United States v. Leroy Irvin

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: 24-2455
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________________

No. 24-2455 _______________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LEROY IRVIN, Appellant _______________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania District Court No. 2:21-cr-00347-001 District Judge: The Hon. Cathy Bissoon __________________________

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) October 31, 2025

Before: BIBAS, SCIRICA, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed January 14, 2026) __________________________

OPINION* __________________________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Leroy Irvin entered a conditional guilty plea admitting to possessing with the

intent to distribute substances with a detectable amount of fentanyl in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(vi), and 841(b)(1)(B)(vi). His conditional

plea preserved the right to challenge the District Court’s denial of a motion for a

Franks1 hearing and three motions to suppress evidence, some of which was

obtained pursuant to the execution of search warrants. After the District Court

sentenced Irvin to, inter alia, 120 months of imprisonment, he filed this timely

appeal.2 We will affirm.

I.

At 8:23 P.M. on June 19, a sensor program known as Shotspotter3 detected

17 rounds of gunfire by multiple shooters at 1717 Belleau Drive, an apartment

building that is part of a Pittsburgh housing complex. A minute later, a second

Shotspotter bulletin reported nine more rounds at 1728 Belleau Drive.4 Sergeant

Emily Myers from the Pittsburgh Police Department responded to the scene.5

1 See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 2 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 Shotspotter is “an acoustic-detection system” that notifies police dispatch when it detects gunfire. Gov’t Br. 4. 4 Thirty-eight shell casings from both 40 caliber and 9 millimeter rounds were recovered at the housing complex in the area of the shooting. 5 Sergeant Myers’ bodycam recorded the events that transpired. In support of his suppression motions, Irvin submitted some of Sergeant Myers’ bodycam footage, together 2 While police were en route, dispatch advised them that a male at 1716 Belleau had

called 911 to report that he had been shot.

Upon arriving at the scene, Sergeant Myers drew her weapon for self-

protection because Shotspotter is “not always accurate,” A332, and she was unsure

“where any potential threats” might be. A309. Other officers who responded did

the same. At building 1716, Officer Matthew McShane noticed blood on the

outside door. As Sergeant Myers and Officer McShane entered the building, they

observed more blood on the ground floor apartment door. Sergeant Myers

announced the officers’ presence and directed the occupant to open the door.

Having viewed the videos that accompanied the suppression motion, Judge

Bissoon found that Irvin opened the door, and was “on the floor bleeding out.”

A297.

As Sergeant Myers worked to extricate Irvin from the apartment, three

police officers, including Officer McShane, entered the apartment. Based on the

videos, Judge Bissoon stated that it was “clear” that when entering the apartment,

the police, with guns drawn, “believed that there was a gunman on the loose.”

A296-97. After the officers pulled Irvin out of the apartment and onto the

with footage from the bodycams of other responding officers. The District Judge noted at the time the suppression hearing commenced that she had already viewed the bodycam videos. 3 sidewalk outside, they observed an iPhone Irvin dropped on the floor of the

hallway outside the apartment.

After ruling out the presence of anyone else in the apartment, Officer

McShane proceeded to the apartment door. There he spotted a firearm on the

living room floor between an illuminated television and a couch. Law enforcement

did not move the firearm.

In the meantime, Officer James Ashbaucher and Sergeant Myers attended to

Irvin. Officer Ashbaucher, a former EMT, cut off Irvin’s clothes to determine

where he was injured. What he found were gunshot wounds to both the chest and

the right leg, prompting the application of a tourniquet. As Irvin was being

transported away by EMTs who had arrived at the scene, Officer Ashbaucher

reached into Irvin’s pants pockets looking for identification and any indication of

pre-existing medical issues or emergency contacts. What Officer Ashbaucher

found was a large roll of cash.

Pittsburgh Detective Joseph Lippert arrived to process the crime scene and

observed, from his position in the doorway, that a firearm was lying on the floor of

the apartment. He then supplied his colleague, Detective Caleb Hines, with this

information and other observations in support of a probable cause affidavit for a

search warrant of the apartment. A search warrant was granted and executed later

that evening. During the search of the apartment, police seized drugs, heroin

4 stamped bags, a gun without a serial number (sometimes referred to as a “ghost

gun”), and a Samsung cellphone. Police also seized the unattended iPhone

previously observed in the public hallway. They later obtained a search warrant to

determine ownership of the iPhone. Irvin’s clothing, which had been cut off, was

also taken from the scene into police custody.

The District Court conducted a hearing on Irvin’s motions for both a Franks

hearing and for suppression of the evidence that had been seized from the

apartment, the iPhone, and Irvin’s pants. At the conclusion of the hearing, and

after considering arguments from the parties, the District Court denied the motions.

II.

Irvin contends that he was entitled to a Franks hearing because he made a

substantial showing that the applications for the search warrants contained false

statements, as well as omissions, that were material to probable cause

determinations made by Pennsylvania magistrate district judges.6 Judge Bissoon

rejected that contention, stating that Irvin failed to “demonstrate[] a falsity with

respect to many of these items, [and had] certainly not demonstrated that [any

6 In reviewing the denial of a Franks hearing, we review for clear error the determination of whether a false statement is made with reckless disregard for the truth. United States v. Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 235 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2022). De novo review applies to any questions of law. Id. 5 statement or omission] was made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the

truth.” A425-26.

Irvin asserts that the application to search the apartment falsely suggested

that the firearm was observed lawfully and not during the initial warrrantless entry

into the apartment. Detective Lippert testified, however, that in the ten to fifteen

seconds after he arrived at the apartment door he observed the firearm, on the

apartment floor. And Detective Lippert explained that he made this same

observation before speaking with an officer who also advised that there was a

firearm in the apartment. Judge Bissoon found that the evidence supported that the

firearm was visible from the apartment’s open door. She also found that Detective

Lippert’s testimony was credible. In light of these factual findings, we discern no

clear error in the District Court’s determination that the affidavit of probable cause

to search the apartment contained neither a false statement nor an omission.

Nor are we persuaded that the District Court erred in rejecting Irvin’s

assertion that the affidavit in support of the iPhone search falsely stated that the

owner was unknown. The mere fact that Irvin dropped the iPhone did not establish

his ownership. It merely established that he had it in his possession before

dropping it in the hallway. And given the presence of a Samsung cellphone on the

couch in the apartment, it was not clear who owned either cellphone.

6 III.

Irvin also contends that the District Court erred in refusing to grant his

motions to suppress.7 We are not persuaded.

First, Irvin contends that the evidence obtained from the apartment should be

suppressed. In his view, exigent circumstances did not excuse the warrantless

entry into that dwelling since he was the victim of the shooting and had stated to

the police that no one else was inside. That, he maintains, eliminated any

perceived threat. Thus, he contends that the warrant was tainted because it referred

to the presence of the firearm which police learned of only through their earlier

warrantless search of his apartment. Yet the District Court credited Detective

Lippert’s account that he spotted the firearm from outside the apartment before any

officer informed him that it was there. Accordingly, evidence from the initial

sweep of the apartment did not taint the probable cause affidavit.8 The warrant, as

7 In reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we review the District Court’s factual findings for clear error and conduct plenary review of questions of law. United States v. Kramer, 75 F.4th 339, 342 (3d Cir. 2023). And because the suppression motions were denied, “we view the facts in the light most favorable to the Government.” Id. 8 Although we need not address whether the warrantless search was excused by exigent circumstances, we cannot ignore that the District Court declared that law enforcement had “entered what was potentially an active shooter situation, and bodycam footage clearly demonstrates that they are searching for victims and/or shooters.” A439; see Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (observing that “[o]ne exigency obviating” the warrant requirement is the “need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury”) (omitting internal quotation marks and citation). 7 the District Court determined, was supported by probable cause and there was no

basis for suppressing the evidence seized from the apartment pursuant to it.

Second, Irvin asserts that all evidence derived from the search of his pants

must be suppressed. He acknowledged at the suppression hearing that the pants

were evidence of a crime and could, therefore, be lawfully taken from the scene.

But he claims that the warrantless search of his pockets violated the Fourth

Amendment and requires suppression of anything found therein.

Under the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule,

“[e]vidence obtained by the police unlawfully may nonetheless be admitted into

evidence if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that

the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful

means[.]” United States v. Bradley, 959 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 2020) (omitting

internal quotation and citations); see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444

(1984). Here, police testified that they would have seized Irvin’s pants to conduct

an inventory search, and that it was the Police Department’s practice to do so to

“protect people’s property” and preserve evidence. A401; see Colorado v. Bertine,

479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) (“[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory

procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”). The

District Court credited that testimony. Since Irvin’s pants would have eventually

been searched pursuant to a lawful inventory search, the inevitable-discovery

8 doctrine bars exclusion of that evidence. Accordingly, we will not disturb the

District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress the evidence obtained from Irvin’s

bloody pants.

Third, Irvin challenges the evidence obtained from the iPhone, contending it

was unconstitutionally seized without a warrant. He argues that there was no basis

to seize the iPhone because it was not immediately apparent that it contained any

incriminating evidence.

The District Court concluded that “law enforcement had probable cause to

believe that the iPhone contained evidence of a crime, making the seizure of Mr.

Irvin’s iPhone constitutional pending issuance of a warrant to later examine its

contents.” A441. The District Court did not clearly err in making that finding.

Detective Lippert testified that the police “did not know what [Irvin’s] role was[,]

whether he was a true victim or if he was … a perpetrator who … lost the gun

fight.” A373. The cellphone, Detective Lippert explained, could reveal, inter alia,

the parties involved in the shooting, and “any messages” or “threats” between

them. A374. Accordingly, seizure of the unattended iPhone from the public

hallway, where the probable cause to seize the phone was immediately apparent,

did not offend the Fourth Amendment. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27

(1987); see also Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462–63 (2011).

9 IV.

In sum, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.