NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0233n.06
Case No. 24-6014 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 08, 2025 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE MARTEZ LAMAR POE, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: BOGGS, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Martez Lamar Poe with one count
of knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Poe moved to
dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment, both on its face and as applied to him. The district court denied the motion. Poe
conditionally pleaded guilty and reserved the right to appeal that denial. He now appeals on his
as applied challenge, contending that reversal and a limited remand are necessary so that he can
establish that he’s not dangerous under United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024).
But, because § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him and a remand isn’t required, we affirm.
I.
In June 2023, while on patrol, officers with Tennessee’s Jackson Police Department saw
Martez Lamar Poe leave a house carrying a rifle. They saw Poe put the rifle in a car. They knew,
through prior interactions, that he was not allowed to have a gun because he was a felon. But they No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
ran his record to confirm this fact. And, in fact, he had been convicted and sentenced that February
for evading arrest and driving with a revoked license. Indeed, he was on probation for this
conviction when the officers saw him in June.
With that confirmation, the officers followed Poe as he drove off. They followed him to
the parking lot of an apartment complex, where he got out of the car and quickly entered one of
the units. Poe left the rifle in the car. One officer went to Poe’s parked car and the other went to
the unit Poe entered. The officer at the car saw the rifle lying in the front passenger seat. The
other found Poe and arrested him. When they recovered the rifle, they found it loaded with one
round in the chamber and thirteen rounds in the magazine.
In February 2024, a grand jury indicted Poe with one count of knowingly possessing a
firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment,
arguing § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional, facially and as applied to him, under the Second
Amendment. The district court denied the motion. It held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional,
reasoning that Poe was a felon and the Second Amendment doesn’t protect felons.
Poe entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved the right to appeal that denial. The court
sentenced Poe to 30 months’ imprisonment.1 He timely appealed.
II.
Poe appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. The sole issue is whether
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is unconstitutional as
1 His Presentence Report (PSR) calculated a total offense level of 12, a criminal-history category of VI, and an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment, and recommended a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, Poe requested a sentence of time served while the government asked for 32 months of imprisonment. 2 No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
applied to him because it infringes on his Second Amendment rights. We review this constitutional
challenge de novo. United States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822, 824 (6th Cir. 2024).
“The Second Amendment provides: ‘A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.’”
Williams, 113 F.4th at 643 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. II.). Section 922(g)(1), though,
permanently disarms felons by making it “unlawful for any person—who has been convicted in
any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess “any
firearm or ammunition.”
We’ve held that felons are included among “the people” protected by the Second
Amendment. Williams, 113 F.4th at 649–50. But because “our nation’s history and tradition
demonstrate that Congress may disarm individuals they believe are dangerous,” and “most
applications of § 922(g)(1) are constitutional,” we’ve ruled that “§ 922(g)(1) is constitutional on
its face.” 2 Id. at 657, 662. At the same time, we’ve said that “§ 922(g)(1) might be susceptible to
an as-applied challenge in certain cases.” Id. at 657. In such cases, a court must assess whether a
defendant’s criminal history reveals dangerousness consistent with our nation’s history and
tradition of regulating firearms ownership by dangerous individuals. Id. at 658–62. If the
defendant’s criminal history does, permanent disarmament is constitutional as applied to that
defendant. Id. at 662–63.
There are a few things to keep in mind when reviewing as applied challenges to
§ 922(g)(1). For one, the burden is on the defendant “to demonstrate that he is not dangerous.”
Id. at 657. For another, we’ve been careful not to “draw bright categorical lines” to define
dangerousness. Id. at 660. But we’ve held that if a defendant has committed “a crime that
2 Poe concedes as much and abandons his facial challenge on appeal. 3 No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
inherently poses a significant threat of danger,” even without direct violence against an individual,
then such evidence “strongly suggest[s] that [this] individual is dangerous.” Id. at 660, 663.
And an evaluation of dangerousness requires consideration of the “individual’s entire criminal
record—not just the predicate offense for purposes of § 922(g)(1).” Id. at 657–58. On this, a court
is “not confined to the fact of conviction alone, but may consider how an offense was committed.”
United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2024); accord Williams, 113 F.4th at 660,
663.
Poe wants a remand, despite making no effort on appeal to show he’s not dangerous. He
claims that he never had the chance below to show he’s not dangerous. But that’s not entirely
accurate. True, he moved to dismiss in May 2024, and the district court denied his motion in
June 2024, which was before we issued Williams in August 2024. And Williams “left open the
possibility for a defendant to succeed on an as-applied challenge” if he satisfies his burden to prove
that he’s not dangerous. United States v. Vaughn, No. 23-5790, 2024 WL 4615853, at *2 (6th Cir.
Oct. 30, 2024).
But the district court didn’t sentence him until October 2024. And between August and his
sentencing, Poe didn’t acknowledge Williams or try to establish that his past convictions aren’t
dangerous. It’s true that when the district court denied the motion to dismiss, it held that the
Second Amendment didn’t protect Poe since he was a felon. But the court didn’t have the benefit
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0233n.06
Case No. 24-6014 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 08, 2025 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE MARTEZ LAMAR POE, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: BOGGS, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. A grand jury indicted Martez Lamar Poe with one count
of knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Poe moved to
dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment, both on its face and as applied to him. The district court denied the motion. Poe
conditionally pleaded guilty and reserved the right to appeal that denial. He now appeals on his
as applied challenge, contending that reversal and a limited remand are necessary so that he can
establish that he’s not dangerous under United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024).
But, because § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him and a remand isn’t required, we affirm.
I.
In June 2023, while on patrol, officers with Tennessee’s Jackson Police Department saw
Martez Lamar Poe leave a house carrying a rifle. They saw Poe put the rifle in a car. They knew,
through prior interactions, that he was not allowed to have a gun because he was a felon. But they No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
ran his record to confirm this fact. And, in fact, he had been convicted and sentenced that February
for evading arrest and driving with a revoked license. Indeed, he was on probation for this
conviction when the officers saw him in June.
With that confirmation, the officers followed Poe as he drove off. They followed him to
the parking lot of an apartment complex, where he got out of the car and quickly entered one of
the units. Poe left the rifle in the car. One officer went to Poe’s parked car and the other went to
the unit Poe entered. The officer at the car saw the rifle lying in the front passenger seat. The
other found Poe and arrested him. When they recovered the rifle, they found it loaded with one
round in the chamber and thirteen rounds in the magazine.
In February 2024, a grand jury indicted Poe with one count of knowingly possessing a
firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment,
arguing § 922(g)(1) was unconstitutional, facially and as applied to him, under the Second
Amendment. The district court denied the motion. It held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional,
reasoning that Poe was a felon and the Second Amendment doesn’t protect felons.
Poe entered a conditional guilty plea that reserved the right to appeal that denial. The court
sentenced Poe to 30 months’ imprisonment.1 He timely appealed.
II.
Poe appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. The sole issue is whether
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is unconstitutional as
1 His Presentence Report (PSR) calculated a total offense level of 12, a criminal-history category of VI, and an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment, and recommended a sentence of 30 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, Poe requested a sentence of time served while the government asked for 32 months of imprisonment. 2 No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
applied to him because it infringes on his Second Amendment rights. We review this constitutional
challenge de novo. United States v. Gailes, 118 F.4th 822, 824 (6th Cir. 2024).
“The Second Amendment provides: ‘A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.’”
Williams, 113 F.4th at 643 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. II.). Section 922(g)(1), though,
permanently disarms felons by making it “unlawful for any person—who has been convicted in
any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to possess “any
firearm or ammunition.”
We’ve held that felons are included among “the people” protected by the Second
Amendment. Williams, 113 F.4th at 649–50. But because “our nation’s history and tradition
demonstrate that Congress may disarm individuals they believe are dangerous,” and “most
applications of § 922(g)(1) are constitutional,” we’ve ruled that “§ 922(g)(1) is constitutional on
its face.” 2 Id. at 657, 662. At the same time, we’ve said that “§ 922(g)(1) might be susceptible to
an as-applied challenge in certain cases.” Id. at 657. In such cases, a court must assess whether a
defendant’s criminal history reveals dangerousness consistent with our nation’s history and
tradition of regulating firearms ownership by dangerous individuals. Id. at 658–62. If the
defendant’s criminal history does, permanent disarmament is constitutional as applied to that
defendant. Id. at 662–63.
There are a few things to keep in mind when reviewing as applied challenges to
§ 922(g)(1). For one, the burden is on the defendant “to demonstrate that he is not dangerous.”
Id. at 657. For another, we’ve been careful not to “draw bright categorical lines” to define
dangerousness. Id. at 660. But we’ve held that if a defendant has committed “a crime that
2 Poe concedes as much and abandons his facial challenge on appeal. 3 No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
inherently poses a significant threat of danger,” even without direct violence against an individual,
then such evidence “strongly suggest[s] that [this] individual is dangerous.” Id. at 660, 663.
And an evaluation of dangerousness requires consideration of the “individual’s entire criminal
record—not just the predicate offense for purposes of § 922(g)(1).” Id. at 657–58. On this, a court
is “not confined to the fact of conviction alone, but may consider how an offense was committed.”
United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492, 499 (6th Cir. 2024); accord Williams, 113 F.4th at 660,
663.
Poe wants a remand, despite making no effort on appeal to show he’s not dangerous. He
claims that he never had the chance below to show he’s not dangerous. But that’s not entirely
accurate. True, he moved to dismiss in May 2024, and the district court denied his motion in
June 2024, which was before we issued Williams in August 2024. And Williams “left open the
possibility for a defendant to succeed on an as-applied challenge” if he satisfies his burden to prove
that he’s not dangerous. United States v. Vaughn, No. 23-5790, 2024 WL 4615853, at *2 (6th Cir.
Oct. 30, 2024).
But the district court didn’t sentence him until October 2024. And between August and his
sentencing, Poe didn’t acknowledge Williams or try to establish that his past convictions aren’t
dangerous. It’s true that when the district court denied the motion to dismiss, it held that the
Second Amendment didn’t protect Poe since he was a felon. But the court didn’t have the benefit
of Williams.
Regardless, what’s important is that Poe had a chance, with Williams in hand, to at least
ask the district court for what he is now requesting from us: to “develop a record” and “present
4 No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
evidence that he is not dangerous.” Appellant Br. at 6. And importantly, on appeal, Poe fails to
tell us what “evidence” he would have presented on the dangerousness question.3
In any event, post-Williams, we’ve not required a remand to establish dangerousness when
a defendant’s criminal history makes clear that he’s dangerous and can be disarmed. See Morton,
123 F.4th at 500; Williams, 113 F.4th at 662; United States v. Henson, No. 24-3494, 2025 WL
1009666, at *7 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025); United States v. Fordham, No. 24-1491, 2025 WL 318229,
at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2025); Vaughn, 2024 WL 4615853, at *2. And Poe’s criminal history4
dooms his challenge.
Starting in March 2018, he was convicted of two counts of possession of a firearm with
intent to go armed, which generally means the offender is prepared to use the firearm. In
June 2019, he was convicted of escape. While already incarcerated, he was arrested after walking
away from trash-crew duty to a local restaurant. Then, in May 2020, Poe was convicted of
aggravated criminal trespassing and unlawfully possessing a firearm. While responding to a shots-
fired call at an apartment building, Jackson Police Department officers received a description of
an armed man with a handgun. Upon arrival at the building, an officer tried to stop Poe since he
fit the description. But Poe refused to stop. Instead, he ran into an apartment unit, without the
tenant’s permission, even though the tenant was home. Once inside, Poe tried to hide the gun in a
trash can.
3 In Williams, we stated that “district courts should make fact-specific dangerousness determinations after taking account of the unique circumstances of the individual, including details of his specific conviction.” 113 F.4th at 663. We aren’t opining on what would be appropriate for a defendant to present to the court on this question. We are only saying that whatever that might be, Poe hasn’t identified it. 4 We take portions of Poe’s criminal history from his PSR, to which he didn’t object below. See id. at 662. 5 No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
Poe’s criminal activity continued after this. In December 2020, he was again convicted for
unlawfully possessing a firearm. And in February 2023, Poe received his felony evading-arrest
conviction. There, a Jackson Police Department officer tried to pull him over because he was
wanted for a home invasion committed earlier that day. But he refused to stop and then sped up.
He eventually abandoned his car and fled on foot into the woods and dropped a weapon when
doing so.
Poe’s criminal history, marked by repeated firearm convictions and flight from law
enforcement while armed, indicates he’s a dangerous felon. See United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th
794, 797 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[R]epeated actions demonstrate[] a likelihood of future dangerous
conduct.”). Poe accumulated enough points to place him in the highest criminal category (VI)
under the Sentencing Guidelines in just six years. His multiple convictions for unlawfully
possessing firearms and possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed indicate his propensity
for having weapons with him when he shouldn’t. His escape conviction, including walking away
from custody while already incarcerated, and his felony evading-arrest conviction show his clear
unwillingness to comply with legal obligations and law enforcement and justify a finding of
dangerousness. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373, 377–78 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding a
defendant’s “deliberate attempt to flee or elude a police officer in a motor vehicle” “nearly always
pose[s] a substantial danger to pedestrians, other motorists, passengers, and pursuing officers” and
is a violent and aggressive act warranting a sentencing enhancement); United States v. Martin,
378 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2004) (same).
And his conviction for aggravated criminal trespassing with a firearm highlights his
escalating behavior. Poe not only entered an occupied apartment without permission while armed,
but he did so while actively evading police. Then he tried to hide his gun. And don’t forget
6 No. 24-6014, United States v. Poe
his rifle possession here. A loaded gun is inherently dangerous. Cf. United States v. Morris,
No. 98–4525, 2000 WL 1359627, at *6 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 2000) (unpublished table opinion)
(“[C]ourts have recognized that even an unloaded gun can be considered dangerous.”). And Poe
placed it in the passenger seat next him, presumably for quick access and use.
Poe’s criminal history shows convictions for repeated firearms use and defiance of law
enforcement, and an instance of armed intrusion into a private residence, all contributing to the
assessment of him as dangerous. See Williams, 113 F.4th at 659, 663 (a felon is dangerous and
can be disarmed if he’s committed “a crime that inherently poses a significant threat of danger,”
even if that crime doesn’t “involve an immediate and direct threat of violence against a particular
person”). Poe’s history leaves no doubt that he has no interest in following the law and will
continue to create a risk of violent confrontation and place others at risk of immediate harm unless
disarmed. See id. at 659 (convictions of crimes that “put someone’s safety at risk” “justify a
finding of danger.”). Had the district court assessed Poe’s dangerousness, we have no doubt it
would have come to the same conclusion.
In sum, the district court incorrectly held that the Second Amendment didn’t apply to Poe
because he was a felon. See id. at 649; Vaughn, 2024 WL 4615853, at *3. But we affirm because
Poe is dangerous and failed to establish otherwise, so § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to
him. See Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999) (“We may affirm a district court’s
judgment for reasons other than those stated by the lower court.”); Allen v. Diebold, Inc., 33 F.3d
674, 676 (6th Cir. 1994) (same).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.