United States v. Marcus Campbell

Sixth Circuit

United States v. Marcus Campbell

482 F. App'x 997

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

DecidedNovember 29, 2012

Docket11-4440

StatusUnpublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 482 F. App'x 997 (United States v. Marcus Campbell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Marcus Campbell, 482 F. App'x 997 (6th Cir. 2012).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Marcus Campbell, who is represented by counsel, appeals a district court judgment sentencing him to 180 months of imprisonment following his guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon.

Campbell was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to the mandatory minimum sentence. While conceding that precedent is against his arguments, he argues for the purposes of possible further appeal that the residual provision of the ACCA is void for vagueness and that his previous convictions for third-degree burglary and fourth-degree aggravated assault are not violent felonies.

“We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.” United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.2010). The residual clause of the ACCA, referring to a previous offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), has been held by the Supreme Court to not be unconstitutionally vague. Rather, the clause provides guidance that allows a person to conform his conduct to the law. See Sykes v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2277, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n. 6, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). Campbell hopes that the dissents in those cases will persuade us to find the statute unconstitutionally vague. However, we are bound by the existing *998 precedent to the contrary. Thus, the district court did not err in overruling Campbell’s objection to his sentence based on the alleged vagueness of the ACCA.

Campbell also argues that his previous convictions for third-degree burglary and fourth-degree aggravated assault are not violent felonies under the ACCA, in order to preserve these issues for further appeal. However, he concedes that we have held to the contrary. See United States v. Coleman, 655 F.3d 480, 482-83 (6th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1045, 181 L.Ed.2d 768 (2012) (holding that third-degree burglary is a violent felony); United States v. Rodriguez, 664 F.3d 1032, 1037-39 & n. 2 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that fourth-degree aggravated assault is a violent felony).

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Marcus Campbell, who is represented by counsel, appeals a district court judgment sentencing him to 180 months of imprisonment following his guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a felon.

Campbell was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to the mandatory minimum sentence. While conceding that precedent is against his arguments, he argues for the purposes of possible further appeal that the residual provision of the ACCA is void for vagueness and that his previous convictions for third-degree burglary and fourth-degree aggravated assault are not violent felonies.

“We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.” United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.2010). The residual clause of the ACCA, referring to a previous offense that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), has been held by the Supreme Court to not be unconstitutionally vague. Rather, the clause provides guidance that allows a person to conform his conduct to the law. See Sykes v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 2277, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n. 6, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007). Campbell hopes that the dissents in those cases will persuade us to find the statute unconstitutionally vague. However, we are bound by the existing *998 precedent to the contrary. Thus, the district court did not err in overruling Campbell’s objection to his sentence based on the alleged vagueness of the ACCA.

Campbell also argues that his previous convictions for third-degree burglary and fourth-degree aggravated assault are not violent felonies under the ACCA, in order to preserve these issues for further appeal. However, he concedes that we have held to the contrary. See United States v. Coleman, 655 F.3d 480, 482-83 (6th Cir.2011), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1045, 181 L.Ed.2d 768 (2012) (holding that third-degree burglary is a violent felony); United States v. Rodriguez, 664 F.3d 1032, 1037-39 & n. 2 (6th Cir.2011) (holding that fourth-degree aggravated assault is a violent felony).

The district court’s judgment is affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

482 F. App'x 997, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-marcus-campbell-ca6-2012.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack