United States v. McDonald

653 F. Supp. 793, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4951
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Georgia
DecidedFebruary 12, 1987
DocketCrim. CR-85-21-G
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 653 F. Supp. 793 (United States v. McDonald) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. McDonald, 653 F. Supp. 793, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4951 (N.D. Ga. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

O’KELLEY, District Judge.

Following a hearing on February 6,1987, the court denied the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr.’s motion to suppress or, in the alternative, to limit the use of grand jury testimony he gave in the process of delivering documents requested pursuant to two grand jury subpoenas. The defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. seeks to suppress the testimony based upon his contention that its use would violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. After review of the defendant’s motion and the evidence presented at trial prior to the Féb-ruary 6, 1987 hearing, the court concludes that the defendant’s testimony was not “compelled” within the meaning of the fifth amendment and that its use, therefore, would not violate the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.

The fifth amendment is violated when a criminal defendant “is [1] compelled to make a [2] testimonial communication that is [3] incriminating.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1579, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976). It is a clearly established principle of fifth amendment law that “an individual may not claim the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to withhold documents of a collective entity held in a representative capacity.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Ackerman), 795 F.2d 904, 907 (11th Cir.1986); see also Beilis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974). The defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. has not contended before this court that the records requested in the subpoenas are not corporate documents held in a representative capacity or that the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc. is a sole proprietorship and protected under the exception carved out of the general rule by United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984). Thus, there is no doubt that the grand jury could subpoena the corporate records of the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc. and that the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. could not invoke his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination to prevent the production of those documents. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Ackerman), 795 F.2d at 907.

Likewise, there is no doubt that the grand jury could personally require the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. to produce the corporate documents and to identify the documents so produced as being those requested. In re Agan, 498 F.Supp. 493, 496 (N.D.Ga.1980). However, when an individual is personally (or through his attorney) directed or ordered to produce and identify corporate documents that might incriminate that individual, any later attempt by the government to implicate that individual on the basis of his act of production or his accompanying testimony is subject to a motion to suppress. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (85-W-71-5), 784 F.2d 857, 861 (8th Cir.1986); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Morganstem), 771 F.2d 143, 148 (6th Cir.1985), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 594, 88 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served on J. Denis Jackson, et al., (Grand Jury 85-4) (April 29,1986 Shoob, J.); In re Grand Jury 83-8 (MZA) Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 611 F.Supp. 16, 24 (S.D.Fla.1985). See also United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 n. 1 (5th Cir.1979) (“proper inquiry when material has been transferred to an attorney for the purpose of legal advice and the subpoena is directed to the attorney, then, is whether the subpoena, if directed to the client himself [or herself% would require (1) compulsion of a (2) testimonial communication that is (3) incriminating”) (emphasis added).

In the instant case, therefore, the court must determine from the facts whether the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. was personally required to produce the corporate documents. The evidence before the court shows that the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. appeared before the grand jury *795 on numerous occasions pursuant to two subpoenas that had been issued either to the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc. or to the “custodian of records” of the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc. Neither of the subpoenas specifically named the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. Regarding the first subpoena, a motion to quash the subpoena was filed by Homer McDonald, Jr. in which he asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. By order of District Court Judge G. Ernest Tidwell dated March 18, 1983, the motion to quash was denied and the “authorized custodian of the records of McDonald Chevrolet and Oldsmobile, Inc. ... [was] directed to respond to the subpoena at 9:30 a.m. on March 22, 1983, and to produce the documents requested in the subpoena and to give limited oral testimony, including his name, address, and whether specific documents have been produced.” No reference to the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. was made in Judge Tidwell’s order. The defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. appeared before the grand jury on March 22, 1983, but refused to answer any questions concerning the documents requested under the subpoena.

The defendant was then taken before District Court Judge Orinda D. Evans. While the court has not been provided with a written order by or a transcript of the proceedings before Judge Evans, it appears that she found the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc. and the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. to be in contempt of court and stated that she would fine the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc. $1,000.00 per day and would require the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr., as the president and representative of the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc., to be incarcerated until the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc. complied with the subpoena. Judge Evans refused to stay the contempt finding or allow the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. to be released on bond pending an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. The defendant Homer McDonald, Jr. then agreed to appear before the grand jury and testify concerning the requested documents in order to purge the contempt.

Defendant Homer McDonald, Jr.’s conduct relating to the second subpoena followed a similar series of events. He again filed a motion to quash the subpoena which was denied by District Court Judge Robert H. Hall by order dated March 28, 1984. In his order, Judge Hall directed the defendant McDonald Chevrolet-Olds., Inc.’s “custodian of records” to “produce the requested documents and give whatever auxiliary testimony is necessary both to establish that a full and complete search for responsive documents was made and to identify and authenticate all documents that are produced.” No reference was made to the defendant Homer McDonald, Jr.

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653 F. Supp. 793, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4951, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mcdonald-gand-1987.