United States v. Marcus Rambo

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: July 25, 2024
• Docket: 23-13772
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-13772 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/25/2024 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13772 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus MARCUS ALBERT RAMBO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20149-CMA-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-13772 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/25/2024 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 23-13772

Before GRANT, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Marcus Rambo appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment, both facially and as applied to his conduct. The government, in turn, moves for summary affir- mance. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary dis- position is appropriate when “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1 Our binding precedent holds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is con- stitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amend- ment. In United States v. McAllister, we held that “§ 922(g)(1) is not an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Com- merce Clause,” explaining that the statute’s requirement of a con- nection to interstate commerce was sufficient to satisfy the “mini- mal nexus” requirement of the Commerce Clause. 77 F.3d 387, 389‑90, 391 (11th Cir. 1996). The government proves a “minimal

1 Groendyke Transportation is binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit under

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). USCA11 Case: 23-13772 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/25/2024 Page: 3 of 4

23-13772 Opinion of the Court 3

nexus” to interstate commerce if it demonstrates—as Rambo con- cedes it did here—that the firearm was manufactured outside of the state where the offense took place and, thus, necessarily trav- eled in interstate commerce. Wright, 607 F.3d at 715–16. And in United States v. Dubois, we reaffirmed our earlier precedent holding that under District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008), “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” 94 F.4th 1284, 1292 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010)). The prior precedent rule requires us to follow a prior bind- ing precedent unless and until it is overruled by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016). “To constitute an overruling for the purposes of this prior panel precedent rule, the Supreme Court de- cision must be clearly on point,” and it must “actually abrogate or directly conflict with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel.” United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). And to do that, “the later Supreme Court decision must ‘demolish’ and ‘eviscerate’” each of the prior precedent’s “fundamental props.” Dubois, 94 F.4th at 1293 (quota- tion omitted). So, for example, our precedent relying on Heller for the proposition that “felons are categorically ‘disqualified’ from ex- ercising their Second Amendment right” was not abrogated by a later Supreme Court decision (New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)) that “repeatedly stated that its decision was faithful to Heller.” Id. USCA11 Case: 23-13772 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 07/25/2024 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 23-13772

The same principle applies here. Rambo concedes that his Commerce Clause arguments are currently foreclosed by this Court’s binding precedents. And our binding precedents in Dubois and Rozier similarly foreclose his Second Amendment arguments. The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi did not ab- rogate Dubois or Rozier because it did not “demolish” or “eviscer- ate” the “fundamental props” of those precedents. Rahimi did not discuss § 922(g)(1) at all, nor did it undermine our previous inter- pretation of Heller. To the contrary, Rahimi reiterated that prohi- bitions “like those on the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889, No. 22-915, slip op., at 15 (June 21, 2024) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). Because the government is “clearly correct as a matter of law” that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment facially and as applied to Rambo, we GRANT its motion for summary affirmance. See Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. AFFIRMED.