PER CURIAM:
Appellant Lester Livingston was found guilty of mailing threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the district
court improperly admitted into evidence a letter from him to his then-wife, Sharon Drewery, in violation of the marital communications privilege. Accordingly, Appellant argues, the charge against him must be dismissed. In the alternative, Appellant argues that the district court erred by failing to exclude evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and a new trial is warranted. We AFFIRM.
I. Background
Appellant and Sharon Drewery were married for fifteen years. During that time, Appellant also had an intimate relationship with Drewery’s sister, Cynthia Coleman. In June 2005, Appellant was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Yazoo City, Mississippi. On or about-June 30, 2005, Appellant sent a letter (“the letter”) to Drewery, addressed to her parents’ house in McCool, Mississippi, where Drewery continued to receive mail. In eight different sentences of the letter, Appellant asked Drewery to speak with Coleman in order to mend his relationship with Coleman. The letter contained alleged threats that formed the basis of Appellant’s charge under 18 U.S.C. § 876. Specifically, Appellant wrote:
[I]f I have to come looking for [Coleman], me and her both are going to die on the same day, because, I’m not living without her, because, she is my life, and, I’m not about to let another mother fucker take my place, and, I will make sure that I’ll die in her arms ... we’ll die in eachothers [sic] arms ... if I have to come looking for her, and, I will find her, you are going to lose us both in the same day, because, we will die in ea-chothers [sic] arms, and, that’s a promise, because, I’m tired of her fucking around on me.... Sharon, I don’t want to come looking for her, because, it will be our last day on earth, and, I can promise you that.
Drewery, Coleman, and Coleman’s husband (then boyfriend), Donald Coleman, traveled to McCool to read the letter. Subsequently, Donald Coleman contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) to complain about the letter. Appellant voluntarily agreed to speak with two FBI agents. He admitted writing the letter, but stated that “it was just talk and he would never hurt his family.”
The FBI also interviewed Drewery and Coleman. The women stated that Appellant had a history of abusing them. The transcripts of these interviews were not provided to Appellant’s counsel prior to trial. When the government mentioned Appellant’s alleged history of abuse during its opening statement and when Drew-ery and Coleman testified to the same, Appellant’s counsel objected and moved for mistrial. The district court denied both motions for mistrial. The jury found Appellant guilty, and judgment was entered against him on May 21, 2007.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Pace,
10 F.3d 1106, 1115 (5th Cir.1993).
III. Analysis
A. Marital Communications Privilege
Appellant argues that the district court violated his marital communications privilege when it admitted the letter into evidence. Marital communications “are presumptively confidential.”
Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 332, 333, 71 S.Ct. 301, 95 L.Ed. 306 (1951). There is no dispute that the letter was written while Appellant and Drewery were still married. However, “wherever a communication, because of its nature or the circumstances under
which it was made, was obviously not intended to be confidential, it is not a privileged communication.”
Wolfle v. United States,
291 U.S. 7, 14, 54 S.Ct. 279, 78 L.Ed. 617 (1934). The presumption of confidentiality “may be overcome by proof of facts showing that they were not intended to be private,” such as “[t]he presence of a third party ... [or] the intention that the information conveyed be transmitted to a third person.”
Pereira v. United States,
347 U.S. 1, 6, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954) (citations omitted); see
also United States v. Archer,
733 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir.1984). The government bears the burden of showing that the communication was not intended to be confidential.
Blau,
340 U.S. at 332, 71 S.Ct. 301.
Here, Appellant argues that the letter is protected under the marital communications privilege because the sentences expressing his desire for Drewery to talk to Coleman do not contain the threats against Coleman. Thus, Appellant argues, the threats that are necessary for a § 876 conviction were not intended to be conveyed to Coleman, a third party.
Appellant’s argument requires this Court to parse the letter sentence by sentence to determine which phrases were intended to be conveyed to Coleman and which were intended to remain confidential between him and Drewery. Under the circumstances of this case, we reject Appellant’s argument. Nothing in the letter suggests that Appellant intended for Drewery to only relay certain statements to Coleman. The threats were interwoven with the pleas to talk to Coleman, and the nature of the letter, as a whole, evidences Appellant’s intent that the content be transmitted via Drewery to Coleman. This is in fact what happened: Drewery testified that after reading the letter she passed it to Coleman “because it was about her.” Therefore, we find that the district court properly admitted the letter, and Appellant’s marital communications privilege was not violated.
B. Evidence of Prior Bad Acts
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PER CURIAM:
Appellant Lester Livingston was found guilty of mailing threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the district
court improperly admitted into evidence a letter from him to his then-wife, Sharon Drewery, in violation of the marital communications privilege. Accordingly, Appellant argues, the charge against him must be dismissed. In the alternative, Appellant argues that the district court erred by failing to exclude evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and a new trial is warranted. We AFFIRM.
I. Background
Appellant and Sharon Drewery were married for fifteen years. During that time, Appellant also had an intimate relationship with Drewery’s sister, Cynthia Coleman. In June 2005, Appellant was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Yazoo City, Mississippi. On or about-June 30, 2005, Appellant sent a letter (“the letter”) to Drewery, addressed to her parents’ house in McCool, Mississippi, where Drewery continued to receive mail. In eight different sentences of the letter, Appellant asked Drewery to speak with Coleman in order to mend his relationship with Coleman. The letter contained alleged threats that formed the basis of Appellant’s charge under 18 U.S.C. § 876. Specifically, Appellant wrote:
[I]f I have to come looking for [Coleman], me and her both are going to die on the same day, because, I’m not living without her, because, she is my life, and, I’m not about to let another mother fucker take my place, and, I will make sure that I’ll die in her arms ... we’ll die in eachothers [sic] arms ... if I have to come looking for her, and, I will find her, you are going to lose us both in the same day, because, we will die in ea-chothers [sic] arms, and, that’s a promise, because, I’m tired of her fucking around on me.... Sharon, I don’t want to come looking for her, because, it will be our last day on earth, and, I can promise you that.
Drewery, Coleman, and Coleman’s husband (then boyfriend), Donald Coleman, traveled to McCool to read the letter. Subsequently, Donald Coleman contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) to complain about the letter. Appellant voluntarily agreed to speak with two FBI agents. He admitted writing the letter, but stated that “it was just talk and he would never hurt his family.”
The FBI also interviewed Drewery and Coleman. The women stated that Appellant had a history of abusing them. The transcripts of these interviews were not provided to Appellant’s counsel prior to trial. When the government mentioned Appellant’s alleged history of abuse during its opening statement and when Drew-ery and Coleman testified to the same, Appellant’s counsel objected and moved for mistrial. The district court denied both motions for mistrial. The jury found Appellant guilty, and judgment was entered against him on May 21, 2007.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Pace,
10 F.3d 1106, 1115 (5th Cir.1993).
III. Analysis
A. Marital Communications Privilege
Appellant argues that the district court violated his marital communications privilege when it admitted the letter into evidence. Marital communications “are presumptively confidential.”
Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 332, 333, 71 S.Ct. 301, 95 L.Ed. 306 (1951). There is no dispute that the letter was written while Appellant and Drewery were still married. However, “wherever a communication, because of its nature or the circumstances under
which it was made, was obviously not intended to be confidential, it is not a privileged communication.”
Wolfle v. United States,
291 U.S. 7, 14, 54 S.Ct. 279, 78 L.Ed. 617 (1934). The presumption of confidentiality “may be overcome by proof of facts showing that they were not intended to be private,” such as “[t]he presence of a third party ... [or] the intention that the information conveyed be transmitted to a third person.”
Pereira v. United States,
347 U.S. 1, 6, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954) (citations omitted); see
also United States v. Archer,
733 F.2d 354, 359 (5th Cir.1984). The government bears the burden of showing that the communication was not intended to be confidential.
Blau,
340 U.S. at 332, 71 S.Ct. 301.
Here, Appellant argues that the letter is protected under the marital communications privilege because the sentences expressing his desire for Drewery to talk to Coleman do not contain the threats against Coleman. Thus, Appellant argues, the threats that are necessary for a § 876 conviction were not intended to be conveyed to Coleman, a third party.
Appellant’s argument requires this Court to parse the letter sentence by sentence to determine which phrases were intended to be conveyed to Coleman and which were intended to remain confidential between him and Drewery. Under the circumstances of this case, we reject Appellant’s argument. Nothing in the letter suggests that Appellant intended for Drewery to only relay certain statements to Coleman. The threats were interwoven with the pleas to talk to Coleman, and the nature of the letter, as a whole, evidences Appellant’s intent that the content be transmitted via Drewery to Coleman. This is in fact what happened: Drewery testified that after reading the letter she passed it to Coleman “because it was about her.” Therefore, we find that the district court properly admitted the letter, and Appellant’s marital communications privilege was not violated.
B. Evidence of Prior Bad Acts
In the alternative, Appellant argues that reference to his alleged abuse of Drewery and Coleman via testimony and the government’s opening statement was improper under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because the government did not disclose this evidence prior to trial.
In response, the government argues that the evidence was intrinsic to the crime charged and, therefore, Rule 404(b) is inapplicable.
See United States v. Coleman,
78 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir.1996) (“Intrinsic evidence does not implicate Rule 404(b), and consideration of its admissibility pursuant to Rule 404(b) is unnecessary.”).
We do not reach the issue of whether the evidence of alleged abuse was intrinsic because we find, even assuming such evidence was not intrinsic and subject to Rule 404(b), any error was harmless. An error is harmless if it did not cause “substantial prejudice.”
Guidry v. Dretke,
397 F.3d 306, 331 (5th Cir.2005). Evidence regarding the alleged abuse was not substantially prejudicial to Appellant because the other evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly
supported a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 876. A violation of § 876 occurs where the government “prove[s] that the defendant wrote a letter containing a threat and knowingly caused it to be mailed.”
United States v. Raymer,
876 F.2d 383, 391 (5th Cir.1989);
see also United States v. De-Shazo,
565 F.2d 893, 894-95 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (finding violation of § 876 where defendant admitted he wrote a letter containing threats to Senators Dole and Móndale and caused it to be placed in the mail, despite defendant’s claim that he did not intend to harm anyone). It is undisputed in this case that Appellant wrote the letter and knowingly caused it to be mailed. Thus, assuming
arguendo
that the alleged abuse was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b), such error was harmless and Appellant is not entitled to a new trial. Therefore, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.