USCA4 Appeal: 24-6175 Doc: 17 Filed: 03/12/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-6175
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LORENE CHITTENDEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00394-AJT-4)
Submitted: February 27, 2025 Decided: March 12, 2025
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lorene Chittenden, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-6175 Doc: 17 Filed: 03/12/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Lorene Chittenden seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying as moot her
motion for an extension of time to appeal and denying her motion for appointment of
counsel, motion to appeal in forma pauperis, and letter motion (the “January 31, 2024,
order”). She also seeks to appeal the district court’s garnishment disposition order and the
underlying restitution order in her criminal case. 1 We deny Chittenden’s motion for
appointment of counsel and, for the reasons that follow, affirm in part and dismiss in part.
In criminal cases, the defendant must file the notice of appeal within 14 days after
the entry of the judgment or order appealed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). With or without
a motion, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may grant
an extension of up to 30 days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). Because
the appeal period in a criminal case is not a jurisdictional provision, but rather a claim-
processing rule, United States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009), we generally
decline to dismiss an untimely criminal appeal where, as here, the Government has not
moved to dismiss the untimely appeal, United States v. Oliver, 878 F.3d 120, 129 (4th Cir.
2017). However, when adjudicating an untimely criminal appeal “would significantly
implicate the efficiency and integrity of the judicial process,” id. at 127, we may exercise
our inherent authority to dismiss the appeal sua sponte, id. at 128-29.
1 Although Chittenden did not designate the garnishment disposition order or the restitution order in her notice of appeal, we liberally construe her original informal brief as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal from those orders. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 247-49 (1992); Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Chittenden noted her appeal of both the January 31, 2024, order and the garnishment
disposition order outside the 14-day appeal period applicable to those orders. Nevertheless,
we decline to dismiss Chittenden’s appeal of those orders sua sponte. See id. at 127-29.
The restitution order, however, is readily distinguishable. The district court entered its
postjudgment restitution order on March 9, 2015. Chittenden noted her current appeal of
that order on April 4, 2024, nine years out of time. Because Chittenden failed to file a
timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension of the appeal period, the appeal is
untimely. Although the Government has not invoked the appeal’s untimeliness, we
conclude that this portion of the appeal presents circumstances we previously have
recognized as warranting sua sponte dismissal. See id. at 128-29. We therefore dismiss
Chittenden’s appeal of the restitution order as untimely.
With respect to the January 31, 2024, order, we confine our review to the issues
raised in the informal briefs. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Chittenden’s informal briefs
do not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, she has forfeited appellate
review of the court’s order. 2 See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is
limited to issues preserved in that brief.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
2 In any event, even if we were to construe Chittenden’s informal briefs to challenge the district court’s denial of her motion for an extension of the appeal period, any success in challenging that ruling would entitle Chittenden to no greater relief than we otherwise afford her today—consideration of her appeal of the garnishment disposition order.
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order. United States v. Chittenden, No. 1:12-cr-00394-AJT-4 (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 31, 2024
& entered Feb. 1, 2024).
Turning to the garnishment disposition order, the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act (MVRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227-41, authorizes the Government to
enforce a restitution judgment “in accordance with the practices and procedures for the
enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal law or State law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a); see
18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(d), 3613(f), 3664(m)(i)(A)(1). One available method of enforcement
is the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789,
which includes procedures for garnishment, see 28 U.S.C. § 3205. “[T]he MVRA treats
restitution orders like tax levies for purposes of garnishment enforcement,” whereby “the
[G]overnment steps into the [debtor’s] shoes and acquires whatever rights the [debtor]
[her]self possesses.” United States v. Frank, 8 F.4th 320, 331 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Upon commencement of a garnishment proceeding under the FDCPA, the
Government must serve notice of the action upon the garnishee and the judgment debtor.
28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(3). The garnishee must answer the writ and describe the property of
the debtor within the garnishee’s possession. 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(4). The debtor must be
served with instructions for objecting to the garnishee’s answer and for obtaining a hearing
on the objections. 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(3)(B). If the debtor requests a hearing within 20
days of receipt of the garnishee’s answer, the district court shall hold a hearing on the
debtor’s objections. 28 U.S.C. § 3205
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USCA4 Appeal: 24-6175 Doc: 17 Filed: 03/12/2025 Pg: 1 of 6
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-6175
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LORENE CHITTENDEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00394-AJT-4)
Submitted: February 27, 2025 Decided: March 12, 2025
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lorene Chittenden, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 24-6175 Doc: 17 Filed: 03/12/2025 Pg: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Lorene Chittenden seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying as moot her
motion for an extension of time to appeal and denying her motion for appointment of
counsel, motion to appeal in forma pauperis, and letter motion (the “January 31, 2024,
order”). She also seeks to appeal the district court’s garnishment disposition order and the
underlying restitution order in her criminal case. 1 We deny Chittenden’s motion for
appointment of counsel and, for the reasons that follow, affirm in part and dismiss in part.
In criminal cases, the defendant must file the notice of appeal within 14 days after
the entry of the judgment or order appealed. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). With or without
a motion, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, the district court may grant
an extension of up to 30 days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). Because
the appeal period in a criminal case is not a jurisdictional provision, but rather a claim-
processing rule, United States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009), we generally
decline to dismiss an untimely criminal appeal where, as here, the Government has not
moved to dismiss the untimely appeal, United States v. Oliver, 878 F.3d 120, 129 (4th Cir.
2017). However, when adjudicating an untimely criminal appeal “would significantly
implicate the efficiency and integrity of the judicial process,” id. at 127, we may exercise
our inherent authority to dismiss the appeal sua sponte, id. at 128-29.
1 Although Chittenden did not designate the garnishment disposition order or the restitution order in her notice of appeal, we liberally construe her original informal brief as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal from those orders. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 247-49 (1992); Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir. 2014).
2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6175 Doc: 17 Filed: 03/12/2025 Pg: 3 of 6
Chittenden noted her appeal of both the January 31, 2024, order and the garnishment
disposition order outside the 14-day appeal period applicable to those orders. Nevertheless,
we decline to dismiss Chittenden’s appeal of those orders sua sponte. See id. at 127-29.
The restitution order, however, is readily distinguishable. The district court entered its
postjudgment restitution order on March 9, 2015. Chittenden noted her current appeal of
that order on April 4, 2024, nine years out of time. Because Chittenden failed to file a
timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension of the appeal period, the appeal is
untimely. Although the Government has not invoked the appeal’s untimeliness, we
conclude that this portion of the appeal presents circumstances we previously have
recognized as warranting sua sponte dismissal. See id. at 128-29. We therefore dismiss
Chittenden’s appeal of the restitution order as untimely.
With respect to the January 31, 2024, order, we confine our review to the issues
raised in the informal briefs. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Because Chittenden’s informal briefs
do not challenge the basis for the district court’s disposition, she has forfeited appellate
review of the court’s order. 2 See Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“The informal brief is an important document; under Fourth Circuit rules, our review is
limited to issues preserved in that brief.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
2 In any event, even if we were to construe Chittenden’s informal briefs to challenge the district court’s denial of her motion for an extension of the appeal period, any success in challenging that ruling would entitle Chittenden to no greater relief than we otherwise afford her today—consideration of her appeal of the garnishment disposition order.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6175 Doc: 17 Filed: 03/12/2025 Pg: 4 of 6
order. United States v. Chittenden, No. 1:12-cr-00394-AJT-4 (E.D. Va. filed Jan. 31, 2024
& entered Feb. 1, 2024).
Turning to the garnishment disposition order, the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act (MVRA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227-41, authorizes the Government to
enforce a restitution judgment “in accordance with the practices and procedures for the
enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal law or State law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a); see
18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(d), 3613(f), 3664(m)(i)(A)(1). One available method of enforcement
is the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789,
which includes procedures for garnishment, see 28 U.S.C. § 3205. “[T]he MVRA treats
restitution orders like tax levies for purposes of garnishment enforcement,” whereby “the
[G]overnment steps into the [debtor’s] shoes and acquires whatever rights the [debtor]
[her]self possesses.” United States v. Frank, 8 F.4th 320, 331 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Upon commencement of a garnishment proceeding under the FDCPA, the
Government must serve notice of the action upon the garnishee and the judgment debtor.
28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(3). The garnishee must answer the writ and describe the property of
the debtor within the garnishee’s possession. 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(4). The debtor must be
served with instructions for objecting to the garnishee’s answer and for obtaining a hearing
on the objections. 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(3)(B). If the debtor requests a hearing within 20
days of receipt of the garnishee’s answer, the district court shall hold a hearing on the
debtor’s objections. 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(5). The district court is authorized to enter a
4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-6175 Doc: 17 Filed: 03/12/2025 Pg: 5 of 6
garnishment disposition order upon the expiration of the debtor’s time to object if no
hearing is requested. 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(7).
Chittenden did not respond to any of the garnishees’ answers. Nor did she otherwise
object to or attempt to quash the writs of continuing garnishment. In doing so, she forfeited
her opportunity to dispute the garnishment of her identified funds. While Chittenden now
attempts to challenge the garnishment disposition order by disputing her underlying
restitution obligation, her arguments are misplaced. See United States v. Onyeri, 996 F.3d
274, 281 (5th Cir. 2021) (“It is well-settled that a defendant may not use a garnishment
proceeding to challenge the underlying judgment and restitution order in his case.”).
Chittenden also seeks to challenge the manner in which the Government disbursed
her garnished funds following their liquidation. But Chittenden did not raise or develop
these matters before the district court. Her failure to do so precludes our meaningful
consideration of these issues. 3 See NAACP v. Bureau of Census, 945 F.3d 183, 193 (4th
Cir. 2019) (“[W]e are a court of review, not first review.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); cf. Frank, 8 F.4th at 331-33 (discussing fact-intensive inquiry necessary to
determine tax implications of garnishing defendant’s retirement accounts). Because
Chittenden does not identify any valid basis for overturning the garnishment disposition
order, we affirm the district court’s order. United States v. Chittenden, No. 1:12-cr-00394-
AJT-4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2023).
3 Chittenden appears to have recently raised these or related issues in a motion currently pending before the district court. We express no opinion as to the merits of that motion, leaving any consideration to the district court in the first instance.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART