United States v. McGovern

1 F. Supp. 568, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1783
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided June 3, 1932·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

WOOLSEY, District Judge.

I adjudge Patrick McGovern in contempt.

I. I have carefully read, twice, in full, the whole transcript of all the evidence given by Mr. McGovern which was embodied in the presentment before me. It is all relied on by the United States, and, in addition, the United States has filed certain specifications which constitute a kind of bill of particulars which are hereby referred to, and by such reference embodied in this opinion.1

II. The question of self-incrimination is not involved here in any way owing to the letter of May 9, 1932, in which the United States has released the witness from all liability, both civil and criminal, in respeet of his income taxes during the period covered by the inquiry herein.

We, therefore, are not concerned with the defendant’s constitutional rights not to be forced to incriminate himself, but only with the question of his attitude toward the grand jury.

III. I think it is proper to say that the untruthfulness of many of Mr. McGovern’s answers is a necessary inference from the evidence put before me in this presentment, and is not merely a possible inference, as the Court of Appeals found of Dr. Doyle’s an[569]*569swers in People ex rel. Falk v. Sheriff of New York County, 258 N. Y. 437, at page 439, 180 N. E. 110.

In my opinion, the evidence here meets all the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt necessary to justify punishment for criminal contempt, under the principles laid down in Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 45 S. Ct. 18, 69 L. Ed. 162, 35 A. L. R. 451, and Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 444, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874, in that the answers of the witness are shown to have been to a large extent untrue and in that he was evasive and was obstructing the investigation by the! grand jury as far as it lay in his power to do so. This is obvious on most of the 202 pages of his evidence which have been submitted to me.

The record shows that Mr. McGovern was duly sworn. This means that he was sworn before his God to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. His testimony is a sad commentary on the slight effect which this oath had on him. That he has never told the whole truth to the extent that inquiry in regard to it was made of him is clear on the face of his testimony, and he himself has admitted at many places in the evidence that earlier answers given by him were not true.

IV. The grand jury, not only historically but also in its present-day functioning, is necessarily an inquisitorial body, and may, if it wish, institute an investigation based on its suspicion that crimes have been committed without having any knowledge of the names or descriptions of the persons who may be involved. The inquiry does not have to be limited to the determination of the kind of crime which known persons may have committed.

If I assume the truth of Mr. McGovern’s answers that he did not pay any of the ^money drawn by him from the bank — by the cheeks referred to in the government’s specifications and in the evidence — to Mr. C'ommerford, Mr. MeConville, and/or Mr. Huddell, non constat that others who had not made income tax returns and should have done so, or who had! made false returns,, might have received some of this money and not accounted for it in their income tax returns.

Consequently, the argument of counsel for the witness that Mr. McGovern might do what he would with his own does not meet the situation.

Assuming, for argument’s sake, that he himself did not need to report the expenditures by an information return under the provisions of 26 U. S. Code, §§ 2148-2151 (26 USCA §§ 2148-2151), because that question is out of the case under the letter of release of May 9th, above referred to, those who received the moneys were required, except in the ease of outright gifts to them, or sales made to Mr. McGovern, to file returns which would have included such payments.

The income tax laws with their interlocking reports have to a large extent woven the pecuniary activities of men into a kind of accounting texture in which the government may pick out and follow for its own purposes what strands it pleases. But if the strand is eut and an investigation of large expenditures, such as these, is so obstructed that it is left unexplained, revenues to which the government is entitled may be withheld by recalcitrant taxpayers almost at will.

V. It is quite true, as counsel for the witness contends, that this case differs somewhat in its facts from the ease of O’Connell v. United States (C. C. A.) 40 F.(2d) 291, which was perhaps a stronger ease against the witness, because the witness there entirely refused to answer many questions on the ground that he might be incriminated, when it was obvious that such a result was impossible.

That case, however, justifies the procedure here followed, and support for my views on the merits is found in United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495, decided by Judge Learned Hand in this District, and in Lang v. United States, 55 F.(2d) 922 (C. C. A. 2), which is as nearly like the instant case in its essential structure as one case ever is to another.

In United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495, (D. C. S. D. N. Y., June 1913), Judge Learned Hand said: “The rule, I think, ought to be this: If the witness’ conduct shows beyond any doubt whatever that he is refusing to tell what he knows, he is in contempt of court. That conduct is, of course, beyond question when he flatly refuses to answer, but it may appear in other ways. A court, like any one else who is in earnest, ought not to be put off by transparent sham, and the mere fact that the witness gives some answer cannot be an absolute test. For instance, it could not be enough for a witness to say that he did not remember where he had slept that night before, if he was sane and sober, or that he could not tell whether he had been married more than a week. If a court is to have any power at all to compel an answer, it must surely have power to compel an answer [570]*570which is not given to fob off inquiry. Nevertheless, this power must not be used to punish perjury, and the only proper test is whether on its mere face, and without inquiry collaterally, the testimony is not a bona fide effort to answer the questions at all.”

Keferring with approval to this statement by Judge Hand, Chief Justice White, in Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, at page 393, 39 S. Ct. 337, 339, 63 L. Ed. 656, 11 A. L. R. 333, said: “An obstruction to the performance of judicial duty resulting from ah act done in the presence of the court is, then, the characteristic upon which the power to punish for contempt must rest. This being true, it follows that the presence of that element must clearly be shown in every case where the ^power to punish for contempt is exerted — a principle which, applied to the subject in hand, exacts that in order to punish perjury in the presence of the court as a contempt there must be added to the essential elements of perjury under the general law the further element of obstruction to the court in the performance of its duty.”

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United States v. McGovern, 1 F. Supp. 568, 1932 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1783 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).

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