United States v. Mejia

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 21, 2024
• Docket: 24-664
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-664 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cr-10125-RBM-1 v. MEMORANDUM*

JOSE LUIS MEJIA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Ruth Bermudez Montenegro, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 11, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Jose Luis Mejia appeals his sentence for violating a condition of supervised

release. The district court held a single sentencing hearing during which it

sentenced Mejia to 18 months for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1324, plus a consecutive

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). ten-month term for violating a condition of his supervised release under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e). Mejia contends that the district court procedurally erred in imposing the

second sentence by (1) providing an inadequate explanation of the sentence and (2)

denying him his right to allocution.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Where, as here, a defendant

raises an objection to sentencing for the first time on appeal, “we apply plain error

review.” United States v. Hammons, 558 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009). We

have historically reviewed denials of the right to allocution for harmless error

regardless of whether the defendant objected at sentencing. See United States v.

Gunning, 401 F.3d 1145, 1147, 1149 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Daniels,

760 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2014). Finding no error, we affirm.

1. “The district court’s duty to consider the § 3553(a) factors necessarily

entails a duty to provide a sufficient explanation of the sentencing decision to

permit meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003,

1009 (9th Cir. 2013). This explanation will ideally “come from the bench, but

adequate explanation in some cases may also be inferred from the PSR or the

record as a whole.” United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en

banc).

Consideration of the entire record allows us to infer the district court’s

rationale. Mejia’s arguments were straightforward, and the district court imposed a

2 24-664 sentence within the Guidelines range for the violation of supervised release. See

U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. B, introductory cmt. (U.S. Sent’g

Comm’n 2023); id. § 7B1.4, p.s. The district court reviewed the presentence report

and sentencing memoranda from the parties, listened to argument, and directly

rejected at least one of Mejia’s arguments. Although the court’s oral explanation

was brief, it was adequate because the court’s reasoning was expressed or implied

elsewhere in the record.

2. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure “32.1(b)(2)(E) requires a court to

address a supervised releasee personally to ask if he wants to speak before the

court imposes a post-revocation sentence.” Daniels, 760 F.3d at 924. The district

court invited Meija to speak before imposing the sentence for violating 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324, and he did so minutes before the court turned to the sentence for the

supervised release violation. Under these circumstances, Mejia’s right to

allocution was not violated because he had an “opportunity to make a statement

and present any information in mitigation” before the revocation sentence was

imposed. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-664