United States v. McCullough

26 F. Cas. 1069, 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 202
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 15, 1876
StatusPublished

This text of 26 F. Cas. 1069 (United States v. McCullough) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. McCullough, 26 F. Cas. 1069, 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1876).

Opinion

BLATCHFORD, District Judge.

This matter seems to me very plain. The information in this case is based upon a sale and delivery—a removal out of the stoek or possession of the party of a package of spirits, containing not less than five wine gallons. It does not involve a question of receiving, and I see no difference whatever between the law' as it was in 1SG8, and the section ip the Revised Statutes; because in 1868 the provisions in regard to wholesale liquor dealers were precisely the same as they are in the Revised Statutes—that is, that a [1070]*1070■wholesale liquor dealer had to pay a tax; that every person who sells or offers for sale foreign or domestic distilled spirits shall pay the tax, and this Mr. McCullough paid the tax, although he never dealt in domestic spirits, only in foreign spirits; never dealt in domestic wine, only in foreign wine. Now, the 45th section of the statute of 186S, f which contained these same provisions provided that every wholesale liquor dealer— that is, every person within this category of selling or offering for sale either foreign or domestic spirits—shall provide a book, in the form prescribed by the commissioner of internal revenue; and whenever he sells any spirits—of course that means any spirits which, as a wholesale liquor dealer, he pays a tax in respect to which is foreign and domestic both—he shall enter, etc. Therefore to put the words “foreign and domestic” into the Revised Statutes is a mere interpretation of the law as it was at that time, and upon that the supreme court of the United States, in a recent case, has decided that-we are to take the Revised Statutes as declaring what the law was at the time. And that is the sense in which we are to look at the Revised Statutes, and not as containing anything new. And I have no doubt whatever that under that authority, and as matter of fact, in the 45th section of the act of 1868, the word “spirits” meant foreign or domestic spirits. Now, this provision is very specific: “Every wholesale liquor dealer.” And this defendant was in point of fact a wholesale liquor dealer, because he did deal in “foreign or domestic spirits,” did in point of fact sell and offer for sale. And he recognizes himself as a wholesale liquor dealer by very properly paying his license, his taxes, and, therefore, he is a wholesale liquor dealer, and he is estopped from saying he is not a wholesale liquor dealer. Then the statute says, “Every person who sells or offers for sale foreign or domestic distilled spirits in quantities of not less than five wine gallons at the same time shall be regarded as a wholesale liquor dealer.” Now, an importer of foreign spirits who, instead of putting them into consumption, entering them for consumption and putting them on a floor of his store, leaves them in the bonded warehouse of the government, has them in his stock quite as much as if they were in the floor of his store. They are his property, subject merely to the duty, and to the privilege which the government gives him in keeping them in warehouse subject to the payment of duty; and he is the owner of them, subject of course to the control which the government has for the purpose of securing its duty, and subject to the privilege that he has of having them exported out of the country by a drawback, without paying duty. But they are his stock, his property; and it would seem to me that the intention of the law when it says, “shall at the time of sending out of his stock or possession any spirits,” covers having them in a bonded warehouse; in order to avoid the difficulty of the importer saying, “Well, they are not in my possession; they are in the possession of the government.” Then the point is taken, that the statute goes on to say, “and before the same are removed from his premises,” as if that required that they should be upon his premises. Well, I think, if that were necessary, that under the warehouse act, and the privilege given to him, the party Tuts his goods into a bonded warehouse, for the purpose of this case. Those are his premises; the bonded warehouse is his premises; therefore even if that were necessary, as X have said, the prescription there is this, the undoubted sense of it is that the party shall at the time of sending out the spirits, and before he parts with such control and possession of them as he had, shall make this entry. That is the meaning and the sense of it', and even if it meant that it is necessary that they should be upon his premises, why, they are in his premises, under the warehouse acts. Because the provision of the warehouse acts is that they shall be sent to such bonded warehouse as he designates. That is, the law gives him the privilege of selecting the bonded warehouse; and, therefore, that they are in his premises for all practical purposes—for the purposes of this suit, I have no doubt whatever.

Now, it is said that this penalty is imposed only for a neglect or refusal to make entries therein specified; and that, that means that the refusal to make each and every of the above specified entries is necessary, to impose the penalty; and that the penalty cannot be imposed if a man is able, for instance, to make four entries and only makes three of them, that the penalty cannot be imposed for a failure to make four. I do not think the statute is capable of any such construction. I think that is one of those cases where the construction of the statutes is well settled and laid down; that it means a failure to make any of the above entries which he can make. Well, of course, he is not obliged to make entries which it is impossible to make. If he is required to put down in the book the serial number of the package, and it has no serial number on it, why, of course, he cannot put that on it; because there is no neglect or refusal to do what it is impossible to do. There can be no neglect or refusal to do what does not exist. But the meaning of the statute is that he shall do what he can do; that is, he shall enter the day when, the name and place of business of the person or firm to whom, the spirits are to be sent. That he can do. And he can also enter the quantity of spirits. Next is the number of gallons and the proof. If it is utterly impossible, then he is not obliged to do it, but, if he can. he must do it. Then if it is a branch of the statute which is applicable only to domestic spirits, that is incumbent on those [1071]*1071who deal in domestic spirits. It is not obligatory on those who deal in foreign spirits, simply because these foreign spirits have no serial numbers. Here is ¿ statute which applies to wholesale liquor dealers, who deal both in foreign and domestic spirits; and, in so far as the requirements can be carried out, by dealers in foreign spirits, they are to do it. In so far as it requires things, some of which the foreign man cannot do, but the domestic man can do, of course the foreign man is obliged to do only those things which he can do, and the domestic man is obliged to do those which he can do. The reason of this statute is this, that the country, as we all know, as congress knew, is flooded with spirits concocted and made up here in imitation of foreign spirits. Every one—you and I—go to-day to our grocery-man, and get something called imported which never saw the other side of the water.

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Bluebook (online)
26 F. Cas. 1069, 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 202, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mccullough-nysd-1876.