United States v. MacMillan

209 F. 266, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1109
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedNovember 18, 1913
DocketNos. 10,622-10,630
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 209 F. 266 (United States v. MacMillan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. MacMillan, 209 F. 266, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1913).

Opinion

GEIGER, District Judge

(after stating the facts as above). From the declarations and pleas we may summarize that the funds, which we may term the “principal” received by the clerks and deposited in the banks and whereon the interest was earned, may be classified into: (a) Moneys deposited by litigants with the clerk subject to be disbursed to himself or to others as occasion may demand in the course of the litigation; (b) fees and emoluments earned by the clerk and paid to himself out of such last above specified deposits—and, as -to such earned fees and emoluments, a semiannual account was rendered, the account being charged to himself, and against the same was credited the office expense, the compensation retainable ($3,500 per annum) and the surplus- remaining, which latter was always paid to the government.

To put it in another way, the interest moneys in question arose from bank deposits which were constituted from two sources: First, moneys deposited by litigants who, until such moneys were actually covered into fees payable by them, retained the beneficial interest or ownership therein; and, secondly, the fees and emoluments, before a surplus was ascertained and paid over.

What is the character or status, as between the government, the clerk, and the litigant, of the moneys received, upon which, when deposited in the banks, the interest moneys arose, as stated? Are they public moneys whereof the clerk is trustee for the plaintiff government? This.is the fundamental question whose answer, if affirmative, will sustain, if negative, will overrule, the demurrers.

Exhaustive historical reviews of legislation respecting fees of clerks of the federal courts are found in United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169, 7 Sup. Ct. 510, 30 L. Ed. 627, United States v. Hill, 123 U. S. 681, 8 Sup. Ct. 308, 31 L. Ed. 275, and United States v. Mason, 218 U. S. 517, 31 Sup. Ct. 28, 54 L. Ed. 1133; and, in considering the question now presented, no purpose will be served by repetition thereof. It will suffice to note that, prior to 1841, clerks were under no obligation to render any .account of fees or emoluments to the government. They retained all revenues so coming to their hands. But in that and subsequent years the legislation having the effect of limiting their earnings was inaugurated and continued. The cases cited, and others, deal with the intent embodied in such legislation, and, as will be seen, are persuasive in determining the status or character of the moneys or [270]*270revenues which now come, as prior to such legislation came, into clerks’ hands in the discharge of official duties.

It will be assumed that the plaintiff seeks recovery of the interest money in its own right; that the failure to account for and pay it to the government is assigned as a breach by the respective clerks of an official obligation to be discharged by them to the plaintiff; that while, as seen from the statement of facts, the defendant clerks have assumed obligations toward litigants respecting the disbursement of deposited moneys and the return to such litigants of any unexpended portion, no breach of any such obligation is assigned as a basis for institution of suit by the government on behalf of others; in other words, the plaintiff seeks recovery of the interest moneys “as the property of the-United States.” So, too, it will be assumed that, if the revenues coming to the hands of the clerks are in truth public moneys, the property of the government, then any interest earned'thereon, no matter when or how, rightfully follows the principal or corpus, as an incident or increment, in no event subject to personal appropriation by. the custodian of the principal.

[1] Considering first the interest money as arising upon a fund in part constituted from deposits made by litigants to be drawn against by the clerk for payment of fees as they accrue, certainly neither the clerk nor the government has any interest in such deposits, prior to proper appropriation for the uses intended, except to hold them. Even admitting for the time being that the fees when actually earned and paid are then public funds, the deposit made by a litigant to secure such payment is in no proper sense a fund in or over which the government has obtained the slightest proprietary interest or power of disposition. That interest and right is retained by the litigant, save only as he has surrendered it to the clerk to exercise by drawing against it in the defrayal of fees as and when, under the law, they ac-‘ crue and are chargeable against the litigant. While the transaction in making the deposit under the rule may not technically be a bailment, the clerk, in the nature of things, stands as a sort of insurer for the return to the litigant of the deposit or such part thereof as shall not have been earned as fees either by himself or others for whose benefit it is made. Certainly the deposit is not made for the benefit of the gqvernment. The clerk, under the law, is required to account for fees earned whether they are paid or not; and the rule does not impress such deposit with the character of public moneys or revenues; but is a mere regulation' for the protection of the clerk, to guaranty to him in advance, and as an administrative cpnvenience in the discharge of-his duties of and in the payment of moneys primarily receivable by him as his compensation. As indicated, if these court rules for deposits were not in force, it would rest with the clerk to insist upon payment of each fee as it is earned, in advance. If he failed to collect, but accounted for it as earned, the loss is his. His failure actually to collect the. money from the litigant, while it might so result in loss to him, would not, if he accounted for it to the government, be a breach of any condition of his bond. So long, therefore, as the moneys deposited by the litigant retain their status as a security deposit, the gov-[271]*271eminent has and can have no claim to any increment thereof by way of interest.

[2] Coming now to the character or status of the other constituent of the fund upon which the interest money in question arose—the moneys earned by the clerk as official fees and emoluments and which, pending the semiannual accounting and return were deposited in the banks. While it is true that in Bean v. Patterson, 110 U. S. 401, 4 Sup. Ct. 23, 28 L. Ed. 190, the Supreme Court, upon an application for leave to docket an appeal, ruled that, under an act substantially like that governing district court clerks, the clerk of the Supreme Court could demand payment of certain fees in advance; and declared that:

“As the law now stands, the fees and emoluments of the office (clerk of Supreme Court) belong to. the government, subject only to the payment of the annual salary of the clerk, necessary clerk hire, and incidental expenses, and the clerk is the collecting agent for the government;”

—and while the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in United States v. Mason, 129 Fed. 742, 64 C. C. A.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
209 F. 266, 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-macmillan-ilnd-1913.