Me. Justice White,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
.The assignments of errors and arguments at bar present two questions for decision. First. Were the copies of telegrams sent by the postmaster at San Francisco to the Post Office Department admissible in evidence? And, second, if they were, did the certified copy of the account of McCoy as a failing contractor from the books of the Auditor for the Post Office Department, the telegrams from the postmaster at San Francisco and the finding of the Postmaster General that McCoy was a failing contractor, make out a
prima facie
case for the Government? Concerning- the first question it suffices to say that, although it is urged that the telegrams were not admissible because they were merely copies, of copies, the originals being on file in the telegraph office from which the messages were sent, the record does not show that any ruling on this subject was insisted on in the trial court, and hence no exception was taken to the introduction of the copies.' As the objection that the telegrams were not the best evidence because they were merely copies was susceptible of being cured, if insisted on, it follows that the failure to so insist and reserve the question was a waiver of the objection. It then remains only to.' consider whether, taking into view the whole cáse as made by the Government, a
prima facie
right to recover was established. Section 889 of the Revised Statutes is as follows':
“Copies of the quarterly returns of postmasters and of any papers pertaining to the accounts in the office of the Sixth Auditor, and transcripts from the money-order account-books of the Post Office Department, when certified by the Sixth Auditor under the seal of his office, shall be admitted as evi
dence in the courts of the United States, in civil suits and criminal prosecutions; and in any civil suit, in case of delinquency of any postmaster or contractor, a statement of the account, certified as aforesaid, shall be admitted in evidence, and the court shall be authorized thereupon to give judgment and award execution, subject to the provisions of law as to proceedings in such civil suits.”
The certified account from the books of the Auditor for the Post Office Department, which was offered in evidence came clearly within this statute. The items in that account were ascertained - and established in the regular course of official action by the department,' and represented disbursements made in the ordinary course of business for temporary service and under the new contract, all of which was occasioned by the actual or assumed default of McCoy. The payments shown by the items,, therefore, properly appeared on the booljs of the Treasury Department. The account was clearly therefore competent, at least, for the purpose of showing the amount of the indebtedness, if any, existing.
United States
v.
Stone,
106 U. S. 525. As, however, the correctness of' the items in the account depended upon proof of the fact of the delinquency of 'McCoy, the contractor, it remains to determine whether the evidence introduced by the Government at the trial
prima facie
established such delinquency; in other words, whether the evidence was sufficient, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to show that McCoy had totally abandoned his contract on May 5, 1893. The solution of this question depends upon the probative force of the official finding by the Postmaster General that McCoy was a failing contractor, based, as it was, upon the official report on the subject made to the department by the postmaster at San Francisco.
In
United States
v.
Dumas,
149 U. S. 278, the court considered the act of June 17, 1878, 20 Stat. 140, chapter 259, paragraph 1, which provides: “That in any case where the Postmaster General shall be satisfied that a postmaster has made a false return of business, it shall be within his discretion
to withhold. commissions on such returns, and to allow any compensation that.- under the circumstances he may deem reasonable.” The facts were as follows: On August 11, 1888, the then Postmaster General made an order, reciting his “being satisfied” that Dumas had made false returns- of business at' the office of which he had been postmaster, and declaring that in the exercise of the discretion conferred by acts' of Congress the commissions on such returns were withheld, and the compensation of the postmaster was fixed as stated in the order. As a result of this finding by the Postmaster General, an action was subsequently brought against the postmaster, and his sureties, and it was decided that the order of the Postmaster General and the certified accounts of the Government, which were produced and which were founded upon such order, were held to be
prima facie
evidence of the balance due the Government.
' • Moreover, by section;3962 of the Revised Statutes it is provided that—
“The Postmaster General may make deductions from the pay of contractors, for failures to perform service according to contract, and impose fines upon them for other delinquencies. He, may deduct the price of. the trip in all cases where the trip is hot performed; and not exceeding three times- the price if the.failure be occasioned by the fault of the contractor or ’Carrier.”
■And the second section of the act of August 3, 1882, c. 379, 22 Stat. 216, provides as follows:
“Sec. 2. Whenever a contractor for postal service fails to commence proper service under the contract, or, having commenced service, fails to continue in the proper performance thereof, the Postmaster General mayemploy temporary service on the route, át a rate of- pay per annum not to exceed the amount of the bond required to accompany proposals for servieé on such route, as specified in the advertisement of the -route, or at not exceeding
pro rata
of such bond, in cases where • service shall have been ordered to be increased, reduced, cur
tailed, or changed, subsequent to the execution of the contract; the cost of such temporary service to be charged to the contractor, and to continue until the contractor commences or resumes the'proper performance of service, or until the route can be relet, as now provided by law, and service commenced under the new award of contract, all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act being hereby repealed.”
These provisions, by necessary implication, declare that whenever the Postmaster General “is satisfied,” from evidence presented to him, that conditions exist which justify the imposition of fines or the deciding that a postal contractor has abandoned the performance of his contract, the Postmaster General may act as authorized in such provisions. It would seem to be an appropriate act for the Postmaster General to 'make distinct official evidence of the fact of such finding, to be filed among the archives of his office.' The pertinency of such an official finding was, as has been shown, recognized in the
Dumas
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Me. Justice White,
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
.The assignments of errors and arguments at bar present two questions for decision. First. Were the copies of telegrams sent by the postmaster at San Francisco to the Post Office Department admissible in evidence? And, second, if they were, did the certified copy of the account of McCoy as a failing contractor from the books of the Auditor for the Post Office Department, the telegrams from the postmaster at San Francisco and the finding of the Postmaster General that McCoy was a failing contractor, make out a
prima facie
case for the Government? Concerning- the first question it suffices to say that, although it is urged that the telegrams were not admissible because they were merely copies, of copies, the originals being on file in the telegraph office from which the messages were sent, the record does not show that any ruling on this subject was insisted on in the trial court, and hence no exception was taken to the introduction of the copies.' As the objection that the telegrams were not the best evidence because they were merely copies was susceptible of being cured, if insisted on, it follows that the failure to so insist and reserve the question was a waiver of the objection. It then remains only to.' consider whether, taking into view the whole cáse as made by the Government, a
prima facie
right to recover was established. Section 889 of the Revised Statutes is as follows':
“Copies of the quarterly returns of postmasters and of any papers pertaining to the accounts in the office of the Sixth Auditor, and transcripts from the money-order account-books of the Post Office Department, when certified by the Sixth Auditor under the seal of his office, shall be admitted as evi
dence in the courts of the United States, in civil suits and criminal prosecutions; and in any civil suit, in case of delinquency of any postmaster or contractor, a statement of the account, certified as aforesaid, shall be admitted in evidence, and the court shall be authorized thereupon to give judgment and award execution, subject to the provisions of law as to proceedings in such civil suits.”
The certified account from the books of the Auditor for the Post Office Department, which was offered in evidence came clearly within this statute. The items in that account were ascertained - and established in the regular course of official action by the department,' and represented disbursements made in the ordinary course of business for temporary service and under the new contract, all of which was occasioned by the actual or assumed default of McCoy. The payments shown by the items,, therefore, properly appeared on the booljs of the Treasury Department. The account was clearly therefore competent, at least, for the purpose of showing the amount of the indebtedness, if any, existing.
United States
v.
Stone,
106 U. S. 525. As, however, the correctness of' the items in the account depended upon proof of the fact of the delinquency of 'McCoy, the contractor, it remains to determine whether the evidence introduced by the Government at the trial
prima facie
established such delinquency; in other words, whether the evidence was sufficient, in the absence of proof to the contrary, to show that McCoy had totally abandoned his contract on May 5, 1893. The solution of this question depends upon the probative force of the official finding by the Postmaster General that McCoy was a failing contractor, based, as it was, upon the official report on the subject made to the department by the postmaster at San Francisco.
In
United States
v.
Dumas,
149 U. S. 278, the court considered the act of June 17, 1878, 20 Stat. 140, chapter 259, paragraph 1, which provides: “That in any case where the Postmaster General shall be satisfied that a postmaster has made a false return of business, it shall be within his discretion
to withhold. commissions on such returns, and to allow any compensation that.- under the circumstances he may deem reasonable.” The facts were as follows: On August 11, 1888, the then Postmaster General made an order, reciting his “being satisfied” that Dumas had made false returns- of business at' the office of which he had been postmaster, and declaring that in the exercise of the discretion conferred by acts' of Congress the commissions on such returns were withheld, and the compensation of the postmaster was fixed as stated in the order. As a result of this finding by the Postmaster General, an action was subsequently brought against the postmaster, and his sureties, and it was decided that the order of the Postmaster General and the certified accounts of the Government, which were produced and which were founded upon such order, were held to be
prima facie
evidence of the balance due the Government.
' • Moreover, by section;3962 of the Revised Statutes it is provided that—
“The Postmaster General may make deductions from the pay of contractors, for failures to perform service according to contract, and impose fines upon them for other delinquencies. He, may deduct the price of. the trip in all cases where the trip is hot performed; and not exceeding three times- the price if the.failure be occasioned by the fault of the contractor or ’Carrier.”
■And the second section of the act of August 3, 1882, c. 379, 22 Stat. 216, provides as follows:
“Sec. 2. Whenever a contractor for postal service fails to commence proper service under the contract, or, having commenced service, fails to continue in the proper performance thereof, the Postmaster General mayemploy temporary service on the route, át a rate of- pay per annum not to exceed the amount of the bond required to accompany proposals for servieé on such route, as specified in the advertisement of the -route, or at not exceeding
pro rata
of such bond, in cases where • service shall have been ordered to be increased, reduced, cur
tailed, or changed, subsequent to the execution of the contract; the cost of such temporary service to be charged to the contractor, and to continue until the contractor commences or resumes the'proper performance of service, or until the route can be relet, as now provided by law, and service commenced under the new award of contract, all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act being hereby repealed.”
These provisions, by necessary implication, declare that whenever the Postmaster General “is satisfied,” from evidence presented to him, that conditions exist which justify the imposition of fines or the deciding that a postal contractor has abandoned the performance of his contract, the Postmaster General may act as authorized in such provisions. It would seem to be an appropriate act for the Postmaster General to 'make distinct official evidence of the fact of such finding, to be filed among the archives of his office.' The pertinency of such an official finding was, as has been shown, recognized in the
Dumas
case; and, when coupled, as it is in the case at bar, ■ with the reports upon which the finding in the certificate was based, we think the certificate was legally competent to establish
prima facie
the fact that McCoy had abandoned his contract. It was made the duty of the postmaster at San Francisco, by section 3849 of the Revised Statutes, to “promptly report to the Postmaster General every delinquéncy, neglect or malpractice. of the contractors, their agents or carriers, which comes to his knowledge.” The reports embodied in the telegrams in question on their face show that they related to facts which had come to the knSwledge of the postmaster, bearing upon the delinquency of McCoy, particularly the ultimate fact of total abandonment by McCoy of his contract. The opinion in
United States
v.
Corwin,
129 U. S. 381, contains a clear recognition of the competency, as evidence, of official communications of this character, when made to those higher in authority, as supporting and giving evidential weight to findings based thereon. The reports contained in the tele
grams in question present an application of what is stated in the opinion in the
Corwin
case (p. 385) to be “the well-established rule that official reports and certificates made contemporaneously with the facts stated, and in the regular course of official duty, by an officer having personal knowledge of them, are admissible for the purpose of proving such facts."
'
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed; the judgment of the Circuit Court is also reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.