United States v. Leland Alexander

489 F. App'x 572
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJuly 24, 2012
Docket11-3457
StatusUnpublished

This text of 489 F. App'x 572 (United States v. Leland Alexander) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Leland Alexander, 489 F. App'x 572 (3d Cir. 2012).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

JONES, II, District Judge.

On August 25, 2011, Appellant Leland K. Alexander (“Alexander”) pleaded guilty to the charge of Felon in Possession of a Firearm, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to serve a 78-month term of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. The sentencing court further ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to an existing state sentence. Alexander now appeals his judgment of sentence. For the reasons set forth below, that judgment will be affirmed.

I.

We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and thus recount only the essential facts and procedural history.

On or about September 10, 2008, Alexander was convicted in New Jersey’s Union County Superior Court, of Possession of a Weapon for an Unlawful Purpose— namely, a paintball gun — in violation of New Jersey Statutes Annotated, Section 2C:39-4. (A44-45). On or about August 27, 2010, Alexander knowingly possessed a top-break, sawed-off, double-barreled, 12-gauge shotgun and six shotgun shells, outside his residence located at 20 Shaw Avenue in Newark, New Jersey. (A44). At approximately 1 p.m. on that date, Alexander sold the shotgun and shells to an undercover agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in exchange for five hundred and forty dollars ($540.00). (A44; PSR ¶¶ 1, 9-10).

On September 29, 2010, the sawed-off shotgun was tested by the Newark Police Ballistics Laboratory and was found to be operable and capable of being discharged. (PSR ¶ 12). Because Alexander had been previously convicted in New Jersey on a weapon possession charge, local authorities referred the matter to federal authorities and on January 26, 2011 — as Alexander was in custody on a state offense — a warrant was issued for his arrest.

*574 On April 25, 2011, Alexander pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, to one charge of Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (A28-50). A sentencing hearing was held on August 25, 2011, at which time the court considered relevant statutory and guideline provisions, the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) prepared by the United States Department of Probation, Sentencing Memoranda submitted by both sides, and oral arguments. The court also heard information regarding Alexander’s personal background, including his aptitude for athletics and how his life went astray after a one-semester stint at the Berean Institute in Philadelphia.

Alexander is the oldest of three brothers, all of whom lived with their mother in Newark, New Jersey at the time of Alexander’s current offense. (A51; PSR ¶ 55). Alexander is also the father of four children from three different relationships. (PSR ¶¶ 61-62). The children range in age from one to four and Alexander is currently in arrears on court-ordered child support payments for his oldest son. (PSR ¶ 61).

Alexander’s father left the family when Alexander was twelve years old. Alexander claims that because of the pressure he placed upon himself to contribute financially towards his struggling family, he made some poor choices which led him to where he is today. In support of a requested lenient sentence, Alexander claimed “if he had a positive male role model in his life, he would not have began [sic] to ‘look to the streets for a father figure’ and things may have turned out differently.” (A51; PSR ¶ 58).

It was Alexander’s belief that by pleading guilty to the instant offense, he could “end his pattern of bad choices and contacts with the criminal justice system.” (A52). Therefore, he asked the sentencing court to impose a sentence below the recommended guideline range of 70 to 87 months, 1 and requested that any sentence imposed be ordered to run concurrently with the state sentence he was serving at the time. (A55).

After considering all of the information before it, the sentencing court ultimately imposed a 78-month term of imprisonment, and ordered that it run consecutively to Alexander’s imprisonment on any previous state or federal sentence. (A69). The court also imposed a three-year term of supervised release and a one hundred dollar ($100.00) special assessment fee, while waiving any potential fíne. (A69).

The within appeal followed.

II

The issue presented for this Court’s consideration is twofold. First, Alexander questions whether imposition of a 78-month sentence was “overly punitive.” Second, he asks us to assess whether the decision to run that sentence consecutively to a sentence currently being served, was “overly severe” and “even more unreasonable.” (Appellant Br. 2). As such, Alexander is not challenging the procedural aspect of his sentence; only the substantive reasonableness. (Appellant Br. 11).

In conducting our assessment, we are mindful that ...

In addition to being procedurally reasonable, a sentence must also be substantively reasonable. For a sentence to be substantively reasonable, a district court must apply the § 3553(a) factors reasonably to the circumstances of the case. A sentence that falls within the recommended Guidelines range, while not presumptively reasonable, is less *575 likely to be unreasonable than a sentence outside the range. The pertinent inquiry is “whether the final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.” The party challenging the sentence bears the ultimate burden of proving its unreasonableness, and we accord great deference to a district court’s choice of final sentence.

United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir.2007) (citations omitted).

This analysis shall be conducted by utilizing an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

At the time of sentencing, Alexander did not seek a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. (A61). However, he did seek a variance based upon “personal circumstances.” (A61-62). The crux of Alexander’s argument to the sentencing court was that an exception should be made for him because he was an extraordinary athlete but “things just sort of fell apart for him.” (A62). Alexander’s counsel argued that his client felt the pressure of negative influences and wandered down the wrong path in an effort to help his mother and siblings, but that he was ready to change and had the support of his family to do so. (A63). Counsel also referenced Alexander’s “young” age of twenty-three, and the fact that although he had “amassed a considerable number of [criminal history] points in a short period of time,” it was all just the result of “acting foolish and making poor choices” involving weapons and drugs. (A63-64).

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Bluebook (online)
489 F. App'x 572, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-leland-alexander-ca3-2012.