United States v. Mauri

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 17, 2026
• Docket: 25-931
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-931 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 9:24-cr-00015-DLC-1 v. MEMORANDUM*

BRETT MAURI,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Dana L. Christensen, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 12, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: CHRISTEN, HURWITZ, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Brett Mauri appeals his convictions for money laundering, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1957. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

“We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute on void

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). for vagueness grounds.” United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 811 (9th Cir.

2001). “The presumption is that a statute is constitutional,” and “[s]tatutes are

construed to avoid defects which would render them unconstitutional.” United

States v. Harris, 185 F.3d 999, 1003–04 (9th Cir. 1999). “We review de novo

questions of federal constitutional law.” United States v. Kaczynski, 551 F.3d

1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009).

1. Mauri argues that his money laundering convictions should be

overturned because 18 U.S.C. § 1957 is “unconstitutionally vague, in that it is so

broad that it did not provide [him] adequate notice.”1 “A criminal statute is void

for vagueness if it is ‘not sufficiently clear to provide guidance to citizens

concerning how they can avoid violating it and to provide authorities with

principles governing enforcement.’” United States v. Zhi Yong Guo, 634 F.3d

1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Jae Gab Kim, 449 F.3d 933,

942 (9th Cir. 2006)). When a defendant challenges a statute as applied to his own

conduct, the vagueness inquiry “turns on whether the statute provided adequate

notice to him that his particular conduct was proscribed.” United States v. Harris,

1 To the extent Mauri is advancing a separate challenge on overbreadth grounds, he does not argue that the money laundering statute improperly regulates protected speech. Therefore, the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is inapplicable. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“[I]n the First Amendment context, . . . plaintiffs [may] argue that a statute is overbroad because it is unclear whether it regulates a substantial amount of protected speech.”).

2 25-931 705 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 2013).

The language of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 provided adequate notice to Mauri that it

is illegal to engage in large financial transactions with funds that he knows are

derived from crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), (f)(1)–(3); see also 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1956(c)(7)(A), 1961(1)(B). Mauri’s conduct was clearly proscribed by the

statute. Indeed, as the evidence showed at trial, Mauri engaged in two transactions

involving more than $10,000 in funds that he knew were derived from his own

scheme to defraud. Because Mauri had actual notice that his conduct was

prohibited, we decline to set aside his money laundering convictions for vagueness.

See United States v. Backlund, 689 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a

conviction will not be set aside for vagueness if the defendant had adequate notice

because “there is no due process problem”).

2. Mauri also argues that that his money laundering convictions merged

with his wire fraud convictions. But Mauri’s money laundering was not “a central

component of” his criminal scheme. See United States v. Bush, 626 F.3d 527, 535

(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir.

2009)). At trial, the government established that the purpose of Mauri’s overall

scheme was to attract new clients who entrusted him with their money and

believed he would build them a custom home in return. The evidence also showed

that Mauri never intended to finish these projects as promised. While the

3 25-931 government highlighted evidence that Mauri spent most of his clients’ money on

purchases unrelated to their projects, these purchases were not “central to carrying

out the scheme’s objective of encouraging further investment.” See United States

v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010). And the same is true for the

two money laundering transactions. Indeed, Mauri’s scheme to defraud was not

reliant on the two transfers into his wife’s business account. Mauri’s money

laundering convictions therefore did not merge with his wire fraud convictions.

See Bush, 626 F.3d at 535.

3. To the extent Mauri advances a double jeopardy challenge, it is

meritless because the two statutes at issue involve different elements. Compare 18

U.S.C. § 1343, with 18 U.S.C. § 1957. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166

(1977).

AFFIRMED.

4 25-931