United States v. Lee

251 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 2017 WL 1901683, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70305
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedMay 9, 2017
DocketCase No. 14-CR-78
StatusPublished

This text of 251 F. Supp. 3d 1262 (United States v. Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Lee, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 2017 WL 1901683, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70305 (E.D. Wis. 2017).

Opinion

STATEMENT OF REASON MEMORANDUM

LYNN ADELMAN, District Judge

The government charged defendant Roosevelt Lee with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and related offenses. He pleaded guilty to possession of ■cocaine with intent to distribute, contrary to.21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C), and I set the case for sentencing. In imposing sentence, a district judge must first determine the defendant’s imprisonment range under the guidelines, then make an individualized assessment of the appropriate sentence based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). E.g., United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 837 (7th Cir. 2015).

I. GUIDELINE CALCULATION

Defendant’s pre-sentence . . report (“PSR”) set a base offense level of 32 based on a drug weight of 15-50 kilograms of cocaine, U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c)(4); added 2 levels under U.S.S.G. § 201.1(b)(1) based on the discovery of a firearm during the search of a residence connected to the conspiracy; then subtracted 3 levels for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, for a final level of 31; The PSR further determined that' defendant qualified as a career offender based on two prior drug trafficking convictions, resulting in a criminal' history category of VI. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.

[1264]*1264Defendant objected to the PSR’s drug weight determination, arguing that he should not be held responsible for relevant conduct of 15 to 50 kilograms of cocaine because he was in prison during significant portions of the conspiracy. He further indicated that the house where police found the gun was not his home, and that the gun belonged to a co-actor.

I found it unnecessary to resolve these objections. Even if I had adopted a lower base offense level under § 2Dl.l(e) and declined to impose the 2 level enhancement under § 2Dl.l(b)(l), the guideline range would not have changed much, as the career offender provision and its base level of 32 would have kicked in. Whether the range was 188-235 months or 151-188 months, the sentence imposed under § 3553(a) would have been the same. See United States v. Minhas, 850 F.3d 873, 880 (7th Cir. 2017).

II. SECTION 3553(a)

A. Sentencing Factors

Section 3553(a) directs the court to consider:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 'and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the [advisory sentencing guideline range;]
(5) any pertinent policy statement ... issued by the Sentencing Commission[;]
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The court must, after considering these factors, impose a sentence “sufficient but not greater than necessary” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing: just punishment, deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation of the defendant. Id. In determining a sufficient sentence, the district court may not presume that a guideline term would be proper. E.g., United States v. Coleman, 763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014). Rather, after calculating the advisory range so that it “can derive whatever insight the guidelines have to offer, [the district court] must sentence based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) without any thumb on the scale favoring a guideline sentence.” United States v. Sachsenmaier, 491 F.3d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2007).

B. Analysis

1. The Offense

This prosecution arose out of the government’s investigation of a racketeering enterprise headed by Kevin R. Arms, which was involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, and acts of violence. This defendant engaged in drug trafficking with other associates of the enterprise. The evidence against him consisted primarily of the results of two searches and statements from sources of information.

On March 5, 2012, agents conducted a consent search at a residence in Milwaukee. A co-conspirator was located inside [1265]*1265the home, while defendant was found hiding in the common hallway. In the basement of the residence, agents located a 9mm handgun next to clear plastic bags containing 13.86 grams of crack cocaine. Subsequent analysis revealed the co-conspirator’s fingerprint on one of the clear plastic bags.

On March 28, 2013, agents executed a search warrant at a residence in Milwaukee. Inside the home, they located a diaper that contained 109 grams of powder cocaine, a Pyrex cup with what appeared to be cocaine residue, digital scales, plastic bags, and a razor blade with residue. Along with these items, agents further'located boxes of baking soda, known to be used in the preparation of crack cocaine, which upon subsequent analysis revealed defendant’s fingerprint.1

A number of sources further discussed defendant’s involvement with Arms. One source indicated that Arms supplied defendant with one kilogram of cocaine from every delivery Arms received. Another stated that in July 2012 defendant received 9 ounces of cocaine from Arms. A third reported that in 2012 he observed Arms supply defendant with several ounces of cocaine.

Defendant told the PSR writer that his motivation for committing the offense was financial. Defendant stated that he approached Arms, a childhood friend, to buy drugs to sell because he needed money. He denied ever working a legitimate job. He estimated that he received approximately $50,000 from his involvement in the offense and all the money was gone; he spent it on jewelry, women, alcohol, and cars. He was living an expensive lifestyle but lost everything.

2. The Defendant

Defendant reported a good childhood, in a two parent home.

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Related

United States v. Gerald W. Sachsenmaier
491 F.3d 680 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
United States v. Quadale Coleman
763 F.3d 706 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
United States v. Parrish Kappes
782 F.3d 828 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Rashid Minhas
850 F.3d 873 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
251 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 2017 WL 1901683, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70305, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-lee-wied-2017.