was 181 months, which was 47 months below the low-end

of the aggregate GSR determined by the court at sentencing.

This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Mello asserts that his sentence is both

procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We review preserved

claims of sentencing error for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Montero-Montero, 817 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2016). This is a

two-step process that begins with review of the claims of

procedural error. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

In doing so, "we afford de novo review to the sentencing court's

interpretation and application of the [S]entencing [G]uidelines,

assay the court's factfinding for clear error, and evaluate its

judgment calls for abuse of discretion." United States v.

Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 2015).

If no procedural error is found, "we then consider the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse of

discretion rubric." United States v. Melendez-Hiraldo, 82 F.4th

48, 53 (1st Cir. 2023). The guiding principle for our substantive

review is that "[t]here is no one reasonable sentence in any given

- 12 - case but, rather, a universe of reasonable sentencing outcomes."

United States v. Flores-Nater, 62 F.4th 652, 655 (1st Cir. 2023)

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Clogston, 662

F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 2011)). A sentence falls within this

universe if it bears "the hallmarks of a substantively reasonable

sentence: a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible

result." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United

States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145, 157 (1st Cir. 2020)).

A. Procedural Soundness

Mello lodges a litany of challenges to the procedural

reasonableness of his sentence. First, he argues that the district

court erroneously determined the quantity of drugs for which he

was responsible. Second, he maintains that consideration of his

juvenile offenses overstated his criminal history. Third, Mello

contends that the district court erred in including the

obstruction-of-justice enhancement and denying an

acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment. Finally, he disputes the

court's refusal to grant him a downward departure from the

guideline range based on his age, mental health conditions, and/or

overrepresentation of his criminal history score.6 We address each

challenge in turn.

6 Effective November 1, 2025, the U.S. Sentencing Commission revised the Guidelines to remove most departure provisions, including the ones at issue here. See Sentencing Guidelines for

- 13 - 1. Drug Quantity

The parade of procedural errors began, so Mello says,

with the district court's calculation of his base offense level.

Mello contends that the court's finding that the total CDW was

over 3,000 kg -- resulting in a base offense level of 32 -- was a

clear error given the lack of reliable evidence establishing

Mello's possession of 11,000 pills containing fentanyl and the

court's refusal to account for Mello's personal use of drugs.

Our review of Mello's challenge is constrained by the

substantial leeway afforded to district courts when calculating

drug quantity. The sentencing court need only determine drug

quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.

Cintrón-Echautegui, 604 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2010). Moreover, our

cases do not demand "mathematical precision . . . [but rather] a

'reasonable approximation of the weight of the controlled

substance(s) for which the defendant should be held responsible.'"

United States v. Dunston, 851 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting

United States v. Demers, 842 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2016)). We

review this factual finding for clear error and ask not "whether

United States Courts, 90 Fed. Reg. 19798, 19855-56 (May 9, 2025) ("In the years since [United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),] the frequency of departures has steadily declined with courts relying to a greater extent on variances in a manner consistent with the statutory requirements in [S]ection 3553(a)."). However, we still consider Mello's claim of error, as we apply the Guidelines in effect at the time of Mello's sentence. See United States v. Hernández, 964 F.3d 95, 101 (1st Cir. 2020).

- 14 - there is any view of the evidence that might undercut the district

court's finding," but rather "whether there is any evidence in the

record to support the finding." United States v. Rodriguez, 115

F.4th 24, 50 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Kinsella,

622 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir. 2010)). Consequently, we will not

disturb the district court's drug quantity calculation "unless, on

the whole of the record, we form a strong, unyielding belief that

a mistake has been made." United States v. Rodriguez, 731 F.3d

20, 28 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R.,

902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990)).

Guided by this framework, we first reject Mello's claim

that the evidence relied on by the district court lacked any

indicia of reliability. As we have often emphasized, the

sentencing court "enjoys broad discretion in determining whether

given evidence is sufficiently reliable for sentencing purposes."

Rodriguez, 731 F.3d at 31; see Cintrón-Echautegui, 604 F.3d at 6

("[T]he [sentencing] court may rely upon 'virtually any dependable

information' . . . [including] information contained in a

presentence report." (citations omitted) (quoting United States v.

Sklar, 920 F.2d 107, 110 (1st Cir. 1990))); U.S.S.G. §6A1.3(a).

Here, the court adopted the PSR's calculation that Mello possessed

11,000 purported oxycodone pills based on WhatsApp photographs,

FedEx receipts, and pill counts described in messages exchanged by

Mello and Chop. Besides his own say-so, Mello provides no

- 15 - explanation for why the district court should have concluded that

the WhatsApp messages and their attachments were unreliable. He

does not point to any evidence that contradicts the pill counts

described by him and Chop, nor does he present any argument to

suggest that either of them inaccurately counted the pills.

Without more, we see no reason to conclude that the district

court's reliability determination was unfounded. See United

States v. Bernier, 660 F.3d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting

reliability challenge to co-conspirator's testimony about drug

quantity because the district court was better suited to evaluate

credibility and "the defendant d[id] not identify any specific

contradiction or implausibility in [the] testimony").

This brings us to Mello's related contention that, even

if the messages constitute competent evidence, it is possible that

some of the 11,000 pills referenced in the messages did not contain

fentanyl. Mello hinges this argument on the fact that the majority

of the 11,000 pills attributed to him were never seized or tested.

But this purported lack of direct evidence does not lead to the

conclusion that the court's calculation was erroneous. "[I]n the

absence of direct evidence of the total quantity of drugs, the

court may rely on a reasonable estimate of the total quantity."

Rodriguez, 115 F.4th at 50. "In making such a reasoned estimate,

the court is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from

information contained in the sentencing record."

- 16 - Cintrón-Echautegui, 604 F.3d at 7. Often, this method of

calculation rests on testimony from co-conspirators describing the

average number of sales within a given time period and the number

of pills per sale. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 731 F.3d at 31

(explaining that sentencing court may calculate drug quantity

"based on a known or readily calculable number of transactions

involving clearly established or conservatively estimated

quantities" (quoting United States v. Marquez, 699 F.3d 556, 561

(1st Cir. 2012))); United States v. Platte, 577 F.3d 387, 390,

393-94 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming total drug estimate derived from

quantity average of drug purchases over a given period testified

to by witness). Here, however, the district court did not have to

wade through testimony describing the recollection of past sales

because Mello's own statements over WhatsApp presented the Court

with real-time pill counts and discussions of the distribution of

those pills. The messages included tracking receipts for two

separate shipments of "3k" sent from Chop to Mello in May, photos

of the "5k" pills that Mello received in June, and discussions

about the quantities of "perks" that Mello had bagged and sold.

Furthermore, the district court's conclusion that all of

the 11,000 pills contained fentanyl was reasonable. Mello

confirmed receipt of the first May 2020 shipment from Chop on

May 8, texted A.K. minutes later that he received the pills, and

then later that night, sold A.K. twelve blue pills that were later

- 17 - found to contain fentanyl. Similar blue pills were sent to Mello

in June, sold by Mello to the CI in July, and then seized from

Mello when he was subsequently arrested. Random samples from the

pills sold to the CI and from those seized at Mello's arrest all

revealed that the pills contained fentanyl. The logical inference

from this evidence is that the seized pills came from the

contemporaneous shipments that Mello and Chop discussed. It was

therefore not an error for the district court to use the average

drug weight per capsule of the tested pills to derive the total

drug weight for the 11,000 pills. See Cintrón-Echautegui, 604

F.3d at 7 (holding district court "plausibl[y] extrapolat[ed]"

calculation from "the average drug weight per capsule suggested by

the scientific evidence and the average drug sales per shift

suggested by the cooperating witness"); United States v. Hilton,

894 F.2d 485, 486, 488 (1st Cir. 1990) (concluding that court

reliably used drug weight of seized package to calculate total

drug weight of twenty-one similar packages observed in defendant's

possession but that were never seized or tested).

In aid of his attack on the circumstantial nature of the

evidence, Mello also points to cases in which we have approved of

a district court's conservative estimate when calculating a total

drug quantity. See, e.g., Dunston, 851 F.3d at 104 ("We have

consistently upheld a sentencing court's use of reasonable

estimates in assessing drug quantity, and that praxis has

- 18 - particular appeal when -- as in this case -- the sentencing court,

in fashioning its estimate, has taken a conservative approach."

(citations omitted)); Platte, 577 F.3d at 393 ("[I]mprecision in

the available evidence suggests that a sentencing court should

make conservative estimates based on the totality of the

evidence."). But Mello skates over a crucial distinction between

those cases and this one. The need for such caution in estimates

often arises where there is conflicting testimony between

co-conspirators. See Bernier, 660 F.3d at 547 ("Given the ranges

in the testimony concerning the frequency and volume of the drug

exchanges, the district court wisely . . . used throughout

conservative estimates of the number of interactions and low-end

estimates of volume."); Platte, 577 F.3d at 393 (explaining how

"the court was careful to pick and choose" among the testimony of

co-conspirator that relayed "differing estimates of drug

quantities" and "took the lower end of most of the estimates upon

which it relied"). But here, the district court was not provided

with conflicting estimates of the drug weight or quantity. To

accept Mello's argument, the court would have been required to

pick an arbitrary number of pills to exclude in attempt to lower

the CDW below 3,000 kg.

Moreover, the PSR's drug quantity methodology was

reasonable in light of the record. Evidence suggested that Mello

sold drugs prior to May, that he had sold other drugs, such as

- 19 - cocaine, and that he possessed several baggies of white powder at

the time of his second arrest. Despite these suggestions of a

larger universe of drugs in Mello's possession, the

11,000-fentanyl pill count included in the drug weight calculation

stemmed solely from the pill counts referenced in Mello's messages

between May and July -- the period in which there was direct

evidence that Mello had sold fentanyl. The pills sold to A.K. and

the CI, and the 417 seized at Mello's arrest were not separately

included in the drug quantity determination, thus avoiding any

potential double counting. Moreover, in estimating the weight of

the individual pills, the court used the average weight of the

pills seized, even though there was at least some evidence that

the weight of the pills could have been higher, given the higher

weight of the pill sold to the CI. We therefore cannot conclude

that the calculated drug quantity, supported by this evidence, was

clearly erroneous.7

Finally, Mello maintains that the district court erred

in failing to account for his personal use of drugs and to decrease

the total drug weight accordingly. See United States v. Pinkham,

7 At times in his briefing, Mello cites to his belief that the fentanyl pills were oxycodone in order to suggest that the drug weight calculation was incorrect. But accepting this belief hurts rather helps Mello's cause. According to U.S.S.G. §2D1.1. cmt. n.8(D), oxycodone has a significantly higher drug weight conversion rate than fentanyl. The assumption that all of the pills contained a fentanyl mixture, instead of being oxycodone, therefore resulted -- to Mello's benefit -- in a lower total CDW.

- 20 - 896 F.3d 133, 138 (1st Cir. 2018) (explaining how other circuits

have held "that drugs obtained for personal consumption should be

excluded from the drug-quantity calculus"). He asserts that there

is ample evidence that either the white oxycodone pills seized at

the time of his arrest or some portion of the fentanyl pills should

be attributed to his personal use. This assertion is not based on

any evidence that he ever used those pills specifically, but rather

on Mello's long history of drug abuse.

Considering first the fentanyl pills, we spy no error in

the court's finding that the pills were not for Mello's personal

use. As Mello acknowledges, his own admissions to the Probation

Office prior to sentencing supports the finding that he stopped

using opiates in March 2020. Additionally, the amount of fentanyl

in Mello's possession and the evidence that the pills were divided

into several packages suggest that the fentanyl pills were intended

for distribution instead of personal use. Cf. United States v.

Concepcion-Guliam, 62 F.4th 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2023) ("[T]he jury

reasonably could have inferred that the fentanyl -- given the

quantity found -- was not intended for personal use but, rather,

for distribution.").

As to the white oxycodone pills, Mello never raised the

possibility that these pills were for his personal use in his

objections to the PSR. Nor did he do so in his sentencing

- 21 - memorandum to the district court.8 As this argument is raised for

the first time on appeal, we review the inclusion of the oxycodone

pills in the drug quantity for plain error. See Pinkham, 896 F.3d

at 136-37. Mello's argument falters under this more onerous

standard. While the number of oxycodone pills may not have been

large enough by itself to suggest an intent to distribute, we

cannot conclude that the court plainly erred in finding a lack of

personal use when these pills were also packaged in a clear plastic

baggie and when Mello explicitly disavowed use of opiates during

the relevant time period.9

2. Criminal History

Mello also submits that his criminal history score was

overstated due to the district court's inclusion of his two prior

juvenile adjudications. It is undisputed that "[t]he Guidelines

specifically provide for certain juvenile adjudications to be

considered in evaluating the defendant's criminal history."

United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4, 31 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting

8 It was Mello's position below that he believed the white pills were not oxycodone at all, but rather ibuprofen. 9 Mello argues that the district court procedurally erred in finding that he acted with "willful blindness or conscious avoidance" of knowledge that the 11,000 pills contained fentanyl. But the district court did make such a finding. While the PSR listed several facts that led the Probation Office to conclude that Mello acted with willful blindness, this conclusion was never reiterated by the district court nor did it have any impact in the district court's ultimate drug quantity determination.

- 22 - United States v. Gonzalez-Arimont, 268 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2001)).

Indeed, Mello raises no argument that his juvenile offenses do not

fall within the realm of adjudications contemplated by the

Guidelines. Instead, he attempts to sketch a constitutional

challenge to the scoring of juvenile adjudications broadly.

Mello maintains that the district court should not have

assigned any criminal history points based on his juvenile

adjudications because the right to a jury trial was not available

in those proceedings. Citing our decision in United States v.

Unger, 915 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1990), Mello casts nonjury juvenile

adjudications as akin to uncounseled prior convictions, the latter

of which may not be included in criminal history scoring when

obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 761

(assessing constitutionality of prior uncounseled juvenile

adjudications for purposes of criminal history scoring); see also

Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967) (explaining that

conviction obtained in violation of Sixth Amendment right to

counsel may not be used "either to support guilt or enhance

punishment for another offense"); U.S.S.G. §4A1.2 cmt. n.6. But

Mello's juvenile adjudications do not fit the mold of a

"constitutionally infirm" conviction that may not weigh on the

sentence of a later offense. See Unger, 915 F.2d at 761. To

establish the ineligibility of a prior conviction at sentencing,

a defendant first must demonstrate "that he was entitled" to the

- 23 - relevant constitutional protection in the prior conviction. Id.

at 761 (explaining that the defendant must show, among other

things, "that he was entitled to representation at the sentencing

phase of the juvenile adjudication" and that he did not waive that

right); see also United States v. Ponzo, 853 F.3d 558, 588 (1st

Cir. 2017) (explaining that when the government establishes the

existence of a prior conviction, the defendant must then "show

that the earlier conviction was constitutionally infirm" (quoting

United States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 93 (1st Cir. 2004))). Mello

cannot make this showing here because the absence of a jury in a

juvenile proceeding is not a constitutional infirmity. There is

no constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings.

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[J]uveniles are not

constitutionally entitled to trial by jury in delinquency

adjudications." (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528

(1971))). We therefore do not disturb the district court's scoring

of Mello's juvenile adjudications in accordance with U.S.S.G.

§4A1.2(d)(2).10

10 To the extent that Mello asserts that a defendant's due process rights are violated by scoring any conviction that lacked a jury, even when such procedure was not required in the prior proceeding, we decline to address that issue. It is undeveloped and therefore waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).

- 24 - 3. Obstruction of Justice and Acceptance of Responsibility

Next, Mello presents two interrelated claims of error

with respect to the district court's Guidelines calculation: the

court's denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility downward

adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3E1.1, and its imposition of an

obstruction-of-justice enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §3C1.1.

We find no fault with either decision by the district court.

We begin with Mello's challenge to the

obstruction-of-justice enhancement, which -- as it was unpreserved

below -- we review for plain error. See United States v.

Soto-Sanchez, 138 F.4th 81, 92 (1st Cir. 2025) (explaining that

unpreserved challenge to obstruction-of-justice enhancement must

be reviewed for plain error). We note at the outset that Mello

did not address the four-part plain error standard in his opening

brief. This failure often constitutes a waiver. See United States

v. Rathbun, 98 F.4th 40, 58 (1st Cir. 2024). But even if Mello

had addressed our standard of review, his claim would still fail.

A court may apply a two-level enhancement to a

defendant's offense level:

[i]f (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct.

- 25 - U.S.S.G. §3C1.1. An example of conduct warranting such an

enhancement includes "willfully failing to appear, as ordered, for

a judicial proceeding." Id. §3C1.1. cmt. n.4(E). Mello does not

dispute that his failure to appear was sufficient to support the

application of the obstruction enhancement. Rather, he contends

that the obstruction-of-justice enhancement should not have been

applied because he was already subject to a consecutive sentence

based on his § 3146(a)(1) conviction for failing to appear. To

enforce both the enhancement and the consecutive sentence would

punish him twice for the same conduct, Mello argues. To support

this claim, he analogizes to the weapon enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§2D1.1(b)(1), which cannot be imposed when a defendant is otherwise

convicted for possession of firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c), see U.S.S.G. §2K2.4 cmt. n.4. Mello contends that the

sentence in his case is similarly improper.

This argument misunderstands the operation of the

applicable Guidelines. When a defendant is convicted of both a

failure-to-appear and a substantive offense (with respect to which

the defendant failed to appear), the failure-to-appear count and

the substantive count(s) are grouped together under U.S.S.G.

§3D1.2(c). See U.S.S.G. §§2J1.6 cmt. n.3, 3C1.1. cmt. n.8. The

offense level for the group "will be the offense level for the

underlying offense increased by the 2-level adjustment specified

by [U.S.S.G. §3C1.1], or the offense level for the obstruction

- 26 - offense, whichever is higher." Id. §3C1.1. cmt. n.8; see id.

§2J1.6 cmt. n.3. The court then determines the total punishment

for the grouped offenses and allocates that total sentence among

the counts of conviction. See id. §2J1.6 cmt. n.3.

This formula is the exact procedure that was implemented

by the PSR and adopted by the district court in this case. Here,

the offense level for the failure-to-appear count, when adjusted

to account for the underlying drug offenses, was calculated by the

court to be 15. As this offense level is lower than the offense

level for either of the drug counts when increased by the

obstruction enhancement -- an offense level of 34 -- the offense

level for the grouped counts was calculated by using the base

offense level for one of the drug counts. Combined with a criminal

history category of II, the group GSR was 168 months to 210 months.

This range is the same GSR that Mello would have been subject to

if he had not been formally charged with violating § 3146(a)(1)

but still failed to appear for trial. The only impact that the

§ 3146(a)(1) count had on Mello's final sentence is that the

district court was required to apportion, at least nominally, the

sentence of imprisonment between the grouped counts.

The differential treatment accorded to this scenario and

those involving § 924(c) convictions demonstrates why the analogy

proposed by Mello is inapt. Unlike § 3146 convictions -- which

are grouped with the underlying offense -- § 924(c) convictions

- 27 - are expressly excluded from application of §§3D1.2-3D.5 because

§ 924(c) both specifies a mandatory minimum and requires a

consecutive sentence. See U.S.S.G. §3D1.1. cmt. n.2. Since a

§ 924(c) conviction is not subject to the grouping rules described

above, the Guidelines prohibit application of the §2D1.2 weapon

enhancement to avoid double punishment. See id. §2K2.4 cmt. n.4.

Conversely, a § 3146 conviction does not carry a mandatory minimum,

and so any double punishment issue that might arise for § 924(c)

convictions in the absence of the instruction expressed in §2K2.4

cmt. n.4 is simply not present in this case. It was therefore not

plainly erroneous for the district court to calculate Mello's GSR

exactly as the Guidelines appear to envision.

Mello's preserved objection to the district court's

denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility credit fares no better.

Under the Guidelines, the district court may decrease the

defendant's offense level by two levels "[i]f the defendant clearly

demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense."

U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(a). The defendant has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that this downward adjustment is

warranted. United States v. McCarthy, 32 F.4th 59, 65 (1st Cir.

2022). We review the district court's finding of a lack of

acceptance for clear error, "accord[ing] substantial deference to

its determination that acceptance of responsibility has not been

shown." United States v. Langston, 110 F.4th 408, 425 (1st Cir.

- 28 - 2024) (quoting McCarthy, 32 F.4th at 63); see U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 cmt.

n.5.

Ordinarily, conduct justifying an

obstruction-of-justice enhancement "indicates that the defendant

has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct."

U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 cmt. n.4. There may be, however, "extraordinary

cases" where application of both adjustments is appropriate. Id.;

see United States v. Maguire, 752 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2014)

(describing circumstances where both a downward adjustment under

§3E1.1 and an enhancement for obstruction of justice are

appropriate as "hen's-teeth rare"). Mello points to several

factors that he claims make his one such a case: his history of

having been abused as a child, his mental health struggles, and

his pre-trial rehabilitative efforts while residing in a substance

use treatment facility for three years prior to his failure to

appear.11 But these facts, taken individually or together, fail

to raise to the level of extraordinary circumstances.

Mello also posits that his case is extraordinary because 11

the court's denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment acted as additional punishment for the same conduct that resulted in the obstruction enhancement and a consecutive sentence of six months for his § 3146 conviction. This argument is merely a derivative of the same one addressed and rejected above. Furthermore, even when a defendant pleads guilty, "a defendant has no automatic entitlement to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility." United States v. Hunter, 653 F. App'x 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2016) (unpublished table opinion). It follows that a defendant's failure to receive such credit therefore does not act

- 29 - The district court found that Mello's obstructive

conduct warranted the §3C1.1. enhancement and that Mello had not

shown that his case was an extraordinary one justifying the

acceptance adjustment. At bottom, Mello laments that the district

court overvalued the evidence of his obstructive conduct and

undervalued the facts supporting his acceptance of responsibility.

But the balancing of factors demonstrating the defendant's

contrition (or lack thereof) is an inquiry "uniquely within the

discretion of the sentencing court." McCarthy, 32 F.4th at 65.

While his past trauma and pre-trial rehabilitative efforts may be

relevant to the district court's analysis, see U.S.S.G. §3E1.1

cmt. n.1., these facts are counterbalanced by the heavy weight of

Mello's subsequent failure to appear for trial and avoidance of

arrest, see Maguire, 752 F.3d at 6 (concluding that defendant's

assistance to law enforcement, "his guilty plea, his compliance

with the terms of his pretrial release, and his avowals of

contrition" were insufficient to "overcome the secondary effect of

the warrantable finding that he had obstructed justice"); cf.

Langston, 110 F.4th at 425 ("Under our precedent, 'a defendant's

failure to comply with conditions of a bond [can] be highly

relevant to assessing the sincerity of the defendant's

as additional punishment. See United States v. Rosas, 615 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010).

- 30 - contrition.'" (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

McLaughlin, 378 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2004))).

Notably, Mello does not point to any evidence from after

his failure to appear for trial and subsequent arrest that shows

his sincere remorse. That he ultimately pleaded guilty to all

counts does not, as Mello implies, require the downward adjustment,

since a defendant who enters a plea agreement is not entitled to

the §3E1.1 adjustment as a right. U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 cmt. n.3; see

United States v. D'Angelo, 802 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir. 2015).

While a guilty plea is one factor demonstrating acceptance of

responsibility, the sentencing court may also consider "the

timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the

acceptance of responsibility." U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 cmt. n.1(H). It

is therefore significant that Mello did not plead guilty until

after he failed to appear and was once again arrested. See id.

Under these circumstances, the district court did not clearly err

in denying a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility

in light of Mello's obstructive conduct. See United States v.

Stile, 845 F.3d 425, 432 (1st Cir. 2017) (affirming denial of

acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, even though defendant had

pleaded guilty, because defendant "obstructed the government's

efforts to prosecute him").

- 31 - 4. Departures

Mello asserts that, notwithstanding his below-Guidelines

sentence, the district court erred in refusing to also grant a

downward departure based on his youth, see U.S.S.G. §5H1.1, or the

overrepresentation of his criminal history category given the

scoring of his juvenile adjudications, see id. §4A1.3.12 He argues

that scientific research shows that the regions of the brain

governing impulse control and judgment are not fully formed until

the early to mid-twenties and that such development may be further

stunted by neglect and child abuse. Therefore, "youths are less

culpable," and Mello, given that he was 22 at the time of the

instant offense and that his criminal history consists of only

juvenile offenses, should have been entitled to leniency in the

form of a downward departure.

Mello does not specify whether he raises this issue as

a challenge to the procedural or substantive reasonableness of his

sentence. But regardless of "whether the issue is framed as

substantive or procedural, we review the district court's

'discretionary refusal to depart' from the GSR for

12Mello also argues that a departure was warranted based on his mental health struggles pursuant to U.S.S.G. §5H1.3. This argument, however, was never raised below; nor does Mello address the plain error standard of review on appeal. As such, we do not address this ground for departure. Soto-Sanchez, 138 F.4th at 92-93 (holding unpreserved sentencing argument was waived given defendant's failure to address plain error standard on appeal).

- 32 - 'reasonableness.'"13 United States v. Herman, 848 F.3d 55, 58 (1st

Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Anonymous Defendant, 629 F.3d

68, 74 (1st Cir. 2010)). We address each ground for departure in

turn.

At the time Mello was sentenced in September 2024, the

Guidelines specified that "[a]ge (including youth) may be relevant

in determining whether a departure is warranted, if considerations

based on age, individually or in combination with other offender

characteristics, are present to an unusual degree and distinguish

the case from the typical cases covered by the [G]uidelines."

U.S.S.G. §5H1.1 (U.S. Sent'g Comm'm 2023). The district court

acknowledged this basis for a departure, explicitly referencing

both Mello's age at the time of the offenses and studies concerning

male brain development. The court determined, however, that

Mello's age did not "distinguish[] this case from the typical case"

while noting that he was in his early twenties at the commission

13Citing United States v. Kornegay, 410 F.3d 89, 98 (1st Cir. 2005), the government asserts that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's discretionary denial of a departure. While decided after Booker, our decision in Kornegay drew this judge-made jurisdictional doctrine from our pre-Booker cases. See Kornegay, 410 F.3d at 98 (citing United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991)). We have since clarified that limiting appellate jurisdiction to review discretionary departure decisions makes little sense in the advisory Guidelines system. United States v. Anonymous Defendant, 629 F.3d 68, 73-74 (1st Cir. 2017). Accordingly, essentially "all sentences imposed under the advisory guidelines . . . are open to reasonableness review, including those that entail either a discretionary refusal to depart or a departure whose extent is contested." Id. at 74.

- 33 - of the underlying offenses. There was no error. Mello was

seventeen when he committed his juvenile offenses, twenty-two when

he began drug trafficking, and twenty-six when he failed to appear

for trial. Mello was young, but not so young that the sentencing

court had to find that this case fell outside the realm of the

typical case.

Mello's argument in favor of a departure based on age

stumbles over another hurdle: the court, while denying the

departure, did consider Mello's age to be relevant to his sentence

under § 3553(a). Recent changes to the Guidelines, although they

do not control this case, support the reasonableness of the court's

decision to consider age as grounds for a variance but not also

for a departure. The Guidelines were revised to remove most formal

grounds for departure, including U.S.S.G. §5H1.1. See supra

note 6. In deleting these formal departure provisions, the

Sentencing Commission noted that their removal would likely be

"outcome neutral" as "judges who would have relied upon facts

previously identified as a basis for a departure will continue to

have the authority to rely upon such facts, or any other relevant

factors, to impose a sentence outside of the applicable [G]uideline

range as a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." Sentencing

Guidelines for United States Courts, 90 Fed. Reg. 19798, 19856

(May 9, 2025). We cannot say, in light of these amendments, that

it was unreasonable for the court to deny the departure for age

- 34 - and exclusively consider Mello's age as a ground for a variance.

As "[w]e have observed[,] . . . 'a departure is just a variance by

another name.'" United States v. Fletcher, 56 F.4th 179, 187 (1st

Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Santini-Santiago, 846 F.3d

487, 490 (1st Cir. 2017)).

The district court's denial of a departure based on

Mello's criminal history was also reasonable. Under §4A1.3(b)(1),

"[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal

history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of

the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the

defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be

warranted." U.S.S.G. §4A1.3(b)(1). The district court found that

such over-representation was not present here. The court reviewed

Mello's juvenile offenses, noting his vandalism of a car, his

violation of probation, his charges of burglary and criminal

trespass, and the length of his subsequent periods of detention.

It was significant to the court that Mello began drug trafficking

less than four years after he had been discharged from juvenile

detention. Considering that his prior detentions did not deter

his commission of the instant offenses, the court found that a

departure based on criminal history was not warranted. Such a

reasoned explanation for the denial of a departure carries "no

hint of unreasonableness." Maguire, 752 F.3d at 7.

- 35 - B. Substantive Reasonableness

We turn finally to Mello's claim that the 115-month

sentence of imprisonment for his drug offenses was substantively

unreasonable. Acknowledging that the district court considered

his personal characteristics when varying downward from the GSR,

Mello disputes the extent of that variance and insists that the

court undervalued his background and age. We disagree.

"[T]hat [a] sentencing court chose not to attach to

certain of the mitigating factors the significance that the

[defendant] thinks they deserved does not make the sentence

unreasonable." United States v. Sansone, 90 F.4th 1, 10 (1st Cir.

2024) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting

Clogston, 662 F.3d at 593). Given that "the weighting of [the

section 3553(a)] factors is largely within the [district] court's

informed discretion," Clogston, 662 F.3d at 593, "[w]e are bound

to 'accord significant deference'" to the district court's

"informed determination that the [S]ection 3553(a) factors justify

the sentence imposed," United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d

1, 21 (1st Cir. 2020). Moreover, Mello "faces an even steeper

climb than most defendants . . . because '[i]t is a rare

below-the-range sentence that will prove vulnerable to a

defendant's claim of substantive unreasonableness.'" Herman, 848

F.3d at 58-59 (second alteration in original) (quoting United

States v. King, 741 F.3d 305, 310 (1st Cir. 2014)).

- 36 - The district court explained its reasoning for imposing

the sentence that it did and explicitly stated that it had

considered the § 3553(a) factors. The court addressed Mello's

"personal history and characteristics," noting that Mello had

suffered emotional trauma and abuse as a child, had been diagnosed

with a variety of mental health conditions, and has substance abuse

issues. The court also discussed in detail Mello's upbringing,

his young age at the time of the offense, his lack of education,

his employment history, and his decision to plead guilty. These

facts, the court explained, supported a downward variance. The

district court also reasoned, however, that a lengthy sentence was

appropriate given the seriousness of the offenses, Mello's choice

to continue to sell drugs after A.K.'s death, his failure to appear

for trial, the quantity of drugs for which Mello was accountable,

the deterrent effect on both Mello and others that a substantial

sentence would have, and the victim impact statement from A.K.'s

husband. In discussing and balancing these numerous mitigating

and aggravating factors, the court adequately explained its

sentencing rationale. See United States v. De Jesús-Torres, 64

F.4th 33, 42 (1st Cir. 2023) (finding sentence substantively

reasonable where court weighed defendant's "age, mental health

condition, mental disability, first time offender status, and his

allocution" against the serious nature of his crime); United States

v. Pacheco-Martinez, 791 F.3d 171, 180 (1st Cir. 2015) (affirming

- 37 - sentence as reasonable where district court "explicitly considered

[defendant's] age" but also "considered other relevant factors"

that cut against the mitigating factor of his age).

Mello's sentence is also defensible. In arguing that an

even lower sentence was warranted, he emphasizes that 115 months

for the drug charges alone is almost double the length of sentences

imposed for drug trafficking offenses in 2023.14 However, a claim

of sentencing disparity requires comparison of "apples to apples."

United States v. Reyes-Santiago, 804 F.3d 453, 467 (1st Cir. 2015).

"And, if 'material differences between the defendant and the

proposed comparator suffice to explain the divergence,' a

sentencing disparity claim is unlikely to prevail." United States

v. Rosario, 143 F.4th 41, 47 (quoting Demers, 842 F.3d at 15). We

agree with the government that Mello has failed to provide such a

like-kind comparator. The U.S. Sentencing Commission data to which

14That the court did not explicitly reference these national sentencing statistics is of little moment in light of the court's statement that it considered all of the § 3553(a) factors and thus endeavored to reach a sentence that avoided unwarranted sentencing disparities. See Clogston, 662 F.3d at 592 ("Even though the district court did not specifically mention disparity, it stated that it had considered all of the [S]ection 3553(a) factors. Such a statement 'is entitled to some weight.'" (quoting United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2010))). The failure to mention all of Mello's arguments merely suggests that "they were unconvincing, not ignored." United States v. Ortiz-Pérez, 30 F.4th 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d at 152); see also Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d at 19 (explaining that "a sentencing court is under no obligation . . . to address every argument that a defendant advances in support of his preferred sentence").

- 38 - Mello points does not include any of the information about the

defendants and the crimes that we have deemed relevant to

determining if a comparator is similarly situated, such as the

criminal histories of the defendants, the nature of the offenses,

or the amounts of drugs involved. See id. at 48-49 (concluding

that the defendant failed to provide "necessary information to

determine whether he and his co-defendants were identically

situated," as the defendant failed to provide "his proposed

comparators' criminal histories, the specific circumstances of

their plea agreements, or the particularities of their crime-spree

conduct"). Without this context, we cannot say that Mello's higher

sentence is "unwarranted." See United States v. Jiménez, 946 F.3d

8, 16 (1st Cir. 2019) (concluding that defendant "can point to no

relevant disparity that might render her sentence substantively

unreasonable" because the defendant "has not offered evidence that

would show that her circumstances are sufficiently similar to the

national median fraud defendant to create a meaningful point of

comparison"); United States v. Ayala-Landor, 994 F.3d 73, 77 (1st

Cir. 2021) (rejecting defendant's sentencing disparity argument

because, even though defendant's sentence was higher than national

sentence statistics, that "does not mean that a modest variance

was 'unwarranted' in [the defendant's] case, given his criminal

history and characteristics").

- 39 - The district court, in varying downward from the

Guidelines, unquestionably placed significant weight on Mello's

personal characteristics. That the court did not vary to the

extent that Mello believes he deserves does not make the sentence

unreasonable. The court reasonably balanced Mello's youth and

traumatic childhood with, inter alia, the high volume of drugs

Mello trafficked and the likelihood that he would recidivate. In

short, we hold that Mello's sentence both rests on a plausible

sentencing rationale and reflects a defensible result.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons described above, Mello's sentence is

affirmed.

- 40 -