United States v. Martin Anderson

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: May 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-4043
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4043 Doc: 56 Filed: 05/18/2026 Pg: 1 of 4

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4043

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MARTIN THOMAS ANDERSON, a/k/a Martin McNeil,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:23-cr-00031-JPB-JPM-1)

Submitted: March 19, 2026 Decided: May 18, 2026

Before WILKINSON, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Frank C. Walker II, FRANK WALKER LAW, Clairton, Pennsylvania, for Appellant. Matthew L. Harvey, United States Attorney, Clayton J. Reid, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4043 Doc: 56 Filed: 05/18/2026 Pg: 2 of 4

PER CURIAM:

Martin Thomas Anderson appeals the 151-month sentence imposed following his

guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). As relevant to this appeal, in calculating Anderson’s

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, the district court assessed a base offense level of 30

based on a finding that the offense involved at least 50 grams but less than 150 grams of

“Ice,” see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(5) (2023), and applied a two-

level enhancement because the offense involved the use of a firearm, see USSG

2D1.1(b)(1). Both the drug evidence and the firearm relevant to these determinations had

been recovered from a backpack found by Anderson’s crashed vehicle after an attempted

traffic stop. On appeal, Anderson argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that

the backpack and its contents were attributable to him for sentencing purposes. We affirm.

We “review[] all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside

the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.

Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 257 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). In

performing this review, we first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether

the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the

Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain

the chosen sentence.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020). Only if

“the district court has not committed procedural error,” do we then assess the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence. Id.

2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4043 Doc: 56 Filed: 05/18/2026 Pg: 3 of 4

“When determining whether the district court properly applied the advisory

Sentencing Guidelines, [we] review[] the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its

factual findings for clear error.” Claybrooks, 90 F.4th at 253 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “‘Under the clear error standard, we will only reverse if left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). “It is well settled that we review the district court’s calculation of the quantity

of drugs attributable to a defendant for sentencing purposes for clear error.’” United

States v. Everett, 91 F.4th 698, 713 (4th Cir. 2024) (citation modified).

“In undertaking that task, district courts enjoy considerable leeway and may give

weight to any relevant information before it, including uncorroborated hearsay, provided

that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its accuracy.” United

States v. Banks, 104 F.4th 496, 526 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Further, sentencing courts may consider acquitted conduct in establishing drug amounts

for the purpose of sentencing, so long as the amounts are established by a preponderance

of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And, “there is ‘no requirement

that the government present its relevant conduct evidence at trial, nor is the district court

at sentencing bound by the evidence presented at trial when determining drug quantity or

other relevant conduct.’” Everett, 91 F.4th at 713. This Court “thus afford[s] great

deference to a district judge’s credibility determinations and how the court may choose to

weigh the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Based on these principles, we discern no clear error in the district court’s finding

that the backpack and its contents were attributable to Anderson and therefore in either its

3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4043 Doc: 56 Filed: 05/18/2026 Pg: 4 of 4

calculation of the applicable drug weight or application of the firearm enhancement.

Viewing the facts and circumstances in their totality, including the officer’s observations

and testimony, the evidence from the scene, and the identifying information found in and

around the backpack, the district court reasonably concluded that the backpack was

attributable to or owned by Anderson. Anderson’s arguments to the contrary fail to show

that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous or that the court made any other

error in its calculation of the advisory Guidelines range that would render his sentence

procedurally unreasonable. Anderson does not challenge the substantive reasonableness

of his sentence.

Anderson has also filed a motion to adopt his pro se reply to the Government’s

response and a pro se motion to remove his counsel of record and appoint substitute

counsel. Alternatively, he asks to proceed pro se. We grant Anderson’s motion to adopt

his reply brief. However, we deny his motion to appoint substitute counsel or to proceed

pro se. We affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED