United States v. Mandycz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: December 4, 2003
• Docket: 02-1846
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0425P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0425p.06 Farmington Hills, Michigan, Richard P. Zipser, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellant. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Michelle Heyer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , X OPINION Plaintiff-Appellee, - _________________ - - No. 02-1846 R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellee, the v. - United States, moves to dismiss the interlocutory appeal of > Defendant-Appellant, Iwan Mandycz, for lack of jurisdiction. , Because the district court’s denial of Mandycz’s motion for IWAN MANDYCZ , - Defendant-Appellant. - summary judgment was not a “final order” of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss Mandycz’s N interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint. In the underlying complaint, the Government seeks No. 00-40148—Paul V. Gadola, District Judge. Mandycz’s denaturalization based on his alleged service at two Nazi-run labor camps during World War II. In the Submitted: September 25, 2003 district court, Mandycz moved for summary judgment on two grounds. First, he claimed that laches bars the Decided and Filed: December 4, 2003 denaturalization action because the Government unreasonably delayed filing its complaint and that the delay prejudiced Before: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; COLLIER, Mandycz because his mental capacity diminished in the District Judge.* intervening period. Second, he claimed that the denaturalization action should be dismissed because he is _________________ mentally incompetent. Mandycz contends that he suffers from Alzheimer’s disease and cannot effectively participate COUNSEL in his own defense. ON BRIEF: Andrew J. Haliw III, Tracy S. Thomas, Joseph Initially, the district court ordered a competency hearing A. Siciliano, HALIW, SICILIANO & MYCHALOWYCH, and requested briefing from both parties on the applicability of mental competency standards to denaturalization proceedings. However, after considering the parties’ briefs, * the court ruled that incompetency to stand trial is not a The Honorab le Curtis L. Collier, United States District Judge for the defense to a denaturalization action. The court, therefore, Eastern D istrict of T ennessee, sitting b y designation.

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cancelled the competency hearing. The district judge also Even if the district court’s ruling on the mental competency held that laches is unavailable as a defense against the and laches issues was conclusive and separate from the merits Government in a denaturalization proceeding. Accordingly, of the action, Mandycz cannot satisfy the third prong of the the district court denied Mandycz’s motion for summary collateral order analysis, which requires that the order be judgment. The district court later denied Mandycz’s request “effectively unreviewable” on appeal from a final judgment to certify the competency and laches issues in an interlocutory of the district court. Rights that are effectively unreviewable appeal to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The on appeal are those that “cannot be effectively vindicated instant uncertified interlocutory appeal followed. Although after the trial has occurred.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. trial was scheduled to begin on July 16, 2002, the district 511, 525 (1985) (“A major characteristic of the denial or court granted Mandycz’s motion for a stay of the trial’s granting of a claim appealable under Cohen’s ‘collateral commencement pending our disposition of the instant appeal. order’ doctrine is that ‘unless it can be reviewed before [the proceedings terminate], it can never be reviewed at all.’”) The Government now moves to dismiss the interlocutory (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1952) (opinion of appeal on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to Jackson, J.)). Orders implicating claims of immunity – or consider it because the district court’s denial of Mandycz’s claims tantamount to immunity – are the most common motion for summary judgment was not a final order. examples of collateral orders because immunity is “an Mandycz opposes the Government’s motion to dismiss, entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of contending that the competency and laches issues are litigation.” Id. at 526 (district court’s denial of a claim of immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order absolute immunity is an order appealable before final doctrine set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., judgment). Pursuant to similar reasoning, the Supreme Court 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). has also held immediately appealable orders denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds, Abney This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to “final decisions” of v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977), and orders denying a the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, the collateral motion to dismiss an indictment based on immunity rooted in order doctrine establishes that a “small class” of interlocutory the Speech and Debate Clause of the United States appeals are immediately appealable, since they amount to Constitution, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979). “final decisions” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546. That small class of appealable Other effectively unreviewable orders are those that result collateral orders “includes only decisions that are conclusive, in a loss of liberty that cannot be corrected on appeal. For that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and instance, the Supreme Court has held that an order denying a that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final motion to reduce bail is reviewable as a collateral order judgment in the underlying action.” Swint v. Chambers because if the appeal was not allowed, no remedy exists down County Com’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995) (citing Cohen, 337 the line for the resulting loss of liberty. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 546). “If the order at issue fails to satisfy any one of U.S. 1 (1951). In addition, it is well-established that orders these requirements, it is not appealable under the collateral- of commitment for psychiatric examination are immediately order exception.” Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. appealable. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286 Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988). (6th Cir. 1996). In Davis, the Sixth Circuit explained: No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 5 6 United States v. Mandycz No. 02-1846

[L]oss of liberty occasioned by the commitment for absolute immunity or the Double Jeopardy Clause, the examination, and the forced intrusion of a court-ordered incompetency of a criminal defendant does not implicate an psychiatric examination, are completely unreviewable by absolute right not to be tried. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525. the time of final judgment. Appellate review after final Accordingly, courts that have addressed this issue have judgment would be available only if the defendant is consistently ruled that competency determinations – unlike found guilty, and even then, no effective relief could be commitment orders – are not appealable as collateral orders provided for her loss of liberty during the period of because they are fully reviewable following the final commitment. judgment of the district court. See United States v. Mattison, 904 F.2d 709, 1990 WL 75252, at *1 (6th Cir. June 6, 1990); 93 F.3d at 1289 (citing United States v. Weissberger, 951 see also United States v. Caraza, 483 F.2d 432, 436 (11th Cir. F.2d 392, 396 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The c om pe te nc y and 1988); United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (2d laches issues decided by the district court in Mandycz’s case Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1036 (1987); United States fail the Cohen analysis and do not fall into the small class of v. Bendicks, 439 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir. 1971) (per orders that courts have found immediately appealable. First, curiam). We therefore find that the district court’s ruling both issues are fully reviewable on appeal after a decision on concerning a defendant’s competency in denaturalization the merits. Second, neither the competency nor the laches proceedings is not appealable as a collateral order. issue is tantamount to immunity nor entails an uncorrectable loss of liberty along the lines of psychiatric commitment or Although the Sixth Circuit has not considered the laches the denial of bail. defense in the context of Cohen, it routinely reviews laches claims after decisions on the merits, indicating that these Although Mandycz argues that his incompetency claim – if decisions are effectively reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., accepted by the court as equivalent to that of a criminal Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc., defendant’s incompetency claim – is tantamount to immunity, 270 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2001); City of Wyandotte v. Consol. a finding that a criminal defendant is incompetent merely Rail Corp., 262 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2001). Other courts have postpones the proceedings until such time that the defendant explicitly refused to consider laches claims on an is competent to stand trial.1 Unlike the protection afforded by interlocutory basis. See, e.g., Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002). In addition, it is well- settled in this circuit that an order denying a motion to 1 Denaturalization proceed ings are technically considered suits in dismiss on statute of limitations grounds is not immediately equity, not crim inal actions. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. United 516 (1981). However, because at present, mental inco mpe tency is only States v. Pi, 174 F.3d 745, 750-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing recognized as a defense to trial in criminal proc eedings, our analysis is United States v. Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 908-09 (6th Cir.), cert. necessarily based on the corpus of law encompassing mental denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989)); see also United States v. Weiss, incompetency in the context of criminal cases. In civil cases, the competency of a defendant is not irrelevant, of course. Incompetent and 7 F.3d 1088, 1089-91 (2d Cir. 1993). This Court explained infant civil defendants are entitled to the appointment of a guardian ad that “[u]nlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy litem. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). However, a civil defendant’s mental incompetence does not trigger an abatem ent of trial as it does in the criminal context. The district court has never made a finding concerning Mandycz’s com peten ce, but it has appointed him a guardian ad litem. In incompetency standards and protections applicable in criminal cases his interlocutory appeal, however, Mandycz claims that the mental should also apply to den aturaliza tion proceedings. No. 02-1846 United States v. Mandycz 7

Clause,” a statute of limitations defense “does not . . . encompass a ‘right not to be tried’ which must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all.” Davis, 873 F.2d at 909 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 861 (1978)). Because laches is an equitable defense similar to a statute of limitations, we find the same reasoning applicable. Therefore, we hold that an order denying a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment on laches grounds is not immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Mandycz’s interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED.