United States v. Lundholm

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 25-1045
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-1045 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:23-cr-00314-BLW-3 v. MEMORANDUM* JASON REID LUNDHOLM,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho B. Lynn Winmill, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 17, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Jason Reid Lundholm (“Lundholm”) appeals from his conviction for

conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and

846, and possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. We review de novo the denial of a

motion to suppress, and for clear error the underlying factual findings. United

States v. Peterson, 995 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2021). For sentencing, we

“review the district court’s identification of the relevant legal standard de novo, its

factual findings for clear error, and its application of the legal standard to the facts

for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Chichande, 113 F.4th 913, 919 (9th Cir.

2024) (citation omitted). As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not

recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not err in denying Lundholm’s motion to suppress

evidence from a prolonged traffic stop. A lawful traffic stop is “limited in its

scope: an officer may ‘address the traffic violation that warranted the stop,’ make

‘ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop,’ and ‘attend to related safety

concerns.’” United States v. Taylor, 60 F.4th 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354–55 (2015)). If a traffic stop is

“prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing

a ticket for the violation” it can become unlawful, unless there was reasonable

suspicion for the prolongation. United States v. Steinman, 159 F.4th 550, 561 (9th

Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reasonable suspicion

exists when an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which, when

considered with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for

2 25-1045 particularized suspicion.” Id. at 566 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted) (emphasis in original).

Here, the traffic stop was not impermissibly prolonged before the officers

“complete[d] the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation,” and to the extent it

was prolonged after, there was reasonable suspicion for the prolongation. Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The officers’ actions related to the

drug investigation did not extend the time of the traffic stop, which concluded

when the officers finished preparing and printing the citation warning. See

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (noting that “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when

tasks tied to the traffic infraction are . . . completed”).

Although the stop continued after the officers completed the mission of

issuing a ticket for the violation, that prolongation was supported by reasonable

suspicion. Among other things, the officers observed that (1) the vehicle

Lundholm was riding in departed from a residence under active narcotics

surveillance, (2) a passenger entered the vehicle carrying a paper bag from the

residence, (3) the vehicle took an indirect route to another residence also known

for narcotics investigations, (4) the passengers exhibited extreme nervousness

during the stop, and (5) there was an active search warrant alleging

methamphetamine distribution and manufacturing for one of the passengers. These

facts are sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of drug activity. Cf. Steinman,

3 25-1045 159 F.4th at 566–67 (finding reasonable suspicion that the defendant possessed a

firearm as a felon where an officer observed an ammunition box and blanket

covering items in the vehicle and learned that the defendant had felony

convictions).

2. At sentencing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a

minor-role reduction under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.2. “A district court

abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or when its findings

of fact or its application of law to fact are illogical, implausible, or without support

in inferences that may be drawn from the record.” Chichande, 113 F.4th at 919–20

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the record supports the conclusion that the district court applied the

correct legal standard in rejecting Lundholm’s argument for a minor-role sentence

reduction. The district court acknowledged the factors “govern[ing] the

comparative-liability analysis” and the “facts relevant to that analysis,” when it

compared Lundholm’s culpability to that of his co-defendants and referenced the

factors required by Guideline comment 3(C). United States v. Klensch, 87 F.4th

1159, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2023) (listing the steps a district court must take in

determining whether a defendant is eligible for a sentencing reduction). While the

district court did not explicitly refer to the three-step minor-role reduction test

articulated by this court or name all the factors required by 3(C), “it was not

4 25-1045 required to mechanically analyze each factor or reference them verbatim on the

record.” Id. at 1164. Rather, “providing some explanation, even in general terms,

of how the considerations embodied in the factors apply in this case is part and

parcel of considering them,” which the district court did here. Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, we

“generally assume that the district court applied the correct legal standard,” unless

“the record indicates the contrary.” Id. at 1165–66. It does not.

AFFIRMED.

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