United States v. Meadows

2 Ct. Cust. 143, 1911 WL 19828, 1911 CCPA LEXIS 142
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 29, 1911
DocketNo. 598
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 2 Ct. Cust. 143 (United States v. Meadows) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Meadows, 2 Ct. Cust. 143, 1911 WL 19828, 1911 CCPA LEXIS 142 (ccpa 1911).

Opinion

■Barber, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The importation in this case consists of slippers composed of «ott'on and leather. They were assessed for duty at the rate of 50 per cent ad valorem under the provision for articles of wearing apparel of which cotton is the component material of chief value in paragraph 324 of the tariff act of August 5, 1909.

The appellees claim duty should have been taken at the rate of 10 per-cent ad valorem under paragraph 450 of the same act as shoes in chief value of leather made from hides of cattle of the bovine species.

The United States does not claim that the provisions of paragraph 450 are inapplicable if it be held that paragraph 324 does not apply, and it is therefore only necessary to insert here paragraph 324 and that part of paragraph 481 which defines the words “com-[144]*144poneut material of chief value” found in paragraph 324. They are as follows:

324. Clothing, ready-made, and articles of wearing apparel of every description, composed of cotton or other vegetable fiber, or of which cotton or other vegetable fiber is the component material of chief value, made up or manufactured, wholly or in part, by the tailor, seamstress, or manufacturer, and not otherwise provided for in this section, fifty per centum ad valorem.
481.* * * And the words “component material of chief value,” wherever used in this section, shall be held to mean that component material which shall exceed in value any other single component material of the article; and the value of each component material shall be determined by the ascertained value of such material in its condition as found in the article. ■ * * *

The only question in the case is whether the cotton or the leather of which these slippers are made is the component material of. chief value.

The facts are undisputed and are as follows: The soles and heels of the slippers are made chiefly of leather from the hides of cattle of the bovine species, while the uppers are made of cotton. In the process of making the slippers the cotton cloth, which afterwards forms the uppers, is first cut to shape ready to be put into the slipper. It is conceded that the cost of this operation should be applied to the cotton. The leather composing the sole and heel undergoes cutting to shape and certain other minor operations to bring it into condition ready to be put into the slipper, and it is conceded that the cost of these operations should be applied to the leather. After the pieces of cloth have been cut to shape to form the uppers and before being united to the soles they are sewed together with cotton thread. To do this sewing, including the thread used therefor, costs 9 pence per dozen pairs, which, if added to the cost of the cotton composing the uppers, renders the cotton the component material of chief value. If it is not so added, the leather is the component material of chief value.

Restated, and including the respective items of cost, the essential facts are as follows: The conceded value of the cotton in the slippers is 3 shillings and 11$ pence per dozen pairs; the conceded value of the leather is 4 shillings and 7 pence pei^dozen pairs. If the 9 pence, which is the cost of the thread and work necessary to sew the uppers together, be considered as a part of the value of the cotton, then the cotton is the component material of chief value; otherwise not. The real question, therefore, is whether the 9 pence per dozen pairs is a part of the value of the cotton in its condition as found in the slippers or whether it is a part of the expense of manufacturing the slippers and so not be considered in determining the value of the cotton therein.

It is agreed that the cost of attaching the heel and s'ole to the upper is an expense incident to the manufacture of the slippers and applies to both the cotton and the leather. It is therefore to be disregarded in arriving at the value of the respective component materials of the slippers.

[145]*145It appears from the record that upon the first consideration of this case the Board of General Appraisers unanimously sustained the protest and reversed the action of the collector. Thereafter a rehearing was granted upon the request of the United States, whereupon a majority of the board adhered to its previous decision, while a minority favored sustaining the collector’s action. Able and exhaustive opinions, presenting fully the respective views of the majority and minority members of the board, are contained in the record.

The question involved is not entirely free from difficulty and is said to be of considerable importance in customs practice.

Both sides rely upon the case of Seeberger v. Hardy (150 U. S., 420) as authority, and we proceed to its consideration. The articles there involved were opera glasses composed of glass lenses in a metal, frame with a covering of shell, and the question arose whether the component material of chief value was metal, shell, or glass, and therefore under which of the applicable paragraphs of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, they should be assessed for duty. The question before the Supreme Court involved the construction by it of the following clause, which by the provisions of the act of 1883 was made a part of Revised Statutes, section 2499:

Sec. 2499. * * * And on all articles manufactured from two or more materials the duty shall be assessed at the highest rates at which the component material of chief value may be chargeable. If two or more rates of duty should be applicable to any imported article, it shall be classified for duty under the highest of. such rates. •* * *

The court below had charged the jury that to determine the question as to which of these different materials — manufactures of metal, manufactures of shell, or manufactures of glass — was the component material of chief value, “they must ascertain what were their values at the time they were in such condition that nothing remained to be done upon, them except putting them together to make the perfected glasses,” and the correctness of this instruction was reviewed by the Supreme Court. We quote from the opinion in that case sufficiently to show the facts and the holding of the court:

These cases turn upon the question of whether in estimating the value.of the component materials of which a certain manufactured article is made, the value of the materials shall be taken in the raw and unmanufactured condition in which the manufacturer receives them, and before their respective values have been enhanced by work expended upon them, or in the condition that nothing remains to be done upon them by the manufacturer except putting them together to make the completed glass. * * * The manufacturer bought the metal in the shape of ingots, the shell in the natural form of mother-of-pearl, and the glasses in the rough state in which they leave the cast. In neither case did the defendant introduce any testimony. Nothing, therefore, appears in the record as to the value of the materials when purchased appropriate to each opera glass. It is evident that the question involved is one of considerable importance, as in some articles, the raw material is the main cost, and in others, the labor. * * * We think * * * that the value of the [146]*146materials should be taken at the time they are put together to form the completed glass. There are grave difficulties in making the estimation at any other time.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Ct. Cust. 143, 1911 WL 19828, 1911 CCPA LEXIS 142, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-meadows-ccpa-1911.