NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3549 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00135-SVW-2 v. MEMORANDUM* EDGAR LLAUSAS-SILVA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2025** Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.***
Defendant-Appellant Edgar Llausas-Silva was convicted of one count of
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and one
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Llausas-Silva challenges his sentence on several different
grounds.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and background of this case,
we provide only the information necessary to give context to our ruling. After
being arrested for his role in a drug transaction involving a large quantity of
methamphetamine, Llausas-Silva eventually pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine and to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to
distribute. Llausas-Silva sought relief from the minimum mandatory sentence
pursuant to the statutory safety valve, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)—a request that the
Government opposed on the grounds that Llausas-Silva had not been entirely
truthful in his proffer. The district court ultimately agreed with the Government,
concluding that Llausas-Silva was not eligible for safety-valve relief. It sentenced
Llausas-Silva to 120 months of imprisonment, the minimum mandatory sentence.
It also sentenced Llausas-Silva to five years of supervised release and required him
to comply with the standard discretionary conditions outlined in the district court’s
Second Amended General Order 20-04.
Llausas-Silva raises four challenges to his sentence, none of which succeed.
1 Llausas-Silva’s opening brief included an additional issue—that the judgment should be amended to correct a clerical error—but that issue has since been resolved.
2 23-3549 First, Llausas-Silva argues that the district court erred in concluding that he was
ineligible for safety-valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) because he had
not been completely truthful. But we review the district court’s factual
determination that a defendant has not been truthful only for clear error, and we
“‘must accept the district court’s factual findings unless we are “left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”’” United States v. Salazar, 61
F.4th 723, 726 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Lizarraga-Carrizales, 757
F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2014)). Moreover, the district court may rely on reasonable
inferences and its experience in determining whether a defendant has been entirely
truthful. See United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2012).
In the communications constituting his proffer, Llausas-Silva took the position that
he was only a money courier and did not personally bring the methamphetamine to
the drug transaction. The district court did not clearly err in determining that, in
light of the message about the drug transaction received by Llausas-Silva and the
particular circumstances of the transaction, Llausas-Silva’s representations were
not entirely truthful. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in declining to
hold an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Houston, 217 F.3d 1204, 1206–
07 (9th Cir. 2000).
Second, Llausas-Silva argues that the district court improperly relied on
provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that calculated his advisory
3 23-3549 sentencing range based on the purity of the methamphetamine seized. But
although the district court could have agreed with Llausas-Silva that the purity-
based Guideline provisions are outdated and varied downward based on a policy
disagreement, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so. See United
States v. Kabir, 51 F.4th 820, 828–29 (9th Cir. 2022), cert denied, 143 S. Ct. 838
(2023); see also United States v. Blackshire, 98 F.4th 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2024)
(“[W]e review a district court’s . . . application of the Guidelines to the facts for
abuse of discretion[] . . . .”). Moreover, even if the district court had erred in
declining to vary downward in calculating the Guidelines range—which it did
not—such an error would be of no moment because Llausas-Silva was given the
statutory minimum sentence. See United States v. Miller, 151 F.3d 957, 962 (9th
Cir. 1998).
Third, Llausas-Silva argues that the district court violated his right to be
present for the imposition of discretionary supervised-release provisions, relying
on United States v. Montoya, 82 F.4th 640, 647 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). But
there was no Montoya error here. Llausas-Silva had advance notice of the
discretionary conditions that he would be subject to based on the U.S. Probation
Office’s sentencing recommendation letters and the district court’s Second
Amended General Order 20-04. See id. at 652 (noting that a “courtwide . . .
standing order[] that list[s] conditions” could suffice to put a defendant on notice
4 23-3549 of what conditions would be imposed). Additionally, out of an abundance of
caution, the district court ensured that Llausas-Silva was aware of the discretionary
conditions that he would be subject to by having a translator read Second Amended
General Order 20-04. This was sufficient to give Llausas-Silva “a meaningful
opportunity to challenge those conditions.” Id.2
Fourth, Llausas-Silva challenges the district court’s application of a two-
level Guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) on the grounds
that his coconspirator, Alfredo Vidana-Zavala, possessed a firearm during the
methamphetamine transaction. We reject his challenge. “[A] defendant convicted
of conspiracy may be sentenced not only on the basis of his own conduct, but also
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3549 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00135-SVW-2 v. MEMORANDUM* EDGAR LLAUSAS-SILVA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2025** Pasadena, California
Before: RAWLINSON and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.***
Defendant-Appellant Edgar Llausas-Silva was convicted of one count of
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and one
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Llausas-Silva challenges his sentence on several different
grounds.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and background of this case,
we provide only the information necessary to give context to our ruling. After
being arrested for his role in a drug transaction involving a large quantity of
methamphetamine, Llausas-Silva eventually pleaded guilty to conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine and to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to
distribute. Llausas-Silva sought relief from the minimum mandatory sentence
pursuant to the statutory safety valve, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)—a request that the
Government opposed on the grounds that Llausas-Silva had not been entirely
truthful in his proffer. The district court ultimately agreed with the Government,
concluding that Llausas-Silva was not eligible for safety-valve relief. It sentenced
Llausas-Silva to 120 months of imprisonment, the minimum mandatory sentence.
It also sentenced Llausas-Silva to five years of supervised release and required him
to comply with the standard discretionary conditions outlined in the district court’s
Second Amended General Order 20-04.
Llausas-Silva raises four challenges to his sentence, none of which succeed.
1 Llausas-Silva’s opening brief included an additional issue—that the judgment should be amended to correct a clerical error—but that issue has since been resolved.
2 23-3549 First, Llausas-Silva argues that the district court erred in concluding that he was
ineligible for safety-valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) because he had
not been completely truthful. But we review the district court’s factual
determination that a defendant has not been truthful only for clear error, and we
“‘must accept the district court’s factual findings unless we are “left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”’” United States v. Salazar, 61
F.4th 723, 726 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Lizarraga-Carrizales, 757
F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2014)). Moreover, the district court may rely on reasonable
inferences and its experience in determining whether a defendant has been entirely
truthful. See United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2012).
In the communications constituting his proffer, Llausas-Silva took the position that
he was only a money courier and did not personally bring the methamphetamine to
the drug transaction. The district court did not clearly err in determining that, in
light of the message about the drug transaction received by Llausas-Silva and the
particular circumstances of the transaction, Llausas-Silva’s representations were
not entirely truthful. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in declining to
hold an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Houston, 217 F.3d 1204, 1206–
07 (9th Cir. 2000).
Second, Llausas-Silva argues that the district court improperly relied on
provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that calculated his advisory
3 23-3549 sentencing range based on the purity of the methamphetamine seized. But
although the district court could have agreed with Llausas-Silva that the purity-
based Guideline provisions are outdated and varied downward based on a policy
disagreement, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so. See United
States v. Kabir, 51 F.4th 820, 828–29 (9th Cir. 2022), cert denied, 143 S. Ct. 838
(2023); see also United States v. Blackshire, 98 F.4th 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2024)
(“[W]e review a district court’s . . . application of the Guidelines to the facts for
abuse of discretion[] . . . .”). Moreover, even if the district court had erred in
declining to vary downward in calculating the Guidelines range—which it did
not—such an error would be of no moment because Llausas-Silva was given the
statutory minimum sentence. See United States v. Miller, 151 F.3d 957, 962 (9th
Cir. 1998).
Third, Llausas-Silva argues that the district court violated his right to be
present for the imposition of discretionary supervised-release provisions, relying
on United States v. Montoya, 82 F.4th 640, 647 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). But
there was no Montoya error here. Llausas-Silva had advance notice of the
discretionary conditions that he would be subject to based on the U.S. Probation
Office’s sentencing recommendation letters and the district court’s Second
Amended General Order 20-04. See id. at 652 (noting that a “courtwide . . .
standing order[] that list[s] conditions” could suffice to put a defendant on notice
4 23-3549 of what conditions would be imposed). Additionally, out of an abundance of
caution, the district court ensured that Llausas-Silva was aware of the discretionary
conditions that he would be subject to by having a translator read Second Amended
General Order 20-04. This was sufficient to give Llausas-Silva “a meaningful
opportunity to challenge those conditions.” Id.2
Fourth, Llausas-Silva challenges the district court’s application of a two-
level Guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) on the grounds
that his coconspirator, Alfredo Vidana-Zavala, possessed a firearm during the
methamphetamine transaction. We reject his challenge. “[A] defendant convicted
of conspiracy may be sentenced not only on the basis of his own conduct, but also
on the basis of the ‘conduct of others in furtherance of the execution of the jointly-
undertaken criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.’”
United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1349 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting U.S.S.G.
2 Llausas-Silva also raises poorly developed arguments that some of the specific discretionary conditions are unconstitutional. He first argues that the conditions improperly delegate judicial authority to the probation officer. We are unpersuaded. “Where the district court determines ‘whether a defendant must abide by a condition, and how . . . a defendant will be subjected to the condition, it is permissible to delegate to the probation officer the details of where and when the condition will be satisfied.’” United States v. Nishida, 53 F.4th 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2022) (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Wells, 29 F.4th 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2022)). The conditions imposed here—including Condition 14, the only condition pointed to by Llausas-Silva—fall within this rule. Additionally, Llausas- Silva suggests in passing that the discretionary conditions are overbroad, but this argument is not sufficiently developed for us to pass on it.
5 23-3549 § 1B1.3, comment n.1). The district court did not clearly err in concluding that
Vidana-Zavala’s carrying of the firearm was reasonably foreseeable. Where, as
here, a defendant is a party to a large drug transaction, it is reasonably foreseeable
that a codefendant may be carrying a firearm. See id. at 1349–50; see also United
States v. Willis, 899 F.2d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]rafficking in narcotics is
very often related to the carrying and use of firearms.” (quoting United States v.
Ramos, 861 F.2d 228, 231 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988))). Moreover, as was the case with
Llausas-Silva’s methamphetamine-purity argument, the precise Guidelines
sentence is ultimately immaterial because Llausas-Silva was given the minimum
mandatory sentence.
AFFIRMED.
6 23-3549