United States v. Martin

Opinion

Case: 25-30712 Document: 73-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/30/2026

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED April 30, 2026 No. 25-30712 Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Elijah Martin,

Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana USDC No. 2:24-CR-54-1 ______________________________

Before Stewart, Engelhardt, and Douglas, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Defendant-Appellant Elijah Martin pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 1 Martin timely appealed. Martin argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional

_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. 1 Prior to pleading guilty, Martin moved to dismiss the indictment based on the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him, that it is unconstitutionally vague, and that it is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s power to regulate commerce. The district court denied the motion. Case: 25-30712 Document: 73-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/30/2026

No. 25-30712

as applied to him. Martin’s predicate felony convictions are for simple drug possession and for possession of a firearm by a felon. His existing conviction for firearm possession was based on his conviction for simple drug possession. Martin argues that United States v. Hembree controls his appeal such that his convictions must be reversed. 165 F.4th 909 (5th Cir. 2026). The government concedes error and that the issue is foreclosed under Hembree. In Hembree, our court reversed the defendant’s § 922(g)(1) conviction predicated on a conviction for simple drug possession because it was unconstitutional as applied to him. Id. at 910. We held that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen, our court under Diaz takes a felony-by- felony approach to assess whether there is a sufficient historical analogue for the punishment of any of the § 922(g) predicate offenses. Id. at 912–13 (citing N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)); United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2822 (2025). Our court found that the government did not meet its burden to provide a historical analogue for simple drug possession under § 922(g)(1). Id. at 918. We further explained that although our court reasoned in Kimble that a predicate felony conviction of drug trafficking was constitutional, the decision was “narrow” and did not speak to whether there is a historical analogue to simple drug possession. Id. at 916–17 (citing United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025)), cert. denied, No. 25-5747, 2026 WL 135675 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). The government similarly fails to present a historical analogue here. The district court relied on extending Kimble’s drug trafficking analogues to predicate drug possession convictions when denying Martin’s motion to dismiss the indictment. But, as in Hembree, Martin’s convictions are

2 Case: 25-30712 Document: 73-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/30/2026

predicated on simple drug possession, which we have since held to be unconstitutional and distinguishable from Kimble. Id. at 916–18. 2 In light of the foregoing and the government’s concession of error, the government has not met its burden to show that our history and tradition support Matin’s predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1). We hold that Martin’s convictions violate the Second Amendment as applied to him and REVERSE his convictions.

_____________________ 2 Even Martin’s felon-in-possession predicate would not suffice on its own considering it too is predicated on simple drug possession. Diaz, 116 F.4th at 468 (discussing that a firearm possession predicate under § 922(g)(1) was not considered a crime “until 1938 at the earliest,” that being a felon today does not necessarily mean one would have been a felon in the 18th century, and instead considering the government’s evidence “more specifically targeted to [the defendant’s] circumstances.”).