24-1904-cr U.S. v. Lockhart
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of January, two thousand and twenty- six.
PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, SUSAN L. CARNEY, BETH ROBINSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 24-1904-cr
MICHAEL LOCKHART, AKA Mikey Rtn,
Defendant-Appellant,
LUIS GARCIA, AKA Ebk Lou, HENRY FLOY, AKA Mills, SHAKALE BRANTLEY, AKA Charlie Wilson, AKA Kellz, AKA Man Man, ANTOINE SISTRUCK, TA’RON PHARR, AKA 250, JAYLEN WILSON, AKA Jay-Dot, TYIESE WARREN, AKA Loose Screw, AKA LS KG, AMIRE NEWSOME, AKA Mire, ZIARE DEDRICK, AKA Zi, AKA Zi Hb, JOSHUA GILBERT, AKA Lor Heavy, LORENZO CARTER, AKA Zo, JAUWAN EDWARDS, AKA Yaya, JAHAZ LANGSTON, AKA Haz, JAMAR TRAYLOR, AKA J Hop, AKA Jamar Terell Traylor,
Defendants. _________________________________________
FOR APPELLEE: Karen L. Peck, Elena Lalli Coronado, Assistant United States Attorneys, for David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Joseph P. Brown, Law Offices of Pat Brown, Avon, CT.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Dooley, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on July 2, 2024, is
AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Michael Lockhart pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
2 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 108 months’ (nine years’)
imprisonment. On appeal, Lockhart contends his above-Guidelines sentence is
substantively unreasonable on the ground that it exceeds the Guidelines range and
the district court judge put impermissible weight on the violence of alleged fellow
members of the O.N.E. gang while acknowledging that there were no findings that
Lockhart himself was “involved in any particular acts of violence.” App’x 133.
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history,
and arguments on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our
decision.
We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under “a particularly
deferential form of abuse-of-discretion review.” United States v. Davis, 82 F.4th
190, 195–96 (2d Cir. 2023). 1 In our review, we consider the length of the sentence
in light of the statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v.
Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). Our deference to the district court’s
assessment “derives from a respect for the distinct institutional advantages that
district courts enjoy over their appellate counterparts in making an individualized
1In quotations from caselaw, this summary order omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations, and accepts all alterations, unless otherwise noted.
3 assessment of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699
F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50, 51–52 (2007)).
“We will . . . set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in
exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the
range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.
2008) (en banc).
Lockhart first argues that the district court substantively erred by
sentencing him to a period of confinement of 108 months (nine years), which was
31 months in excess of the top of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. We
disagree.
There is no “presumption of unreasonableness . . . applied to sentences
outside applicable Guidelines ranges.” Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 136 (citing Gall,
552 U.S. at 50). While a reviewing court can consider the reasons for an upward
variance in assessing reasonableness, it “must give due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Such deference is warranted because a “sentencing
judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the
individual defendant” than the appellate court. Id. at 51–52.
4 The district court explained its decision to impose an above-Guidelines
sentence with reference to “the context in which [Lockhart’s] crimes were
committed,” including Lockhart’s “participation with an exceptionally violent
street gang” and his conduct in “fashioning a weapon” while in custody awaiting
sentencing after he pled guilty. App’x 135–36. We see no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s sentencing decision.
Lockhart next argues that the district court improperly punished Lockhart
for the violent conduct of alleged fellow gang members. This argument also fails.
At Lockhart’s sentencing hearing, the district court noted that it had considered
all of the § 3553(a) factors and all of the relevant information about Lockhart and
the offense—“the good and the bad.” App’x 131. In relevant part, the district
court acknowledged that there were no findings that Lockhart was “involved in
any particular acts of violence,” but it concluded that the Guidelines range did not
“account for in any fashion [Lockhart’s] participation with the gang of O.N.E. and
the violence and the carnage that was wrought by that gang for a period of time.”
App’x 133.
So here, the district court didn’t sentence Lockhart based on the misconduct
of others, as he contends. Rather, as she explained, she based her upward variance
5 on Lockhart’s own conduct and participation with O.N.E., including egging on
fellow gang members to “amplify the mission of O.N.E.,” App’x 134, being “part
and parcel of the communications, not just about guns and drugs, but about
violence against other gangs,” App’x 133, fashioning a knife out of a toothbrush
while in custody, and staying at a home that “served as an armory of sorts for the
gang and a factory for the distribution of narcotics,” App’x 136. The district
court’s reasons were amply supported by uncontradicted factual findings in the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24-1904-cr U.S. v. Lockhart
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of January, two thousand and twenty- six.
PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, SUSAN L. CARNEY, BETH ROBINSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 24-1904-cr
MICHAEL LOCKHART, AKA Mikey Rtn,
Defendant-Appellant,
LUIS GARCIA, AKA Ebk Lou, HENRY FLOY, AKA Mills, SHAKALE BRANTLEY, AKA Charlie Wilson, AKA Kellz, AKA Man Man, ANTOINE SISTRUCK, TA’RON PHARR, AKA 250, JAYLEN WILSON, AKA Jay-Dot, TYIESE WARREN, AKA Loose Screw, AKA LS KG, AMIRE NEWSOME, AKA Mire, ZIARE DEDRICK, AKA Zi, AKA Zi Hb, JOSHUA GILBERT, AKA Lor Heavy, LORENZO CARTER, AKA Zo, JAUWAN EDWARDS, AKA Yaya, JAHAZ LANGSTON, AKA Haz, JAMAR TRAYLOR, AKA J Hop, AKA Jamar Terell Traylor,
Defendants. _________________________________________
FOR APPELLEE: Karen L. Peck, Elena Lalli Coronado, Assistant United States Attorneys, for David X. Sullivan, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Joseph P. Brown, Law Offices of Pat Brown, Avon, CT.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Dooley, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on July 2, 2024, is
AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Michael Lockhart pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
2 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 108 months’ (nine years’)
imprisonment. On appeal, Lockhart contends his above-Guidelines sentence is
substantively unreasonable on the ground that it exceeds the Guidelines range and
the district court judge put impermissible weight on the violence of alleged fellow
members of the O.N.E. gang while acknowledging that there were no findings that
Lockhart himself was “involved in any particular acts of violence.” App’x 133.
We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history,
and arguments on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our
decision.
We review a sentence for substantive reasonableness under “a particularly
deferential form of abuse-of-discretion review.” United States v. Davis, 82 F.4th
190, 195–96 (2d Cir. 2023). 1 In our review, we consider the length of the sentence
in light of the statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v.
Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2008). Our deference to the district court’s
assessment “derives from a respect for the distinct institutional advantages that
district courts enjoy over their appellate counterparts in making an individualized
1In quotations from caselaw, this summary order omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes, and citations, and accepts all alterations, unless otherwise noted.
3 assessment of sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699
F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50, 51–52 (2007)).
“We will . . . set aside a district court’s substantive determination only in
exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision cannot be located within the
range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.
2008) (en banc).
Lockhart first argues that the district court substantively erred by
sentencing him to a period of confinement of 108 months (nine years), which was
31 months in excess of the top of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. We
disagree.
There is no “presumption of unreasonableness . . . applied to sentences
outside applicable Guidelines ranges.” Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 136 (citing Gall,
552 U.S. at 50). While a reviewing court can consider the reasons for an upward
variance in assessing reasonableness, it “must give due deference to the district
court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Such deference is warranted because a “sentencing
judge has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the
individual defendant” than the appellate court. Id. at 51–52.
4 The district court explained its decision to impose an above-Guidelines
sentence with reference to “the context in which [Lockhart’s] crimes were
committed,” including Lockhart’s “participation with an exceptionally violent
street gang” and his conduct in “fashioning a weapon” while in custody awaiting
sentencing after he pled guilty. App’x 135–36. We see no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s sentencing decision.
Lockhart next argues that the district court improperly punished Lockhart
for the violent conduct of alleged fellow gang members. This argument also fails.
At Lockhart’s sentencing hearing, the district court noted that it had considered
all of the § 3553(a) factors and all of the relevant information about Lockhart and
the offense—“the good and the bad.” App’x 131. In relevant part, the district
court acknowledged that there were no findings that Lockhart was “involved in
any particular acts of violence,” but it concluded that the Guidelines range did not
“account for in any fashion [Lockhart’s] participation with the gang of O.N.E. and
the violence and the carnage that was wrought by that gang for a period of time.”
App’x 133.
So here, the district court didn’t sentence Lockhart based on the misconduct
of others, as he contends. Rather, as she explained, she based her upward variance
5 on Lockhart’s own conduct and participation with O.N.E., including egging on
fellow gang members to “amplify the mission of O.N.E.,” App’x 134, being “part
and parcel of the communications, not just about guns and drugs, but about
violence against other gangs,” App’x 133, fashioning a knife out of a toothbrush
while in custody, and staying at a home that “served as an armory of sorts for the
gang and a factory for the distribution of narcotics,” App’x 136. The district
court’s reasons were amply supported by uncontradicted factual findings in the
Presentence Report.
“The particular weight to be afforded aggravating and mitigating factors is
a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” Broxmeyer,
699 F.3d at 289. Taking into account “the totality of the circumstances, giving due
deference to the sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the
institutional advantages of [the] district court[],” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190, we
conclude that the district court’s determination was “located within the range of
permissible decisions,” id. at 191.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court