United States v. Lipson, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jean Lipson

Opinion

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Timothy J. Huether Trial Attorneys, Tax Division U.S. Department of Justice P.O. Box 683 Washington, D.C. 20044 Phone: (202) 307-2124 Fax: (202) 307-0054 Email: Timothy.Huether@usdoj.gov Western.Taxcivil@usdoj.gov Attorneys for the United States of America FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA United States of America, Case No. 2:23-cv-00127-JCM-DJA Plaintiff, STIPULATION TO EXTEND TIME TO v. FILE OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY Leon W. Lipson, in his capacity as Personal (Second Request) Representative of the Estate of Jean Lipson; Leon W. Lipson, in his capacity as a Trustee of the Jean Lipson Trust; Nadine Lipson, in her capacity as a Trustee of the Jean Lipson Trust; Nadine Lipson, in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of David E. Lipson; Nadine Lipson, individually, Defendants. Pursuant to LR IA 6-1, Plaintiff the United States of America and Defendants Leon W. Lipson, in his capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jean Lipson and in his capacity as a Trustee of the Jean Lipson Trust, and Nadine Lipson, individually and in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of David E. Lipson (collectively, the “parties”), stipulate and move the Court to extend by thirteen days the deadline for the United States to respond to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed on April 4. If granted, the deadline to respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment would be extended from May 2, 2024 to May 15, 2024.

This is the parties’ second request for an extension of the deadline for the United States to respond to this summary judgment motion. The Court previously granted a stipulation to extend the deadline by one week, from April 25 to May 2. Dkt. 24. That deadline has passed. The Court may grant an extension request made after the expiration of the period where the party demonstrates that the failure to file the motion before the deadline expired was the result of excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B); LR IA 6-1(a). The excusable neglect inquiry is equitable in nature and takes into account all relevant surrounding circumstances of the party’s omission, including at least four factors: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the opposing party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on the

proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Bateman v. U.S. Postal Service, 231 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir.2000) (citing Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)); see also Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beazer Homes Holdings Corp., No. 2:09-CV- 626 JCM-PAL, 2013 WL 638632, at *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2013) (applying four-part Pioneer Excusable Neglect balancing test to Rule 6(b)(1)(B)). First, there is no danger of prejudice to the Defendants if the Court were to grant the stipulation. Indeed, the Defendants have stipulated and joined this motion seeking to allow the United States more time to respond to their motion. Their decision to join this motion demonstrates that they do not believe a delay would cause them prejudice. Defendants also stipulated to the parties’ first extension request. Thus, there is no prejudice to the opposing party, and the first factor of Pioneer’s equitable remedy test weighs in favor of the United States. Second, the delay and its potential impact on the proceedings is minimal. If this request is granted, the response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be delayed at most

three weeks. The motion will be ripe less than one month after the initial deadline, resulting in relatively minor potential future delay on the proceedings. See Bateman, 231 F. 3d at 1225. Third, in failing to timely request an extension of the instant deadline, the United States acted carelessly. While the United States admits that this is not a particularly compelling reason, excusable neglect includes situations that are “attributable to negligence” and omissions that are “caused by carelessness.” Lemonge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the third factor does not weigh heavily against the United States, if at all. Fourth, the movant is acting in good faith. The error resulted from negligence and carelessness, rather than deviousness or willfulness. See Bateman, 231 F. 3d at 1225. The final

factor also weighs in favor of the United States. Finally, the United States does not seek this extension to hinder or delay this action. Rather it seeks the extension in good faith, for the reasons explained above. \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ ] For the above reasons, the parties therefore seek that the current deadline be extended by an additional thirteen days from May 2, 2024 to May 15, 2024. Respectfully submitted this 7th day of May, 2024, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, TAX DIVISION ROYAL & MILES LLP DAVID A. HUBBERT Deputy Assistant Attorney General 7\| Timothy J. Huether /s/_ Gregory A. Miles Timothy J. Huether Gregory A. Miles, Esq. Trial Attorneys, Tax Division 1522 W. Warm Springs Road P.O. Box 683, Ben Franklin Station Henderson, NV 89014 Washington, D.C. 20044 Attorney for Defendants Attorneys for the United States of America 1] IT IS SO ORDERED: itus 0. Atala, Unitéd States District Judge Dated: May 8, 2024 STIPULATION TO EXTEND MOTION OPPOSITION DEADLINE (SECOND REQUEST)

I certify that on May 7, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notice to all parties who have appeared in this case and are authorized to receive electronic notice of filings. /s/ Timothy J. Huether TIMOTHY J. HUETHER Trial Attorney, Tax Division U.S. Department of Justice