United States v. Liddy

397 F. Supp. 947, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11784
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedJune 20, 1975
DocketCrim. 1827-72
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 397 F. Supp. 947 (United States v. Liddy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Liddy, 397 F. Supp. 947, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11784 (D.D.C. 1975).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIRICA, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of the defendant George Gordon Liddy for a reduction of sentence', filed May 19, 1975. The Court has carefully reviewed this motion and the memorandum filed in support thereof, and has taken into consideration all of those factors which are usually considered by most judges when passing upon such motions.

The provision for such a motion under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is intended to provide a means by which a convicted defendant may have a second chance before a sentencing judge, while giving the judge an opportunity to reconsider the initial sentence imposed in light of any further information concerning the defendant or the case which might have arisen and been brought to the attention of the Court in the interim. United States v. Ellenbogen, 390 F.2d 537, 543 (2 Cir.) *948 cert. denied 393 U.S. 918, 89 S.Ct. 241, 21 L.Ed.2d 206 (1968).

When this defendant was sentenced, the Court mentioned the four principal reasons for imposing sentences. It was noted at that time that reprisal was not an appropriate purpose for which to sentence this defendant, and that rehabilitation, although considered, was not the principal consideration. The Court, however, emphasized the purposes of imposing just punishment for the grave offenses committed and of deterring others from engaging in such reprehensible conduct.

The deterrent effect of the sentences, as one of the primary reasons for prescribing the term of incarceration for the defendant, is no less important now than it was at the time of his initial sentencing. As the prosecutor stated at that time:

“ . . . What these defendants have done ... is not only violate the freedom of association of a major political party but perhaps more important . . . what they have done is to generate a fear that this illegal activity, wiretapping, bugging and burglary for political purposes, is both widespread and condoned.
. [I]t is important that the sentences imposed in this case . . . respond to this fear by deterring future conduct of this kind and by demonstrating that this kind of conduct will not be tolerated.” 1

Similarly, the purpose of imposing punishment appropriate for the grave offenses of which the defendant was convicted has not been negated by the facts, circumstances or events which have come to the attention of the Court in the interim.

The rehabilitative purpose to be served by Mr. Liddy’s sentence must also be reconsidered. The need for the personal rehabilitation of this defendant has assumed even greater importance than it had two years ago due to the events that have occurred in the interim. A review of his present criminal record is revealing. When this defendant first appeared before the Court he had no criminal record, having never before been sentenced to jail or even having been convicted of an offense more serious than a traffic violation. However, on March 23, 1973, when he stood before this Court to be sentenced, he stood convicted of two counts of burglary, two counts of intercepting wire communications, one count of intercepting oral communications and one count of conspiracy. Since then, the defendant has been convicted by another jury of another felony charge, namely, conspiracy to violate the rights of a citizen; he has been found guilty of statutory contempt of court for refusing to testify before a Federal Grand Jury; and has been found guilty by another federal judge of contempt of Congress for refusing to testify before a Congressional Committee. With the exception of the statutory contempt conviction, the sentences the defendant received for his other convictions were either suspended or made to run concurrently with the sentences imposed by this Court.

Subsequent to his conviction and sentencing in this case, the defendant had several opportunities to provide valuable assistance to governmental investigating units by testifying as to his knowledge of certain alleged illegal activities. He was even granted immunity from prosecution for the testimony which he was subpoenaed to give. Yet, he refused to cooperate. It is reasonable for the Court to assume that this defendant had reason to know and believe that any further consideration he might receive from the Court concerning his sentence might be affected by his conduct after sentencing. In fact he was present in the courtroom when his co-defendants were specifically informed that their coopera *949 tion with the grand jury and the Senate Select Committee would be a relevant factor which the Court would consider in determining their final sentences.

At that time this court stated to all of the defendants in the presence of Mr. Liddy:

“ . . . [N]one of you have been willing to give the government or other appropriate authorities any substantial help in trying this case or in investigating the activities which were the subject of this case.
I think under the law, the Court is entitled to consider this fact in determining sentences.
* * * * * -X-
I believe I may also properly suggest to you that in the interval between now and the time when the Bureau of Prisons studies are completed, you give serious consideration to lending your full cooperation to investigating authorities.
Now I want to speak plainly about this matter. You will, no doubt, be given an opportunity to provide information to the grand jury which has been, and still is, investigating the Watergate affair and to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.
I sincerely hope that each one of you will take full advantage of any such opportunity ....
******
Now I believe that the Watergate [Break-in] affair . . . should not be forgotten. Some good can and should come from a revelation of sinister conduct whenever and wherever such conduct exists. I am convinced that the greatest benefit that can come from this prosecution will be its impact as a spur to corrective action so that the type of activities revealed by the evidence at trial will not be repeated in our nation.
For these reasons, I recommend your full cooperation with the grand jury and the Senate Select Committee. You must understand that I hold out no promises or hopes of any kind to you in this matter but I do say that should you decide to speak freely I would have to weigh that factor in appraising what sentence will be finally imposed in this case. Other factors will, of course, be considered but I mention this one because it is one over which you have control and I mean each and every one of you.” 2

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Related

Johnson v. United States
562 A.2d 603 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1989)
United States v. Ochs
490 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. New York, 1980)
United States v. Winfield L. Roberts A/K/A Win
600 F.2d 815 (D.C. Circuit, 1979)
United States v. McIlwain
427 F. Supp. 358 (District of Columbia, 1977)
United States v. Mitchell
551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Circuit, 1976)
United States v. Liddy
530 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Circuit, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
397 F. Supp. 947, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11784, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-liddy-dcd-1975.