United States v. McVeigh

918 F. Supp. 1467, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1821, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, 1996 WL 91139
District Court, W.D. Oklahoma·Decided February 20, 1996·No. CR-95-110 MH·Published·Cited by 39 cases

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

MATSCH, Chief Judge. *

This criminal proceéding arises from an explosion in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on April 19, 1995, at 9:02 a.m. The measurable effects of that event include the deaths of 168 identified men, women and children, injuries to hundreds of other people, the complete destruction of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building and collateral damage to other buildings, including the United States Courthouse. A damage assessment prepared for the Office of State Finance, The State of Oklahoma, estimated the total incident cost at $651,594,000. The immeasurable effects on the hearts and minds of the people of Oklahoma from the blast and its consequences were thoroughly explored in the hearing on the defendants’ motions for a change of venue under Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in Oklahoma City on January 30 through February 2,1996.

Through the grand jury indictment filed in this district on August 10, 1995, the government has charged that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols conspired with others unknown, beginning in September 1994, to use a “truck bomb” to damage the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building and to kill and injure the people in it and that these two defendants caused the explosion on April 19, 1995. Other counts charge these defendants, jointly, with the use of a bomb as a weapon of mass destruction, resulting in federal property damage and death and personal injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332a and 2(a) & (b); with the intentional, willful and malicious damage and destruction of government property and death and injury to persons by means of an explosive bomb placed in a truck in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f) and 2(a) & (b) and with first degree murder of eight federal law enforcement officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1111 and 2(a) & (b) and 28 C.F.R. § 64.2(h). The prosecution has filed notices of intention to seek the penalty of death as to both defendants on all counts.

Article III of the United States Constitution provides that criminal trials shall be held in the state where such crimes have been committed. The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution provides as follows:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed—

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires fundamental fairness in the prosecution of federal crimes. The right to an impartial jury in the Sixth Amendment and the fundamental fairness requirement of the Due Process clause will override the place of trial provisions in both Article III and the Sixth Amendment in extraordinary eases. That is the foundation for Fed. R.Crim P. 21(a) providing for a change of venue to protect from prejudice. The rule reads as follows:

The court upon motion of' the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to that defendant to another district whether or not such district is specified in the defendant’s motion if the court is satisfied that there exists in the district where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place fixed by law for holding court in that district.

The Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, published with this rule in 1944, make clear that a change of venue can be granted *1470 only on the motion of a defendant since the constitutional requirement for trial in the state and district where the offense was committed under Article III and Amendment VI is a right of the defendant. The filing of the motion waives that right.

The initial question is whether the evidence now before the court shows that there is so great a prejudice against these defendants in the Western District of Oklahoma that they cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial at any place fixed by law for holding court in this district.

Oklahoma City is the principal place for holding court. Judge Alley found that obtaining an impartial jury in Oklahoma City would be “chancy.” He designated Lawton, Oklahoma as the place for this trial under the authority of Fed.R.Crim.P. 18 requiring that due regard be given to the convenience of the defendants and the witnesses. The defendants filed objections to that designation. The evidence presented at the hearing on the defendants’ Rule 21(a) motion demonstrates that a trial of these charges in Lawton is not practicable. The facilities there are inade- . quate. It was stipulated that renovations to the courthouse and related facilities would cost at least $1 million dollars. The time needed for construction would delay scheduling the trial.

There is no disagreement among the parties with Judge Alley’s concern about a trial in Oklahoma City. The effects of the explosion on that community are so profound and pervasive that no detailed discussion of the evidence is necessary. The motions for change of venue are granted as to the Western District of Oklahoma.

The selection of an alternative venue is within the discretion of the court. The government has suggested transfer to the Northern District of Oklahoma with trial at the restored historic courthouse in Tulsa. Although the defendants argue that they do not have to prove prejudice in that district, the court has considered Tulsa as the presumptive transferee district because of the language of Article III, Sec. 2, cl. 3, and the expressed wishes of many of the victims as revealed in the evidence and the arguments of government counsel.

Although no one has suggested a trial in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, to avoid further controversy the focus of this inquiry is enlarged to consider whether there is so great a prejudice against these defendants in the State of Oklahoma that they cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial anywhere in the state.

Ordinarily, the effects of pre-trial publicity on the pool from which jurors are drawn is determined by a careful and searching voir dire examination. That is the preferred practice in this judicial circuit. United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.

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United States v. McVeigh, 918 F. Supp. 1467, 24 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1821, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1730, 1996 WL 91139 (W.D. Okla. 1996).

918 F. Supp. 1467 (United States v. McVeigh) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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