United States v. Maurice Hemingway

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: May 27, 2025
• Docket: 24-4403
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-4403 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/27/2025 Pg: 1 of 6

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-4380

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MAURICE ISSAC HEMINGWAY, a/k/a Mario,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 24-4403

MAURICE ISSAC HEMINGWAY, a/k/a Maurice Hemmingway, a/k/a Mario,

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh and Wilmington. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:24-cr-00087-D-1; 7:20- cr-00180-D-1)

Submitted: May 22, 2025 Decided: May 27, 2025 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4403 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/27/2025 Pg: 2 of 6

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

No. 24-4380, dismissed in part and affirmed in part; No. 24-4430, affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Thomas Reston Wilson, GREENE WILSON CROW & SMITH, PA, New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Katherine Simpson Englander, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, Maurice Issac Hemingway appeals his convictions and

the 204-month upward departure sentence imposed after he pled guilty to possession with

intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(C), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

(“criminal case”), as well as the revocation of Hemingway’s supervised release and the

resulting 60-month revocation sentence (“revocation case”). Counsel has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding that there are no

nonfrivolous issues for appeal, but raising multiple possible issues for review. The

Government moves to dismiss Appeal No. 24-4380 based on the appellate waiver in

Hemingway’s plea agreement but declined to file a response brief in the appeals.

Hemingway has filed a pro se supplemental brief, asserting, in part, that his appellate

waiver was unknowing and involuntary. After conducting our review in accordance with

Anders, we dismiss in part and affirm in part in Appeal No. 24-4380, and affirm in Appeal

No. 24-4403.

We first conclude that Hemingway has waived his right to appeal in the criminal

case. As we have explained, a defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the right

to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir.

1990). “We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo,” United States v. Smith, 134

F.4th 248, 255 (4th Cir. 2025), and will enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue

appealed is within the scope thereof, United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.

2005).

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An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to the

waiver. Id. at 169. “To determine whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed

to waive his appellate rights, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the

defendant’s experience, conduct, educational background and knowledge of his plea

agreement and its terms.” United States v. Carter, 87 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2023).

“Generally, . . . if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate

rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant

understood the full significance of the waiver, the waiver is valid.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Based on the totality of circumstances in this case, we conclude that Hemingway

knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea and understood the waiver, through

which Hemingway waived his right to challenge his convictions and whatever sentence

was imposed on any ground. We therefore grant the Government’s motion and dismiss

Appeal No. 24-4380 in part as to all issues within the scope of the appellate waiver. And,

in accordance with our obligations under Anders, we have reviewed the entire record for

any potentially meritorious issues falling outside the scope of the broad appellate waiver

and have found none. We therefore affirm in part the district court’s judgment in the

criminal case.

Regarding the revocation case, we have held that “[a] district court has broad

discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States

v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation sentence that is both within the

applicable statutory maximum and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal.

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United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In determining whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, this court

assesses it for reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and substantive considerations”

employed in evaluating an original criminal sentence. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d

433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006).

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court has considered

both the policy statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors it is permitted to consider in the revocation context. See

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40. The district court must also provide an

explanation for the chosen sentence, although this explanation “need not be as detailed or

specific” as is required for an original sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544,

547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court

states a proper basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.

Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if we find a sentence unreasonable must we decide whether

it is “plainly” so. Id. at 439. Applying these principles here, we conclude that the

revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the records in these cases and have

found no meritorious issues for appeal. ∗ We therefore grant the Government’s motion to

dismiss in Appeal No. 24-4380 as to any issues within the scope of Hemingway’s appellate

∗ We have considered the arguments Hemingway raises in his pro se supplemental brief and find them to be meritless.

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waiver and affirm the remainder of the criminal judgment. As to Appeal No. 24-4403, we

affirm the district court’s judgment revoking Hemingway’s supervised release and

imposing a 60-month sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Hemingway, in

writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.

If Hemingway requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Hemingway.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

No. 24-4380, DISMISSED IN PART & AFFIRMED IN PART; No. 24-4403, AFFIRMED