22-3178(L) United States v. McCrone
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2025
(Submitted: March 19, 2026 Decided: July 21, 2026)
Docket Nos. 22-3178 (Lead), 22-3204 (Con)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
–v.–
DAVID MCCRONE, PEDRO CHINNERY,
Defendants-Appellants,
JERMAINE LIGHTFOOT, STAN JONES, JASON BRANDT, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 1,
Defendants. *
Before: WALKER, LEE, AND ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.
Defendants-Appellants David McCrone and Pedro Chinnery appeal from a final judgment entered in the United States District Court for the
* The Clerk’s office is respectfully directed to amend the caption as reflected above. Southern District of New York (Seibel, J.) following their guilty pleas to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute narcotics under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B). They challenge conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court as part of their respective sentences. In particular, both McCrone and Chinnery challenge the electronic search condition. McCrone also challenges the portion of the mental health treatment condition requiring him to continue to take prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed by his health care provider. They argue that those conditions were improperly imposed without individualized assessment and explanation.
We agree in part. The record supports the search condition for each defendant, even in the absence of an express individualized analysis by the district court. But it does not support the requirement within McCrone’s mental health treatment condition that he continue to take prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed. As a result, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part and REMAND for the district court to strike the unsupported portion of the mental health treatment condition.
Brendan White, White & White, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant David McCrone.
Benjamin Gruenstein, Joseph B. Linfield, Martin Rather, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Pedro Chinnery.
Jeffrey C. Coffman, Timothy Josiah Pertz, Michael D. Maimin, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
2 ROBINSON, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-Appellants David McCrone and Pedro Chinnery appeal from a
final judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York (Seibel, J.) following their guilty pleas to conspiring to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute narcotics under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B).
They challenge conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court as
part of their respective sentences. In particular, both McCrone and Chinnery
challenge the electronic search condition. McCrone also challenges the portion of
the mental health treatment condition requiring him to continue to take prescribed
medications unless otherwise instructed by his health care provider. They argue
that those conditions were improperly imposed without individualized
assessment and explanation.
We agree in part. The record supports the search condition for each
defendant, even in the absence of an express individualized analysis by the district
court. But it does not support the requirement within McCrone’s mental health
treatment condition that he continue to take prescribed medications unless
otherwise instructed. As a result, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part and
REMAND for the district court to strike the unsupported provision within the
mental health treatment condition.
3 BACKGROUND
Both McCrone and Chinnery were apprehended as part of a larger narcotics
trafficking operation, for which they served as dealers. Their arrests were the
result of an investigation by the FBI that included physical observation, review of
phone records, intercepted wire and electronic communications, and controlled
purchases of narcotics.
After their arrests, McCrone and Chinnery were each charged with one
count of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute narcotics
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). Both pled guilty to the lesser included
offense of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
I. McCrone
At McCrone’s sentencing, his counsel discussed McCrone’s history of
unresolved trauma that resulted in his struggling with substance abuse issues. In
his own statement, McCrone described his history of abuse by family members
and his reliance on drugs to escape, and he explained that he now wanted to break
the cycle and seek treatment. Counsel also submitted the report of a clinical
psychologist, Dr. Pearson, who made certain mental-health diagnoses and
recommended therapy, substance abuse treatment and further evaluations.
4 McCrone’s counsel explained to the court that McCrone was ready for a
change and argued that a significant term of imprisonment would only impede
his progress. Instead, counsel argued that what he needed was treatment and
rehabilitation that would allow him to heal and move forward by addressing the
root causes of his behavior. To that end, counsel asked the court to recommend
that McCrone be enrolled in substance abuse and mental health treatment
programs while incarcerated.
The court reviewed the applicable Guidelines calculation and then
discussed the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the nature of the
offense, which involved distribution of large quantities of methamphetamine.
Considering the history of abuse McCrone experienced, the court observed that it
was unsurprising that McCrone turned to drugs and alcohol at a young age. The
court agreed with counsel’s argument that McCrone needed mental health
treatment to change. Noting additional mitigating factors, the court
acknowledged that McCrone had numerous health issues. The court also
acknowledged McCrone’s lengthy criminal history, which again appeared linked
to his substance abuse. The court ultimately imposed a below-Guidelines sentence
of 102 months’ incarceration followed by five years’ supervised release.
5 The court pronounced the mandatory and standard conditions of release
and imposed four special conditions requiring McCrone to: participate in an
outpatient substance abuse treatment program, participate in an outpatient mental
health treatment program, provide access to his financial information, and submit
to search of his electronic devices and communications.
The first requirement challenged on appeal, embedded within the mental
health condition, states as follows:
You must participate in an outpatient mental health treatment program approved by the United States Probation Office. You must continue to take any prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed by the health care provider. You must contribute to the cost of services rendered based on your ability to pay and the availability of third-party payments. The Court authorizes the release of available psychological and psychiatric evaluations and reports, including the presentence investigation report and Defendant’s sentencing submissions, to the health care provider.
McCrone App’x 86 (challenged portion emphasized).
The second challenged condition, the electronic search condition, requires
McCrone to submit his electronic devices and communications to search by the
probation office and law enforcement upon “reasonable suspicion concerning a
violation of a condition of supervision or unlawful conduct” by McCrone. Id.
6 McCrone’s counsel did not object to the conditions or any other aspect of the
sentence.
II. Chinnery
At Chinnery’s sentencing, his counsel acknowledged the seriousness of the
offense and noted Chinnery’s history of addiction. Counsel argued that Chinnery
was not a violent person and was not a true manager within the trafficking
operation. Counsel noted that Chinnery had a difficult childhood, which led to
Chinnery developing substance abuse issues. Despite those circumstances,
counsel explained that Chinnery has been a caring parental figure. Counsel also
noted Chinnery’s age and the poor conditions of confinement during his pre-trial
imprisonment. In his own statement, Chinnery expressed his remorse for his
actions and his hope to support his community upon his release.
After describing the Guidelines calculation, the court discussed the § 3553(a)
factors, starting with the nature and circumstances of the offense and Chinnery’s
role in the operation—which included coordinating the actions of others and using
threatening debt collection methods. The court described Chinnery’s history,
including his criminal history and difficult childhood, and noted that he has been
an admirable father figure. The court recognized Chinnery’s addiction issues,
spotty work history, and prior failed treatment attempts, as well as his current
7 advanced age. The court ultimately imposed a below-Guidelines, 132-month term
of imprisonment, to be followed by four years’ supervised release.
The court pronounced the mandatory and standard conditions of
supervised release and three special conditions requiring that Chinnery:
participate in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program, participate in an
anger management program, and submit his electronic devices and
communications to searches pursuant to a condition identical to that imposed on
McCrone. Chinnery’s counsel did not object to the conditions or other aspects of
the sentence.
DISCUSSION
We generally review the imposition of conditions of supervised release for
abuse of discretion. United States v. McAdam, 165 F.4th 688, 695 (2d Cir. 2026). But
“plain error review applies when a defendant had a meaningful opportunity to
make objections and failed to raise them before the district court at sentencing.”
Id. at 698. 1 Here, the special conditions now challenged on appeal were included
in each defendant’s presentence report (“PSR”), the court confirmed with each
Defendant that he had reviewed his PSR with counsel, and the court read aloud
1In quotations from caselaw, this opinion omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations, and accepts all alterations, unless otherwise noted.
8 the full text of each condition at sentencing before providing an opportunity to
object. Because neither defendant objected, plain error review applies.
To show plain error, a party must demonstrate “(1) an error, (2) that is plain
and (3) that affects substantial rights.” Id. at 699. Where those conditions are met,
we may “exercise our discretion to correct the error, but only if it seriously affects
the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. “A
sentencing court’s failure to explain its rationale for imposing a special condition
is plain error where it is not obvious from the record why such a condition was
reasonably necessary.” Id.
In recent decisions we have clarified the requirements surrounding the
imposition of discretionary conditions of supervised release. In particular, we
have held that non-mandatory conditions, including the “standard” Guidelines-
recommended conditions, must be pronounced at sentencing if they are to be
properly imposed in the written judgment. United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306,
313–14 (2d Cir. 2025) (en banc). In addition to oral pronouncement, we have held
that in imposing discretionary conditions (that is, conditions that are not
statutorily mandated), the court must conduct an individualized assessment.
McAdam, 165 F.4th at 696–97.
9 Specifically, “For the imposition of special conditions of supervised release
to be procedurally reasonable, a district court must make an individualized
assessment and state on the record the reason for imposing the condition.” United
States v. Robinson, 134 F.4th 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2025). This requires that a district
court “make findings specific to the defendant, connecting those findings to the
applicable § 3553(a) factors that would justify including the special condition.”
United States v. Jimenez, 175 F.4th 341, 349 (2d Cir. 2026). Courts “must also
consider how a special condition will impact any cognizable liberty interests,” and
if it will, the condition “must be supported by particularized findings that it does
not constitute a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary to
accomplish the goals of sentencing.” Id. If a court fails to conduct this
individualized assessment at sentencing, a special condition may nevertheless be
upheld if the court’s reasoning “is self-evident in the record, and the condition is
reasonably related to the sentencing objectives.” McAdam, 165 F.4th at 697.
In addition, a condition must be substantively reasonable. Substantive
reasonableness considers whether “the district court’s exercise of its discretion can
be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Sims, 92 F.4th
115, 122 (2d Cir. 2024). Among other things, a court’s explanation for imposing a
special condition “must be adequately supported by the record.” Id. at 124. And,
10 as relevant here, a condition must be reasonably related to the factors set forth in
§ 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B)-(D), and it must involve no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D). 18
U.S.C. § 3583(d).
With these standards in mind, we consider McCrone’s and Chinnery’s
specific challenges.
I. Electronic Search Conditions
Both McCrone and Chinnery argue that the electronic search condition
imposed on each of them was imposed without the required individualized
assessment and is not supported by reasons that are self-evident in the record. We
disagree. The court did err by failing to conduct an individualized assessment.
But in each case the reason for the condition is self-evident from the record, and
the condition is reasonably related to the sentencing objectives.
McCrone and Chinnery each used electronic devices as instrumentalities of
their crimes. The record reflects that both Defendants sent and received numerous
text messages and telephone calls related to the narcotics operation. Specifically,
Chinnery participated in phone calls discussing narcotics transactions, the use of
couriers to transport narcotics, and how to evade law enforcement scrutiny of
phone calls. Chinnery also telephonically discussed collecting various drug debts
11 by violent means. McCrone participated in numerous phone calls related to
narcotics transactions and the use of couriers to transport narcotics, as well as to
relay to others in the operation the fact that some of McCrone’s customers reported
dissatisfaction with the narcotics’ purity. Significantly, both Defendants
committed these crimes while under parole or probation supervision for a
previous offense.
“[W]here electronic devices were instrumentalized in the commission of the
instant offense conduct and surrounding circumstances, we have regularly held
that an electronic search condition is permissible.” Jimenez, 175 F.4th at 351.
McCrone and Chinnery both used electronic devices to facilitate their offenses and
so the electronic search condition “connects directly to the nature and
circumstances of the offense at issue.” Id. Moreover, both McCrone and Chinnery
committed these crimes while under post-release supervision from a prior crime,
which, although insufficient alone to provide support for the condition, is one
indicator that “the defendant posed a high risk of reoffending during the term of
supervised release or else of evading supervision altogether.” Id. at 352. The
electronic search condition is therefore sufficiently justified by the record and is
related to permissible sentencing objectives in both cases.
12 II. Medication Condition
The same is not true for the medication requirement embedded in
McCrone’s mental health treatment condition. We emphasize that our review is
limited to the medication requirement, not the mental health treatment condition
as a whole. The court acknowledged McCrone’s self-reported mental health
struggles and agreed with his counsel that mental health treatment was
warranted. 2 But the specific terms of the condition imposed are not merely that
McCrone must participate in mental health treatment—treatment that we agree is
amply justified by the record. Instead, the court also required that he “continue to
take any prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed by the health care
provider.” McCrone App’x 86.
The district court provided no individualized explanation of the medication
requirement, its rationale is not self-evident from the record, and, in fact, we see
2The government argues that McCrone has waived any argument about the medication condition because his counsel requested that McCrone receive mental health treatment. But McCrone and his counsel made no request regarding medication—only that he receive treatment more generally—and the report of Dr. Pearson at most suggests that McCrone would benefit from therapy but that further evaluation would be needed to determine whether any medication-based intervention may be appropriate to address certain symptoms. The report does not itself include an opinion on whether medication is warranted or request that McCrone be medicated, did not suggest that McCrone’s offense arose from a mental illness or that medication was important to his rehabilitation, did not suggest that McCrone was incompetent to make his own decisions regarding whether to take prescribed medications, and did not indicate that absent medication McCrone would be a danger to himself or others.
13 nothing in the record that could support this medication requirement. In reaching
this conclusion, we consider the liberty interest implicated as well as the absence
of any record evidence suggesting that any particular medications played a role in
McCrone’s offense or are reasonably related to his rehabilitation. Our conclusion
is bolstered by similar decisions from sister circuits.
A. The Condition Substantially Burdens McCrone’s Liberty.
The challenged medication requirement potentially imposes a substantial
burden on McCrone’s liberty. For one thing, the breadth and intrusion of this
condition is striking. It purportedly applies to any prescribed medication, without
qualification as to the type of medication, the purpose for which it is prescribed,
the side effects it may cause, the availability of more effective alternatives or the
financial cost to McCrone of continuing to take the medication. And, subject to
McCrone’s opportunity to ask the court to modify the condition, it leaves McCrone
to choose between complying with his prescribing physician’s unfettered
discretion and subjecting himself to the consequences of a violation of his
supervised release conditions.
Putting McCrone to this choice impacts a substantial liberty interest. In the
context of forced medication against an individual’s will, the Supreme Court has
long acknowledged that there is a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
14 treatment. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–23, 227 (1990)
(explaining that an inmate has a “significant liberty interest in avoiding the
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs,” with the extent of that interest
“defined in the context of the inmate’s confinement,” and an inmate can be
involuntarily medicated only upon a showing that “the inmate is dangerous to
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest”); Sell v.
United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178–79 (2003) (reaffirming that “an individual has a
significant constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of [mental health medication]”).
The context here is different—the condition does not authorize authorities
to involuntarily medicate McCrone; rather, it requires McCrone to take medication
as prescribed on penalty of court-imposed consequences. But by subjecting
McCrone to the possibility of further restraints on his liberty if he fails to continue
taking whatever medications he is already taking, regardless of whether he wants
to take the medications, the condition likewise implicates a substantial liberty
interest. 3
3We resolve this question on statutory grounds and do not address any constitutional questions. Cf. United States v. Malone, 937 F.3d 1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 2019) (“When ‘stock’ special conditions are proposed and the defendant does not object, it is easy to overlook the constitutional implications at stake. But even when the defendant does not object, the district court must ensure that its conditions conform to the Constitution.”).
15 B. The Record Offers No Support for the Condition.
We see no basis in the record for this imposition on McCrone’s liberty. The
record indicates that McCrone has several chronic physical conditions for which
he takes prescription medications. There is no evidence that any of these
conditions had any bearing on McCrone’s offense conduct or are pertinent to his
rehabilitation.
As to mental health conditions, McCrone has no history of prior treatment
and there is no indication that he has ever been prescribed medications for a
mental health condition. The Presentence Report suggests that McCrone may
suffer from depression, but it says nothing to suggest that McCrone currently takes
any medications for that or any other mental health condition, or even that he
expects to commence any medication. Dr. Pearson’s report includes several
psychological diagnoses but likewise says nothing about any medication
recommendation.
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that McCrone has any history of
not taking medications as prescribed. Nothing suggests that he is not competent
to make his own decisions regarding prescription medications, or that he poses a
danger to himself or others due to an unmedicated condition. And nothing
suggests that McCrone needs medication—and not other, less invasive forms of
16 mental health or substance abuse treatment—to address the court’s concerns that
some kind of mental health intervention was needed to break his cycle of
recidivism.
Given this record, it cannot be said that this condition is reasonably related
to any of the sentencing goals or that those goals could not have been
accomplished by a condition imposing a lesser deprivation of liberty.
C. Sister Circuits Agree.
Sister circuits have rejected required medication conditions in similar
circumstances. In United States v. Malone, the Tenth Circuit vacated a provision in
a “stock” mental health treatment condition that required the defendant to “take
prescribed medication as directed” by mental health staff or a treating physician.
937 F.3d 1325, 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 2019). Reviewing for plain error, the Court
explained that “a defendant on supervised release has a significant interest in
avoiding the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs.” Id. at 1327–28.
The Court declined to adopt a narrowing construction of the condition given its
unambiguous wording, and it held that “this condition, on its face, is an
impermissible infringement into a defendant’s significant liberty interests” that
needed to be supported by particularized findings. Id. at 1328. The district court
had not made such findings, and the record before the district court indicated only
17 that the defendant had anxiety and depression and was hesitant to take medication
because he didn’t want to feel “tranquilized.” Id. Nothing connected that
evidence to a need to require the defendant to take medication. Id. at 1328–29. The
Court doubted that on this record the district court could have found “compelling
circumstances” that would justify the imposition on the defendant’s liberty, and it
ordered that the offending language be stricken from the condition. Id. at 1328–
29.
In United States v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit
vacated a condition requiring the defendant to take psychotropic and other
medications as prescribed for his mental illness. Even though the defendant’s
offense was related to his mental health condition, and even though he had a
history of refusing psychiatric treatment, the Court concluded that the condition
was improperly imposed because the district court did not address whether the
condition applied “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.”
Id. at 1053. In so concluding, the Court emphasized “the high magnitude” of the
defendant’s liberty interest in avoiding mandatory use of antipsychotic
medication, as well as “the absence at sentencing of any explicit medically-based
finding.” Id.
18 It summed up its holding by stating that before imposing a mandatory
medication condition the district court “must make on-the-record, medically-
grounded findings that court-ordered medication is necessary to accomplish one
or more of the factors listed in § 3583(d)(1),” as well as “an explicit finding on the
record that the condition ‘involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary.’” Id. at 1057 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2)).
We agree. Here, the medication requirement can only stand if the district
court makes a medically grounded finding that the condition is “necessary to
accomplish one or more of the factors listed in § 3583(d)(1),” id., as well as a finding
that the condition “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary,” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). The district court made no such findings, and
we see nothing in the record that could support such findings. 4
4 Pointing to a series of this Court’s summary orders, the government contends that we routinely uphold similar medication conditions when challenged. Setting aside that the orders the government cites are non-precedential, nearly all of them focus on other issues, such as the ripeness of the challenge or whether the written condition improperly deviated from the oral pronouncement. The only one that squarely addresses an argument that the medication condition unduly burdened a defendant’s liberty interest in avoiding mandated medical treatment recognized the arguable overbreadth of the condition and narrowed it considerably. See United States v. Schloss, No. 22-3111-CR, 2025 WL 2814700, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 3, 2025) (summary order).
19 CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part and REMAND
with instructions to the district court to strike the medication requirement
provision within the mental health treatment condition.