United States v. McClure
This text of 364 F. Supp. 2d 1183 (United States v. McClure) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
ORDER
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the citation/violation notice [Violation] pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) & (3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure came on regularly for hearing on January 18, 2005, before the Honorable Craig M. Kellison, United States Magistrate Judge. R. Dabney Eastham appeared for and on behalf of Defendant, Terry Lee McClure; and Assistant U.S. Attorney Samantha S. Span-gler appeared on behalf of the United States of America [Government].
Defendant moves to dismiss the Violation on the ground that it fails to state an offense. The gravamen of Defendant’s argument is that Defendant is charged with using National Forest System land without special-use authorization, when the alleged activity that he is charged with doing (gold mining) does not require “special-use authorization”. 36 C.F.R. 251.50(a).
Based on the very specific language in § 251.50(a) exempting such activity; and the court’s ruling in Unites States v. Lex, 300 F.Supp.2d 951, 960-61 (E.D.Cal.2003) [Lex & Waggener ], this Court agrees.
On September 1, 2004, the Defendant was charge with violating 36 C.F.R. 261.10(k) which prohibits use of National Forest System land in the absence of “special-use authorization”. 1
*1184 . In that portion of the Violation entitled “Offense Description” the Defendant is charged with “use or occupancy of national forest system land without special use authorization pursuant [to] 16 USC 551”. 2
The Statement of Probable Cause on the reverse side of the Violation provides a narrative by the citing officer. 3
*1185 In the present case, the alleged offense (being a Class B misdemeanor) 4 is chargeable by way of citation or violation notice.
Rule 58(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows that the trial of a petty offense may proceed by way of a citation or violation notice as the charging document. A citation or violation notice is the functional equivalent of an indictment or an information. Like indictments and informations, a violation notice is required to cite the statute that the defendant is charged with violating. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) (providing that “[t]he indictment or information must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged” and shall include “the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated”).
In Defendant’s motion to dismiss, he argues that since he is an individual engaged in mining activity 5 which specifically does not require “special-use authorization” that he cannot be convicted under § 261.10(k). In support of this argument he references 36 C.F.R. 251.50(a) and cites this court’s recent decision in Lex & Waggener, supra. In Lex & Waggener, supra at 959-960, Judge Karlton noted that:
“36 C.F.R. § 261.10(b) under which appellants were convicted, does not prohibit occupancy that is subject to a special use authorization or that is “otherwise authorized.” Here, because activity *960 covered by the Forest Service’s mining regulations is excluded from the special use regulations, see 36 C.F.R. § 251.50(a), 6 the appellants could not ob *1186 tain a special use authorization for their activity which was subject to the mining regulations.”
The Government argues that the term “special-use authorization” as used in § 261.10(k) broadly includes a “plan of operations,” as said term is used in 36 C.F.R. 228.4 and 36 C.F.R. 228.5. The Government suggests that a “plan of operations” is a specific type of permit and included by implication within the definition of “special-use authorization” as set forth in 36 C.F.R. 261.2 which provides in pertinent part:
The following definitions apply to [Sub-part A — General Prohibitions]:
Special-use authorization means a -permit, term permit, lease or easement which allows occupancy, or use rights on National Forest System land.
To adopt this argument would be contrary to the court’s ruling in Lex & Waggener, supra, but more importantly, would render the statutory language in 36 C.F.R. 251.50(a) meaningless. This, the Court will not do. The terms “special-use” and “special-use authorization” as used in Title 36 C.F.R. are terms of art and are to be afforded the same meaning throughout title 36 C.F.R. We are also guided by the canon that identical terms used in different parts of the same act or legislation are intended to have the same meaning. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995).
The Court is mindful that the Forest Service oftentimes has difficulty in attempting to correspond an individual’s alleged illegal activity with a specific Part 261 prohibition. The various categories of prohibited activities on National Forest System land as set forth in 36 C.F.R. 261 [Part 261 — Prohibitions] are often confusing, and very rarely inclusive. 7 A miner may be charged under 36 C.F.R. 261 for violating an approved plan of operations, United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1989); 36 C.F.R.
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364 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 2005 WL 665338, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mcclure-caed-2005.