United States v. Manuel Curiel, Jr.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 28, 2024
• Docket: 22-30189
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 28 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-30189

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 4:20-cr-00127-DCN-1 v.

MANUEL CURIEL, Jr., MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho David C. Nye, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 23, 2024** Anchorage, Alaska

Before: BYBEE, FRIEDLAND, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Manuel Curiel, Jr., appeals from his conviction, following a jury trial, for

possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §

1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). “We review the district court’s denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Lopez-Cruz, 730 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2013). Where

there was a contemporaneous objection, decisions to admit evidence are also

reviewed for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Carpenter, 923 F.3d 1172,

1180–81 (9th Cir. 2019), but where there was no contemporaneous objection,

evidentiary rulings are reviewed for plain error, see United States v. Santiago, 466

F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 2006).

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of

its order denying Curiel’s motion to suppress. Curiel suggests that the court failed

to appreciate the scope of its discretion, but the court correctly recognized that it

has “inherent authority to modify, alter, or revoke non-final orders.” Although the

court also stated that reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used

sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources,” Carroll

v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), that is a correct

statement of law and does not indicate that the court erroneously believed that it

lacked discretion to grant reconsideration if appropriate.

Curiel argues that the district court’s initial denial of his motion to suppress

was “manifestly unjust” because it resulted from his counsel’s alleged ineffective

assistance. School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)

(explaining that reconsideration is appropriate when an initial decision “was

2 manifestly unjust”). But ordinarily, the determination of ineffective assistance is

“left for collateral habeas proceedings due to the lack of a sufficient evidentiary

record as to ‘what counsel did, why it was done, and what, if any, prejudice

resulted.’” United States v. Sager, 227 F.3d 1138, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1995)). Given the

limited evidentiary record before the district court, the court did not abuse its

discretion in denying reconsideration.

2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Detective

Potter’s testimony about evidence seized in a prior search of Curiel’s trailer. Curiel

conceded that the evidence was relevant, and the district court mitigated any

potential risk of prejudice by limiting the scope of the testimony and providing a

limiting instruction. Cf. United States v. Ramos-Atondo, 732 F.3d 1113, 1124 (9th

Cir. 2013) (“[A]ny such practical prejudice was minimized by the district court’s

careful limiting instruction to the jury.”).

Insofar as Curiel challenges the admissibility of the evidence under Federal

Rule of Evidence 404(b), he did not preserve that challenge in the district court. In

any event, testimony about what was seized in the first search was within the scope

of Rule 404(b)(2), so its admission was not plain error. Under Rule 404(b)(2),

evidence of prior bad acts is admissible when it “(1) proves a material element of

the offense for which the defendant is . . . charged, (2) . . . is similar to the offense

3 charged, (3) is based on sufficient evidence, and (4) is not too remote in time.”

United States v. Ramirez-Robles, 386 F.3d 1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 2004). The

government has the burden of proving that all four requirements are met. United

States v. Arambula-Ruiz, 987 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the government

met that burden. Detective Potter’s testimony was relevant to Curiel’s knowledge,

an element of the charged offense; it involved conduct similar to the charged

conduct; there was a sufficient basis for it because it was testimony from an officer

with personal knowledge of the search; and the prior acts were not too remote in

time. See United States v. Flores-Blanco, 623 F.3d 912, 919–20 (9th Cir. 2010).

AFFIRMED.