United States v. Leslie William Jantzer

28 F.3d 109, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25101, 1994 WL 273905
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJune 17, 1994
Docket93-30240
StatusUnpublished

This text of 28 F.3d 109 (United States v. Leslie William Jantzer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Leslie William Jantzer, 28 F.3d 109, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25101, 1994 WL 273905 (9th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

28 F.3d 109

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Leslie William JANTZER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 93-30240.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 5, 1994.
Decided June 17, 1994.

Before: ALARCON, NORRIS and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM*

Thomas Jantzer seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction for theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641 and depredation of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1361. He contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he had actual knowledge of the theft and destruction of government property, or that he had a subjective awareness of a high probability that (1) the true boundaries of a government timber sale had been destroyed so that additional timber could be taken; and (2) leave trees from Unit 2 were taken that did not create a hazard to the cutters and loggers.

The Government contends that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to show that Jantzer or someone under his direction committed these violations. The Government also argues that the evidence establishes that Jantzer had actual knowledge, or deliberately and purposefully contrived to avoid learning, that (1) the boundaries had been altered and trees were cut outside the boundary line; and (2) leave trees within the legitimate boundary lines of Unit 2 were taken without the Government's consent or proper justification.

A conviction must be upheld if, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We reverse the judgment because the evidence is insufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact that Jantzer had actual knowledge before the fact that trees belonging to the United States would be cut illegally, that he cut trees not authorized by the timber sale, that he directed someone else to do so, or that he deliberately avoided learning the true facts so that he would have a defense should he be subjected to prosecution.

To support a conviction for the crimes of theft and depredation, the Government had the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant knowingly took government property without authorization, United States v. Bigelow, 728 F.2d 412, 413 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984), and knowingly destroyed government property, United States v. Seaman, 18 F.3d 649, 650 (9th Cir.1994), or that he was deliberately ignorant. To prove deliberate ignorance, the Government must show that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposefully contrived to avoid learning all the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution. United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.1991).

I.

The Government maintains that the testimony of Jeff White, Jantzer's foreman, Bruce Dunn, a harvest operations specialist for the Department of Natural Resources, and Special Agent Gregory Assmus, a criminal investigator with the Bureau of Land Management, concerning Unit 2 establishes that Jantzer had the requisite mental state to sustain a conviction for theft and depredation. We have reviewed the record of that testimony. It does not support the Government's position.

The Government asserts that "the testimony of Jeff White was that Jantzer told him and his crew to cut anything in Unit 2 that even remotely resembled a leave tree." Appellee's Brief at 31. The record does not support this paraphrase of White's complete testimony before the petit jury.

White testified on direct examination that he could not recall making a statement to investigating agents that Jantzer had told him to instruct the cutters to cut "any tree that was marked as a leave tree which could even remotely be considered a hazard, unless Jantzer instructed him to do otherwise." Reporter's Transcript (RT) Vol. V at 82, 84. White also did not recall stating that he "could not figure out why Jantzer wanted them cut, and morally disagreed with Jantzer's decision, but ended up cutting them anyway because Jantzer was the boss." RT Vol. V at 84. White acknowledged, however, that prior to his testimony before the grand jury, he reviewed the agent's summary of his statement and stated it was correct. RT Vol. V at 82-83.

On cross-examination, White explained that the instruction Jantzer gave him was that "[i]f there was a safety hazard, to cut it." RT Vol. V at 102. White asserted that Jantzer and the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) disagreed about safety trees. According to White, the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) allowed them "to cut whatever safety trees [the cutters] think need to be cut," but that under the Forest Service contract, "you're supposed to have permission" to cut a leave tree. RT Vol. V at 102. White stated that conflict between the Forest Service contract and OSHA is a common problem because there are some situations "where you have to cut them. They are a hazard." RT Vol. V at 102, 106.

Contrary to the Government's assertion, White's trial testimony established that Jantzer did not tell him to cut anything that resembled a leave tree. The record shows that Jantzer's instructions were to cut trees that presented a safety hazard.

The Government argues that testimony of Dunn established that most of the leave trees taken from Unit 2 did not present a safety hazard. Dunn examined the stumps of the cut leave trees in Unit 2 to determine whether there was a safety reason for taking the designated trees. Dunn testified that a legitimate safety reason existed for the taking of only two of the "thirty or so" leave trees in Unit 2. RT Vol. V at 153. This evidence, when considered in connection with White's testimony, demonstrated that the person who cut leave trees that did not present a safety hazard violated Jantzer's instructions. It does not prove that Jantzer had actual knowledge that trees that did not constitute a safety hazard were being cut, or that he deliberately ignored the facts.

Dunn also testified regarding the discrete styles used to cut the leave trees in Unit 2. Assmus testified that Jantzer demonstrated his cutting style. The Government argues that this evidence proves that Jantzer cut the leave trees in Unit 2. We disagree.

Dunn testified that, in his opinion, the cutting techniques of the cutters in Unit 2 created the safety hazard that required the cutting of the trees. RT Vol. V at 136-52.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
United States v. Ernest Bobby Bigelow
728 F.2d 412 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
United States v. Susana Sanchez-Robles
927 F.2d 1070 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
28 F.3d 109, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25101, 1994 WL 273905, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-leslie-william-jantzer-ca9-1994.