United States v. Mateo-Reyes

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 12, 2025
• Docket: 24-5725
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 12 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-5725 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 3:23-cr-01722-LL-1 v. MEMORANDUM* HECTOR DANIEL MATEO-REYES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Linda Lopez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 4, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: BEA, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Hector Daniel Mateo-Reyes appeals the district court’s

denial of his motion to suppress evidence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). On July 30, 2023, United States Border Patrol Agent Jeremy Peres was

patrolling a mountainous area near San Diego, California known for illegal border

crossings when he stopped Mateo-Reyes pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968), to investigate possible illegal activity. Mateo-Reyes told Agent Peres that

he was a United States citizen, he lived on Barrett Lake Road, and he was hiking in

the area. Agent Peres observed that he was not wearing hiking clothes, and they

were not in an area likely used for hiking from Barrett Lake Road. Agent Peres

asked Mateo-Reyes for identification. During this exchange, Mateo-Reyes

confessed to being a citizen of Mexico without the legal right to enter or remain in

the United States. He was subsequently convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a), (b).

1. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress

evidence, including whether a Terry stop became a de facto arrest and whether

reasonable suspicion existed to perform a Terry stop and frisk. United States v.

Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 2003) (denial of motion to

suppress); United States v. Miles, 247 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) (Terry stop

becomes de facto arrest); United States v. Bontemps, 977 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir.

2020) (reasonable suspicion).

Considering the characteristics of the area, the pattern of illegal border

crossing activity, Mateo-Reyes’ proximity to the border, and his suspicious hiking

2 24-5725 narrative, Agent Peres had reasonable suspicion of illegal activity to justify the

Terry stop of Mateo-Reyes. See United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074,

1079 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (listing factors relevant to the court’s “totality of the

circumstances” review of an officer’s reasonable suspicion). The stop was not

excessively prolonged because Agent Peres’ suspicion had not dissipated at the

time of Mateo-Reyes’ statements, and his questions were related to the purpose of

the Terry stop—retrieving Mateo-Reyes’ identification to confirm his citizenship.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015) (“Authority for the seizure

thus ends when tasks tied to the [stop] are—or reasonably should have been—

completed.”). Finally, the stop did not transform into a de facto arrest requiring

probable cause. Generally, when police move a suspect to a police station or

interrogation room, the Terry stop becomes a de facto arrest because “the

circumstances are deemed to be more coercive than the brief public interview

authorized by [Terry].” United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 914–15 (9th Cir.

1988). None of the hallmarks of coercion were present here as Agent Peres did not

isolate Mateo-Reyes from the public, move him to a patrol vehicle, or transport

him to the Border Patrol station before Mateo-Reyes confessed. Nor did Agent

Peres use force or otherwise coerce Mateo-Reyes into believing he was not free to

leave. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Mateo-Reyes’ motion

to suppress.

3 24-5725 2. The denial of an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000). The

district court properly found that the facts Mateo-Reyes now highlights were

immaterial to its analysis of the motion to suppress. And none of Mateo-Reyes’

alleged disputed facts create a meaningful conflict on appeal. Because

Mateo-Reyes failed to “allege facts with sufficient definiteness, clarity, and

specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that contested issues of fact exist,”

the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary

hearing on his motion to suppress. Id. at 620.

AFFIRMED.

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