United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd.

911 F. Supp. 494, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 475, 1996 WL 18796
CourtDistrict Court, D. Utah
DecidedJanuary 11, 1996
Docket1:94-cv-00168
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 911 F. Supp. 494 (United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd., 911 F. Supp. 494, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 475, 1996 WL 18796 (D. Utah 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

J. THOMAS GREENE, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(A), Fed.R.Crim.Pro., as amended, to compel discovery of statements made by employees and agents of the corporate defendant Lin Lyn Trading, Ltd. in the course of a government investigation. The United States was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Wayne Dance and the defendants were represented by Max D. Wheeler and James D. Gilson.

On October 6, 1995, as a result of prior motions, this court entered an Order re Discovery. A hearing concerning the scope of that Order was held on November 21, 1995, particularly as it relates to disclosure to defendants of statements made by agents of Lin Lyn Trading Co. The government’s motion to compel reciprocal discovery as called for in the October 6, 1995 court order was also addressed. After argument, the court directed the parties to file supplemental memorandums concerning the scope and requirements of the rule as applied to present and former agents and employees of corporate defendants, which has been done.

I.

STATEMENTS MADE BY AGENTS OF CORPORATIONS

Defendants seek discovery of statements known to have been made to government agents by agents of Lin Lynn Trading as well as statements which may have been made which are not known by defendants. In this regard, defendants have identified with some particularity eight individuals known to have been interviewed by government agents, which individuals were involved in the purchasing, shipping or receiving of imported products on behalf of Lin Lyn. 1

*496 Rule 16(a)(1)(A), Fed.R.Crim.Pro., as amended effective December 1, 1994, provides in pertinent part as follows;

(A) ... Upon request of a defendant which is an organization such as a corporation, partnership, association or labor union, the government must disclose to the defendant any of the foregoing statements made by a person who the government contends (1) was, at the time of making the statement so situated as a director, officer, employee, or agent as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to the subject of the statement, or (2) was at the time of the offense, personally involved in the alleged conduct constituting the offense and so situated as a director, officer, employee, or agent as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in respect to that alleged conduct in which the person was involved. (Emphasis added) 2

The government contends that the plain language of the rule, i.e., statements made by persons who were “at the time of the offense, personally involved in the alleged conduct constituting the offense,” only relates to statements made by individuals “who at the time of the alleged offense were criminally culpable for their involvement in the alleged offense and could legally bind the corporate defendant as to such offense.” (Government’s Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Rule 16(a)(1)(A), p. 2. Emphasis added.) In support, counsel for the government relied upon the case of United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F.Supp. 334 (D.Conn.1990). In that case, the court refused to order production of statements by one senior officer of the corporation because there was no evidence that he “committed any of the alleged wrongful conduct. His participation in the presentation to the JTB does not involve him in the conspiracy.” On the other hand, the court ordered production of statements by another senior officer because the government had made only a generalized or conclusory showing that he “was not personally involved in the alleged conduct constituting the offense,” or was a “mere observer.” Id. At 351. Since Young & Rubicam was decided, Rule 16 has been amended twice in such a way as to broaden the government’s discovery obligations. Also, when that case was handed down the Rule required defendants to stipulate that employees were able legally to bind the corporation before their statements were discoverable. For these reasons, this court declines to follow that ease, particularly to the extent that it would require criminal culpability of the person who made the statement in question.

Defendants rely upon the expanded language of amended Rule 16(a)(1)(A) and cite explanatory language from the Advisory Committee Notes applicable to the Rule. Those Notes make it clear that “[t]he amendment is intended to clarify that the discovery and disclosure requirements of the Rule apply equally to individual and organization defendants.” Further, the Notes indicate that:

The amendment defines defendant in a broad, nonexclusive fashion. See also 18 U.S.C. § 18 (the term “organization” includes a person other than an individual). And the amendment recognizes that an organizational defendant could, be bound by an agent’s statement, see e.g., Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), or be vicariously liable for an agent’s actions. The amendment contemplates that, upon request of the defendant, the Government will disclose any statements within the *497 purview of the rule and made by persons whom the government contends to be among the classes of persons described in the rule. (Emphasis added.)

In United States of America v. Bhutani, 1995 WL 632069 (N.D.Ill.), the court was confronted with similar opposing claims by counsel for the government and counsel for defendant. That court observed that the purpose of Amended Rule 16(a)(1)(A) was to “give corporate defendants discovery rights that would be parallel to those of individual defendants,” and ruled that

“To place a corporate defendant in the same position (as an individual defendant), it should be entitled to the statement of anyone for whose acts it may be criminally responsible. Whether the person who gave the statement shared the corporation’s criminal intent at the time he committed the act is immaterial.” Id. at *3.

This court agrees.

In discharge of its obligations under Rule 16, the government should disclose statements of all persons whose statements or conduct it seeks to use in order to hold Lin Lyn Trading criminally responsible. Such statements should be produced whether or not the person in question had knowledge of the illegality of the offense conduct, whether or not that person knew she was violating the law, and whether or not that person would be criminally culpable. In this connection, the court rejects the government’s claim that the statutory requirement that the person making the statement in question be “personally involved” means that the person must be criminally culpable.

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Bluebook (online)
911 F. Supp. 494, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 475, 1996 WL 18796, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-lin-lyn-trading-ltd-utd-1996.