NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0368n.06
No. 25-3022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jul 24, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MARTY TAYLOR, ) OHIO ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION
Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Marty Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of
escaping custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). He appeals his sentence of 10 months of
imprisonment, arguing that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For
the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2024, Taylor was transferred from a federal prison to the Oriana House, a halfway
house in Cleveland, Ohio. He remained in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons while at the Oriana
House. On June 19, 2024, he went to his job at a factory in Cuyahoga Heights, Ohio. At 9:25
a.m., Taylor claimed that he had a medical emergency requiring attention at a hospital’s emergency
room, so he was permitted to go to a local hospital in Cleveland. After Taylor failed to return to
work or contact the Oriana House, he was placed on escape status at 11:15 a.m. He was not taken No. 25-3022, United States v. Taylor
into custody until September 9, 2024, when Taylor turned himself in to the Akron Police
Department. Taylor has since stated that, during his break at work on June 19, he had received a
call from his niece that his mother was in the hospital. He went to stay with his mother, who
passed away that night, and he attended her memorial service on July 14.
On October 16, 2024, Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).
In its Presentence Report, the Probation Department recommended a base offense level of 13. It
then applied a four-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(3) for Taylor’s escape from
the nonsecure custody of a halfway house. The Probation Department also applied a two-level
reduction for his acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The net total offense level
was thus set at 7.
After reviewing Taylor’s criminal history, the Probation Department recommended a
criminal-history category of III. This resulted in an applicable Guidelines range of 4 to 10 months
of imprisonment.
Taylor was sentenced on January 15, 2025. The district court began the sentencing hearing
by reviewing the Presentence Report and identifying the uncontested Guidelines range of 4 to 10
months of imprisonment. Both parties then discussed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Defense counsel argued that Taylor’s medical conditions, which required extensive medical
treatment, and the nature of his offense warranted a low-end sentence of four months, which would
be for time already served. Counsel emphasized that Taylor had a full-time job, was making good
progress before this offense, and had left custody to be with his dying mother. Taylor himself
pointed out that he had accepted responsibility, was doing well, and wanted to continue making
progress.
-2- No. 25-3022, United States v. Taylor
On the other hand, the government argued that Taylor had been given the opportunity to
leave the prison setting for a halfway house, but did not follow the rules, and that he had previous
instances of failing to report. It thus asked the court to apply a within-Guidelines sentence of up
to 10 months.
After hearing argument from both parties, the district court sentenced Taylor to 10 months
of imprisonment, with credit for time served, followed by supervised release for three years. The
court noted that the “sentence [is] sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to satisfy the purposes
of sentencing.” Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R. 25, Page ID #140. It also noted that Taylor had a “lengthy
history of noncompliance, not complying with rules,” including six occasions where he violated
the conditions of probation in the past. Id. The court also discussed Taylor’s prior convictions for
robberies.
But the court noted several mitigating factors, including Taylor’s mental-health issues,
physical-health issues, and lack of family support. It stated that those mitigating factors, however,
did not outweigh the aggravating factors, specifically Taylor’s history of noncompliance. Defense
counsel objected “to the extent that the [c]ourt did not impose a lower sentence based on the
mitigating circumstances” that the defense had presented. Id., PageID. 142. This timely appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
We generally review a defendant’s sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness
by applying the abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A
district court abuses its discretion when it applies the incorrect legal standard, misapplies the
correct legal standard, or relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact.” United States v. Pugh,
-3- No. 25-3022, United States v. Taylor
405 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But if a
defendant has not preserved his challenge to the sentence imposed, we review under the plain-
error standard. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 170–72 (2020). “To show
plain error, a defendant must show (1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected
defendant’s substantial rights[,] and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010).
B. Procedural reasonableness
Taylor contends that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The
government argues that Taylor did not preserve his objection to the procedural reasonableness of
his sentence. But because Taylor’s argument fails under both abuse-of-discretion review and
plain-error review, we need not decide whether his objection was properly preserved.
“A sentence may be held procedurally unreasonable if it is marked by ‘significant
procedural error, such as . . . failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v.
Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 753 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). The key question is
whether the court laid out “a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). A district court must “make the basis
of its decision sufficiently clear on the record to permit reasonable appellate review,” but “need
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0368n.06
No. 25-3022
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Jul 24, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MARTY TAYLOR, ) OHIO ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION
Before: CLAY, GILMAN, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Marty Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of
escaping custody, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). He appeals his sentence of 10 months of
imprisonment, arguing that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For
the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2024, Taylor was transferred from a federal prison to the Oriana House, a halfway
house in Cleveland, Ohio. He remained in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons while at the Oriana
House. On June 19, 2024, he went to his job at a factory in Cuyahoga Heights, Ohio. At 9:25
a.m., Taylor claimed that he had a medical emergency requiring attention at a hospital’s emergency
room, so he was permitted to go to a local hospital in Cleveland. After Taylor failed to return to
work or contact the Oriana House, he was placed on escape status at 11:15 a.m. He was not taken No. 25-3022, United States v. Taylor
into custody until September 9, 2024, when Taylor turned himself in to the Akron Police
Department. Taylor has since stated that, during his break at work on June 19, he had received a
call from his niece that his mother was in the hospital. He went to stay with his mother, who
passed away that night, and he attended her memorial service on July 14.
On October 16, 2024, Taylor pleaded guilty to one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).
In its Presentence Report, the Probation Department recommended a base offense level of 13. It
then applied a four-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(3) for Taylor’s escape from
the nonsecure custody of a halfway house. The Probation Department also applied a two-level
reduction for his acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The net total offense level
was thus set at 7.
After reviewing Taylor’s criminal history, the Probation Department recommended a
criminal-history category of III. This resulted in an applicable Guidelines range of 4 to 10 months
of imprisonment.
Taylor was sentenced on January 15, 2025. The district court began the sentencing hearing
by reviewing the Presentence Report and identifying the uncontested Guidelines range of 4 to 10
months of imprisonment. Both parties then discussed the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.
Defense counsel argued that Taylor’s medical conditions, which required extensive medical
treatment, and the nature of his offense warranted a low-end sentence of four months, which would
be for time already served. Counsel emphasized that Taylor had a full-time job, was making good
progress before this offense, and had left custody to be with his dying mother. Taylor himself
pointed out that he had accepted responsibility, was doing well, and wanted to continue making
progress.
-2- No. 25-3022, United States v. Taylor
On the other hand, the government argued that Taylor had been given the opportunity to
leave the prison setting for a halfway house, but did not follow the rules, and that he had previous
instances of failing to report. It thus asked the court to apply a within-Guidelines sentence of up
to 10 months.
After hearing argument from both parties, the district court sentenced Taylor to 10 months
of imprisonment, with credit for time served, followed by supervised release for three years. The
court noted that the “sentence [is] sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to satisfy the purposes
of sentencing.” Sent’g Hr’g Tr., R. 25, Page ID #140. It also noted that Taylor had a “lengthy
history of noncompliance, not complying with rules,” including six occasions where he violated
the conditions of probation in the past. Id. The court also discussed Taylor’s prior convictions for
robberies.
But the court noted several mitigating factors, including Taylor’s mental-health issues,
physical-health issues, and lack of family support. It stated that those mitigating factors, however,
did not outweigh the aggravating factors, specifically Taylor’s history of noncompliance. Defense
counsel objected “to the extent that the [c]ourt did not impose a lower sentence based on the
mitigating circumstances” that the defense had presented. Id., PageID. 142. This timely appeal
followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
We generally review a defendant’s sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness
by applying the abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “A
district court abuses its discretion when it applies the incorrect legal standard, misapplies the
correct legal standard, or relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact.” United States v. Pugh,
-3- No. 25-3022, United States v. Taylor
405 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But if a
defendant has not preserved his challenge to the sentence imposed, we review under the plain-
error standard. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 170–72 (2020). “To show
plain error, a defendant must show (1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected
defendant’s substantial rights[,] and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 802 (6th Cir. 2010).
B. Procedural reasonableness
Taylor contends that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The
government argues that Taylor did not preserve his objection to the procedural reasonableness of
his sentence. But because Taylor’s argument fails under both abuse-of-discretion review and
plain-error review, we need not decide whether his objection was properly preserved.
“A sentence may be held procedurally unreasonable if it is marked by ‘significant
procedural error, such as . . . failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.’” United States v.
Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 753 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). The key question is
whether the court laid out “a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). A district court must “make the basis
of its decision sufficiently clear on the record to permit reasonable appellate review,” but “need
not engage in a ritual incantation of all the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Presto, 498 F.3d
415, 419 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, Taylor’s procedural-reasonableness
argument that the district court erred in not tying its sentencing decision to an analysis of the
§ 3553(a) factors fails. The court discussed the need for the sentence to meet the goals of
sentencing, and, in particular, to deal with Taylor’s history of noncompliance. See United States
-4- No. 25-3022, United States v. Taylor
v. Torres, 634 F. App’x 575, 576 (6th Cir. 2016) (“No doubt, the court could have spoken at greater
length (and so could we), but its account sufficed to provide an explanation for the sentence and a
basis for reviewing it.”). Although the better practice would be for the district court to discuss
some of the § 3553(a) factors explicitly, the court made clear that Taylor’s criminal history, his
history of violating probation, and a need for deterrence justified a sentence on the upper end of
the Guidelines range. The court also acknowledged Taylor’s mitigating circumstances, but
explained that they did not outweigh the aggravating ones. We consequently conclude that
Taylor’s sentence was procedurally reasonable.
C. Substantive reasonableness
Taylor also argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. He contends that the
district court focused exclusively on Taylor’s prior history to the exclusion of other sentencing
factors. We review that argument under the abuse-of-discretion standard. See United States v.
Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
“A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court . . . gives
an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United
States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008). The § 3553(a) factors, which the court must
consider, include “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” “the history and characteristics of
the defendant,” and the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “promote
respect for the law,” “provide just punishment,” “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,”
and “protect the public.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
“In reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we must ‘take into account the totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v.
Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Sentences within a
-5- No. 25-3022, United States v. Taylor
defendant’s applicable Guidelines range may be presumed reasonable. Id. (“For sentences within
the Guidelines, we may apply a rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness.”). We must
also “give ‘due deference’ to the district court’s conclusion that the sentence imposed is warranted
by the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “The fact that [we] might reasonably
have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the
district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
We conclude that Taylor’s within-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. The
record shows that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and determined that the most
appropriate sentence was at the high end of Taylor’s Guidelines range. Despite Taylor’s arguments
to the contrary, the court considered mitigating factors, including his mental health, his physical
health, and his lack of family support. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Taylor.
III. CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
-6-