United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 20-1812
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ORLANDO MIGUEL MARTÍNEZ-RAMOS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Kayatta, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Rick Nemcik-Cruz, with whom Andrés González Berdecía were on brief, for the Appellant. Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, were on brief, for the Appellee.
May 30, 2025 AFRAME, Circuit Judge. This is a sentencing appeal.
Defendant-appellant Orlando Miguel Martínez-Ramos pleaded guilty
to carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and aiding and
abetting the same, an offense carrying a twenty-five-year maximum
sentence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(2), 2. The conviction stemmed from
a home invasion, robbery, brutal physical attack, and car theft
carried out by Martínez-Ramos and his half-brother, Eliezer
Rosario-Ramos. The victim, a 77-year-old woman, died nine days
after the crime. The advisory guideline sentencing range that
Martínez-Ramos and the government thought applicable topped out at
fourteen years, but Martínez-Ramos acknowledged in his plea
agreement that an upward variance was warranted, at least in part
because of "the victim's death within nine days of the carjacking
and attack."
At sentencing, Martínez-Ramos argued for a fifteen-year
sentence (a one-year upward variance) and the government asked for
sixteen years (a two-year upward variance). The district court
did not accept either party's recommendation. Instead, the court
began the sentencing explanation by expressing agreement with the
analysis in the presentence report, which proposed a higher
advisory guideline range than was agreed to by the parties through
application of the guidelines' first-degree-murder cross
reference. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(c), 2A1.1. Application of that
cross reference would have yielded a recommended sentence of life
- 2 - imprisonment, which would have been reduced to twenty-five years
because of the applicable statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2).
But although the district court thought that there were
grounds for applying the first-degree murder cross reference, it
did not do so. The court gave two reasons for this decision.
First, notwithstanding its inclination to follow the presentence
report's position, it wished to defer to the government's view
that the causation evidence was insufficient to support applying
the cross reference. Second, it believed that a twenty-five-year
sentence would be "harsher than necessary," given Martínez-Ramos's
youth. The court therefore imposed a sentence of eighteen years,
explaining that a substantial upward variance from the guideline
range was warranted because, among other things, the physical
attack upon the victim contributed to her death. The sentence
varied four years above the guideline range ultimately adopted by
the court, and two and three years, respectively, above the variant
sentences sought by the government and Martínez-Ramos.
Martínez-Ramos has filed two briefs challenging the
lawfulness of this sentence. The first, filed by his original
appellate counsel, argues that the district court's upward
variance was substantively unreasonable because the record was
"devoid of evidence to support the factual determination that there
is any causal link between [Martínez-Ramos's] actions and the
victim's death . . . ." The second, filed by newly appointed
- 3 - counsel after Martínez-Ramos's original counsel withdrew, argues
that the court applied too lenient a standard of causation in
connecting Martínez-Ramos's actions to the victim's death. But in
a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter filed after oral argument, the newly
appointed counsel commendably acknowledged that this latter
argument is inconsistent with circuit precedent. See United States
v. Heindenstrom, 946 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2019). And counsel
does not express an intention to challenge that precedent.
Consequently, the only remaining argument is that there
was an absence of evidence to support the district court's
conclusion that the physical attack upon the victim contributed to
her death. The defendant labels the argument as contesting the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. But given that the
argument challenges as unsupported the court's factual finding
that the attack contributed to the victim's death, it is better
understood as arguing that the court's judgment was tainted by a
procedural error. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007) (characterizing as procedural error the imposition of a
sentence based on "clearly erroneous facts"). We review such
factual determinations for clear error. Heindenstrom, 946 F.3d at
63 ("[W]e afford de novo review to the interpretation and
application of the sentencing guidelines, evaluate the sentencing
court's factfinding for clear error, and assay its judgment calls
- 4 - for abuse of discretion." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
First, we reiterate that Martínez-Ramos acknowledged in his plea
agreement that an upward variance was warranted, at least in part,
because of "the victim's death within nine days of the carjacking
and attack." He therefore cannot now complain that the court
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v.
Ortiz-Torres, 449 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the
district court did not clearly err in making a drug-quantity
determination that was consistent with the drug quantity to which
the defendant admitted in his plea agreement).
Second, Martínez-Ramos's contention that the record is
"devoid of evidence" connecting the attack and the victim's
subsequent death is inaccurate. While the autopsy lists four
causes of death -- acute pulmonary edema, atherosclerotic and
hypertensive cardiac disease, uncontrolled arterial hypertension,
and uncontrolled diabetes mellitus -- it also states that
"[f]acial and bodily trauma" were contributory factors. And it
lists the manner of death as "[h]omicide," with a disclaimer
stating that this was not a legal determination. Martínez-Ramos
- 5 - introduced no contrary evidence demonstrating a reason for
declining to take these expert conclusions at face value.1
Third, and finally, we cannot overlook the nature of the
attack itself. Martínez-Ramos and his half-brother broke into the
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United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 20-1812
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
ORLANDO MIGUEL MARTÍNEZ-RAMOS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Kayatta, and Aframe, Circuit Judges.
Rick Nemcik-Cruz, with whom Andrés González Berdecía were on brief, for the Appellant. Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, and W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, were on brief, for the Appellee.
May 30, 2025 AFRAME, Circuit Judge. This is a sentencing appeal.
Defendant-appellant Orlando Miguel Martínez-Ramos pleaded guilty
to carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury and aiding and
abetting the same, an offense carrying a twenty-five-year maximum
sentence. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(2), 2. The conviction stemmed from
a home invasion, robbery, brutal physical attack, and car theft
carried out by Martínez-Ramos and his half-brother, Eliezer
Rosario-Ramos. The victim, a 77-year-old woman, died nine days
after the crime. The advisory guideline sentencing range that
Martínez-Ramos and the government thought applicable topped out at
fourteen years, but Martínez-Ramos acknowledged in his plea
agreement that an upward variance was warranted, at least in part
because of "the victim's death within nine days of the carjacking
and attack."
At sentencing, Martínez-Ramos argued for a fifteen-year
sentence (a one-year upward variance) and the government asked for
sixteen years (a two-year upward variance). The district court
did not accept either party's recommendation. Instead, the court
began the sentencing explanation by expressing agreement with the
analysis in the presentence report, which proposed a higher
advisory guideline range than was agreed to by the parties through
application of the guidelines' first-degree-murder cross
reference. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1(c), 2A1.1. Application of that
cross reference would have yielded a recommended sentence of life
- 2 - imprisonment, which would have been reduced to twenty-five years
because of the applicable statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2).
But although the district court thought that there were
grounds for applying the first-degree murder cross reference, it
did not do so. The court gave two reasons for this decision.
First, notwithstanding its inclination to follow the presentence
report's position, it wished to defer to the government's view
that the causation evidence was insufficient to support applying
the cross reference. Second, it believed that a twenty-five-year
sentence would be "harsher than necessary," given Martínez-Ramos's
youth. The court therefore imposed a sentence of eighteen years,
explaining that a substantial upward variance from the guideline
range was warranted because, among other things, the physical
attack upon the victim contributed to her death. The sentence
varied four years above the guideline range ultimately adopted by
the court, and two and three years, respectively, above the variant
sentences sought by the government and Martínez-Ramos.
Martínez-Ramos has filed two briefs challenging the
lawfulness of this sentence. The first, filed by his original
appellate counsel, argues that the district court's upward
variance was substantively unreasonable because the record was
"devoid of evidence to support the factual determination that there
is any causal link between [Martínez-Ramos's] actions and the
victim's death . . . ." The second, filed by newly appointed
- 3 - counsel after Martínez-Ramos's original counsel withdrew, argues
that the court applied too lenient a standard of causation in
connecting Martínez-Ramos's actions to the victim's death. But in
a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter filed after oral argument, the newly
appointed counsel commendably acknowledged that this latter
argument is inconsistent with circuit precedent. See United States
v. Heindenstrom, 946 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2019). And counsel
does not express an intention to challenge that precedent.
Consequently, the only remaining argument is that there
was an absence of evidence to support the district court's
conclusion that the physical attack upon the victim contributed to
her death. The defendant labels the argument as contesting the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. But given that the
argument challenges as unsupported the court's factual finding
that the attack contributed to the victim's death, it is better
understood as arguing that the court's judgment was tainted by a
procedural error. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007) (characterizing as procedural error the imposition of a
sentence based on "clearly erroneous facts"). We review such
factual determinations for clear error. Heindenstrom, 946 F.3d at
63 ("[W]e afford de novo review to the interpretation and
application of the sentencing guidelines, evaluate the sentencing
court's factfinding for clear error, and assay its judgment calls
- 4 - for abuse of discretion." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
The district court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
First, we reiterate that Martínez-Ramos acknowledged in his plea
agreement that an upward variance was warranted, at least in part,
because of "the victim's death within nine days of the carjacking
and attack." He therefore cannot now complain that the court
reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v.
Ortiz-Torres, 449 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the
district court did not clearly err in making a drug-quantity
determination that was consistent with the drug quantity to which
the defendant admitted in his plea agreement).
Second, Martínez-Ramos's contention that the record is
"devoid of evidence" connecting the attack and the victim's
subsequent death is inaccurate. While the autopsy lists four
causes of death -- acute pulmonary edema, atherosclerotic and
hypertensive cardiac disease, uncontrolled arterial hypertension,
and uncontrolled diabetes mellitus -- it also states that
"[f]acial and bodily trauma" were contributory factors. And it
lists the manner of death as "[h]omicide," with a disclaimer
stating that this was not a legal determination. Martínez-Ramos
- 5 - introduced no contrary evidence demonstrating a reason for
declining to take these expert conclusions at face value.1
Third, and finally, we cannot overlook the nature of the
attack itself. Martínez-Ramos and his half-brother broke into the
elderly victim's house at about 9:00 p.m. as she was watching
television. They threw a cloth over her head, gagged her, and
tied her hands before stealing several of her personal effects and
her car. During the home invasion, one of the assailants
repeatedly hit the victim in the face and head with a frying pan
until she became unconscious. According to the autopsy, the victim
suffered fractures of the orbital floor of her left eye, the right
side of her nasal septum, and a finger on her left hand. She also
suffered several other contusions, abrasions, lacerations, and
bruises noted in the autopsy. She was hospitalized for three days
following the attack. Perhaps the victim's ensuing death from,
among other things, heart disease, uncontrolled hypertension, and
diabetes would have occurred regardless of the trauma from the
1There was a colloquy between defense counsel and the district court at the sentencing hearing where defense counsel made arguments referencing alternative meanings of the term "contributory" in the medical sense. These arguments were mere argumentation, not evidence, and the record before the district court provided no evidentiary support for defense counsel's arguments. Defense counsel admitted as much at oral argument. See, e.g., United States v. Hammer, 3 F.3d 266, 273 (8th Cir. 1993)(observing that, in the sentencing context, "statements of counsel are not evidence").
- 6 - attack. But, on the record presented, the district court was not
clearly wrong in concluding otherwise.
Affirmed.
- 7 -