United States v. Lepere

599 F. Supp. 1322, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21104
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedDecember 19, 1984
DocketCrim. 83-308-T
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 599 F. Supp. 1322 (United States v. Lepere) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Lepere, 599 F. Supp. 1322, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21104 (D. Mass. 1984).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TAURO, District Judge.

The defendant, Frank J. Lepere, was indicted on November 25, 1983 on charges that he engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise and conspired to import and possess large quantities of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 963, and 846. He was arrested near Lake George, New York on November 2, 1984 and transferred to this district five days later. On November 14, 1984, following a hearing, the Magistrate ordered the defendant detained pending trial, pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.

The Magistrate found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant would flee if released on any condition of bail. The Magistrate declared that, “Defendant’s own unequivocal conduct during the course *1324 of the past three years makes this conclusion inescapable.” The Magistrate relied on the fact that defendant had been a fugitive since December 8, 1981 when he was indicted on drug importation charges in the District of South Carolina. Three days earlier, defendant had left his home in Marsh-field, Massachusetts and remained unlocated until his arrest on November 2nd. The Magistrate found that, in light of the arrest of his confederates and the extensive publicity surrounding his case, the defendant was fully aware that law enforcement officers were looking for him. 1

Defendant concedes that his absence for three years indicates some risk of flight, but he emphasizes that the absence was not itself a violation of the law. He maintains that certain stringent conditions of release plus the designation of several millions of dollars of property for forfeiture by his family, friends and business associates is sufficient to negate the possibility of flight. 2

The court is impressed that defendant’s family members have enough faith in him that they are willing to forfeit their homes and be left on the street in the event that he flees. The proffer of property by defendant’s legitimate business associates and his friends is also impressive. Although the Magistrate discounted defendant’s ties to his family and community on account of the fact that defendant had secluded himself in upstate New York for three years, the court is persuaded that the proffer of the property would significantly deter defendant from flight.

Our inquiry does not end here, however. We must consider the impact on our analysis of the statutory presumptions contained in the new Bail Reform Act. Under the Act:

Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.)....

18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).

The defendant is charged with, among other things, engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise under the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 848. If convicted of this charge, defendant faces a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Although this is a crime to which the statutory presumption may apply and although the Magistrate found that the government’s evidence was strong, 3 the Magistrate chose not to invoke the statutory presumption.

After reviewing the record and the Magistrate’s findings, the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that defendant committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by the Controlled Substances Act. As such, the court is compelled to apply the statutory pre *1325 sumption that no condition of release will assure defendant’s appearance or the safety of the community. While the court believes that defendant’s proposed conditions of release and the proffered property significantly negate the risk of flight evidenced by his absence from the jurisdiction for three years, the court is not persuaded that they adequately rebut the statutory presumption of risk of flight and danger.

The legislative history of the Bail Reform Act indicates that one of the major purposes of the Act was to prevent the pretrial recidivism of major drug traffickers. Congress sought to accomplish this by insisting that bail and pretrial release decisions be based on the danger of continued drug activities, as well as the traditional concerns of the likelihood of flight and danger of physical violence on release. Congress also inserted a provision that those charged with major drug offenses would be presumed too dangerous or risky to release.

The Senate Judiciary Report on the 1983 Senate bail reform bill, which was enacted with few modifications by Congress in 1984, stated that the Judiciary Committee,

for the most part, refrained from specifying what kinds of information are a sufficient basis for the denial of release, and has chosen to leave the resolution of this question to the sound judgment of the courts acting on a case-by-case basis. However, the bill does describe two sets of circumstances under which a strong probability arises that no form of conditional release will be adequate.

S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1983) (emphasis added). These circumstances obtain when the defendant has a history of pretrial criminality, or when the defendant is charged with a drug offense punishable by a maximum term of ten years or more or with a felony committed with a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). The Judiciary Committee noted

These [latter crimes] are serious and dangerous Federal offenses. The drug offenses involve either trafficking in opiates or narcotic drugs, or trafficking in large amounts of other types of controlled substances. It is well known that drug trafficking is carried on to an unusual degree by persons engaged in continuing patterns of criminal activity. Persons charged with major drug felonies are often in the business of importing or distributing dangerous drugs, and thus, because of the nature of the criminal activity with which they are charged, they pose a significant risk of pretrial recidivism. Furthermore, the Committee received testimony that flight to avoid prosecution is particularly high among persons charged with drug offenses____

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Related

United States v. Cox
635 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Kansas, 1986)
United States v. Lepere
603 F. Supp. 375 (D. Massachusetts, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
599 F. Supp. 1322, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21104, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-lepere-mad-1984.