USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-12903 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cr-00061-MW-MAF-8
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEONARD SAFFORD,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(July 28, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Leonard Safford appeals his above-guideline sentence as substantively
unreasonable. He was convicted of eight counts of possessing and training a dog for USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 2 of 6
dog fighting and one count of conspiracy to exhibit dogs in and train dogs for dog
fighting. The district court sentenced him to 48 months, a seven-month upward
variance. Safford argues that the district court erred by basing the upward variance
on aggravating factors that the Guidelines already accounted for, by not considering
mitigating factors, and by failing to give “real weight” to the Guidelines.
“[O]nly the rare sentence … will be substantively unreasonable.” United
States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1351 (11th Cir. 2018). We review substantive
reasonableness for abuse of discretion, considering the sentence “in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Trailer, 827
F.3d 933, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). In imposing a sentence, a
district court abuses its discretion if it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant
factors that were due significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor; or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). The district court commits a clear error of judgment only if we are “left with
the definite and firm conviction” that a sentence “lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936 (quoting Irey,
612 F.3d at 1190).
The party challenging the sentence carries the burden of establishing that the
sentence is unreasonable, United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.
2 USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 3 of 6
2010), and we give deference to the district court’s decision that the Section 3553(a)
factors justify the sentence, Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187. Also, the weight given to each
factor lies within the district court’s discretion, and it may reasonably attach great
weight to a single factor. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir.
2013). The district court need not even discuss each Section 3553(a) factor. Id. at
1326. Acknowledging that it considered the factors is sufficient. United States v.
Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).
The district court may impose an upward variance based on the Section
3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 637–38 (11th
Cir. 2013). And we may not presume a sentence outside the guidelines is
unreasonable. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187. As a specific example, the district court may
impose an upward variance if it concludes that the guideline range was insufficient
because of the defendant’s criminal history. United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814
F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). That is true even though a defendant’s criminal
history factors in when calculating the correct guidelines range. See United States v.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1264 (11th Cir. 2015). Indeed, “[d]istrict courts have
broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has
committed,” id. at 1261, and “criminal history [can be] sufficiently compelling to
justify … an upward variance above th[e] guidelines range,” United States v.
Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir. 2009).
3 USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 4 of 6
Here, the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Safford argues that the
district court did not give “real weight” to the Guidelines and that the sentence did
not “adequately reflect the Guidelines’ policy statements and underlying concerns.”
But the district court repeatedly referred to the Guidelines and specifically cited the
commentary for the guideline applying to Safford’s offense. That commentary
explicitly declared that sometimes “the offense level determined under this guideline
[may] substantially understate[] the seriousness of the offense.” U.S.S.G. §
2E3.1(a)(1) cmt. n.2. For example, a higher sentence might be warranted if “the
offense involved extraordinary cruelty to an animal beyond the violence inherent in”
dog fighting or if “the offense involved animal fighting on an exceptional scale (such
as an offense involving an unusually large number of animals).” Id.
In deciding that this was a case for which the guideline did indeed
“substantially understate[] the seriousness of the offense,” the district court properly
weighed the Section 3553(a) factors. As stated above, it noted the guideline
sentencing range and the Guidelines’ commentary. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)–(5).
Additionally, it explained that the sentence was based on the nature and
circumstances of the offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), such as the duration of the dog
fighting enterprise, the number of dogs involved, and the extent of the abuse apart
from the dog fighting. The guideline range does not account for those facts as Safford
argues. See U.S.S.G. § 2E3.1(a)(1) cmt. n.2. And even if it did, a district court can
4 USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 5 of 6
rely on factors that the Guidelines also consider in deciding to vary because the
Guidelines “maintain[] flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences.” United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005); cf. United States v. Early, 686 F.3d
1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2012) (allowing consideration of criminal history even though
criminal history already impacts the recommended guideline range).
The district court also relied on Safford’s criminal history, specifically his
recidivism. It reasoned that a longer prison sentence was needed to deter Safford and
protect the public from his further crimes, 18 U.S.C.
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USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-12903 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cr-00061-MW-MAF-8
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEONARD SAFFORD,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(July 28, 2021)
Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Leonard Safford appeals his above-guideline sentence as substantively
unreasonable. He was convicted of eight counts of possessing and training a dog for USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 2 of 6
dog fighting and one count of conspiracy to exhibit dogs in and train dogs for dog
fighting. The district court sentenced him to 48 months, a seven-month upward
variance. Safford argues that the district court erred by basing the upward variance
on aggravating factors that the Guidelines already accounted for, by not considering
mitigating factors, and by failing to give “real weight” to the Guidelines.
“[O]nly the rare sentence … will be substantively unreasonable.” United
States v. Dixon, 901 F.3d 1322, 1351 (11th Cir. 2018). We review substantive
reasonableness for abuse of discretion, considering the sentence “in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Trailer, 827
F.3d 933, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). In imposing a sentence, a
district court abuses its discretion if it “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant
factors that were due significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor; or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). The district court commits a clear error of judgment only if we are “left with
the definite and firm conviction” that a sentence “lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936 (quoting Irey,
612 F.3d at 1190).
The party challenging the sentence carries the burden of establishing that the
sentence is unreasonable, United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.
2 USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 3 of 6
2010), and we give deference to the district court’s decision that the Section 3553(a)
factors justify the sentence, Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187. Also, the weight given to each
factor lies within the district court’s discretion, and it may reasonably attach great
weight to a single factor. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir.
2013). The district court need not even discuss each Section 3553(a) factor. Id. at
1326. Acknowledging that it considered the factors is sufficient. United States v.
Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).
The district court may impose an upward variance based on the Section
3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 637–38 (11th
Cir. 2013). And we may not presume a sentence outside the guidelines is
unreasonable. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1187. As a specific example, the district court may
impose an upward variance if it concludes that the guideline range was insufficient
because of the defendant’s criminal history. United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814
F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016). That is true even though a defendant’s criminal
history factors in when calculating the correct guidelines range. See United States v.
Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1264 (11th Cir. 2015). Indeed, “[d]istrict courts have
broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has
committed,” id. at 1261, and “criminal history [can be] sufficiently compelling to
justify … an upward variance above th[e] guidelines range,” United States v.
Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 936 (11th Cir. 2009).
3 USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 4 of 6
Here, the sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Safford argues that the
district court did not give “real weight” to the Guidelines and that the sentence did
not “adequately reflect the Guidelines’ policy statements and underlying concerns.”
But the district court repeatedly referred to the Guidelines and specifically cited the
commentary for the guideline applying to Safford’s offense. That commentary
explicitly declared that sometimes “the offense level determined under this guideline
[may] substantially understate[] the seriousness of the offense.” U.S.S.G. §
2E3.1(a)(1) cmt. n.2. For example, a higher sentence might be warranted if “the
offense involved extraordinary cruelty to an animal beyond the violence inherent in”
dog fighting or if “the offense involved animal fighting on an exceptional scale (such
as an offense involving an unusually large number of animals).” Id.
In deciding that this was a case for which the guideline did indeed
“substantially understate[] the seriousness of the offense,” the district court properly
weighed the Section 3553(a) factors. As stated above, it noted the guideline
sentencing range and the Guidelines’ commentary. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)–(5).
Additionally, it explained that the sentence was based on the nature and
circumstances of the offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), such as the duration of the dog
fighting enterprise, the number of dogs involved, and the extent of the abuse apart
from the dog fighting. The guideline range does not account for those facts as Safford
argues. See U.S.S.G. § 2E3.1(a)(1) cmt. n.2. And even if it did, a district court can
4 USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 5 of 6
rely on factors that the Guidelines also consider in deciding to vary because the
Guidelines “maintain[] flexibility sufficient to individualize sentences.” United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264–65 (2005); cf. United States v. Early, 686 F.3d
1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2012) (allowing consideration of criminal history even though
criminal history already impacts the recommended guideline range).
The district court also relied on Safford’s criminal history, specifically his
recidivism. It reasoned that a longer prison sentence was needed to deter Safford and
protect the public from his further crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C), because
he had already been to prison multiple times and “it didn’t do the trick,” see Osorio-
Moreno, 814 F.3d at 1288 (affirming a district court’s upward variance based on a
defendant’s criminal history because that history showed “that a lengthy sentence
was necessary to promote deterrence and respect for the law”); Overstreet, 713 F.3d
at 637–38 (explaining that unrelated criminal history is relevant to the “history and
characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence to promote respect for
the law, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant.” (cleaned up)).
The district court also mentioned that the upward variance was needed to
“reflect the seriousness of the offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), which was a
“significant offense” because it showed that Safford was “willing to torture, literally
torture another living thing.” Finally, the district court noted that an upward variance
5 USCA11 Case: 20-12903 Date Filed: 07/28/2021 Page: 6 of 6
was necessary to avoid unwarranted disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). And the
sentence was below the statutory maximum, which indicates that the sentence was
reasonable. Early, 686 F.3d at 1222.
Nor does Safford’s argument that the district court did not consider mitigating
factors, such as Safford’s apology and his sister’s statement, show otherwise. A
district court’s failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not mean that the district
court ignored that evidence. United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir.
2007). Here the district court heard the mitigating evidence, considered all of the
Section 3553(a) factors, and then explained the reasons for its sentence at length.
That explanation does not rely on anything improper and shows no clear error of
judgment. The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying an upward
variance and sentencing Safford to 48 months.
AFFIRMED.