United States v. Lee Tai-Hsing

738 F. Supp. 389, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6864, 1990 WL 72158
CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedMay 21, 1990
DocketCrim. 90-35-FR
StatusPublished

This text of 738 F. Supp. 389 (United States v. Lee Tai-Hsing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Lee Tai-Hsing, 738 F. Supp. 389, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6864, 1990 WL 72158 (D. Or. 1990).

Opinion

OPINION

FRYE, District Judge:

The following motions are pending:

*391 1. defendant Jen Kuo-Sen’s motion for additional and individual preemptory challenges;

2. Jen Kuo-Sen’s motion to suppress evidence;

3. Jen Kuo-Sen’s motion to dismiss the indictment;

4. Jen Kuo-Sen’s motion for a bill of particulars; and

5. defendant Lee Tai-Hsing’s motion to suppress evidence.

BACKGROUND

The indictment charges that Lee Tai-Hsing and Jen Kuo-Sen “did knowingly and unlawfully possess falsely made, forged, altered and counterfeited securities, moving as and which were a part of and constituted foreign commerce. Said securities were eight bank drafts, each in the amount of $100,000 purportedly drawn on the account of First Commercial Bank of Taiwan, Republic of China, at Citibank, Buffalo, New York. Said securities had been carried by the defendants in foreign commerce on Delta Airlines Flight 50, from Taipei, Taiwan, to Portland, Oregon; all in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2315 and 2.”

1. Jen Kuo-Sen’s Motion for Additional Challenges

Jen Kuo-Sen moves the court for an order allowing him ten preemptory challenges, and allowing him to make such challenges in addition to and independent from any challenges made by co-defendant, Lee Tai-Hsing. Counsel for Jen Kuo-Sen submits an affidavit in support of the motion in which he details his skill in trial advocacy, including studying trial advocacy in law school under the Honorable Robert P. Jones, former Multnomah County Circuit Court Judge, now Judge of the United States District Court. Counsel for Jen Kuo-Sen argues that without the benefit of an effective voir dire examination and a sufficient number of preemptory challenges, the jurors selected will be unable to understand the complexities of this case.

The government responds that this is not a sufficiently novel or complex case to warrant a departure from the court’s regular procedures for jury selection, but agrees that the court has the discretion to allow additional preemptory challenges if it wishes.

The court concludes that there is no basis for it to depart from the usual and regular jury selection procedure. If defendants wish to exercise their preemptory challenges independently from each other, they are free to do so. However, Jen Kuo-Sen’s motion for additional challenges is denied.

2. Jen Kuo-Sen’s Motion to Sup-press Evidence

Jen Kuo-Sen moves the court to suppress any and all evidence derived from a search of his person and property on January 27, 1990 for the reasons stated in the attached memorandum of law.

No evidence of any search was presented to the court. Jen Kuo-Sen’s motion to suppress evidence derived from a search of his person and property on January 27, 1990 is denied.

3. Jen Kuo-Sen’s Motion to Dismiss

Jen Kuo-Sen moves the court to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 2315 is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Jen Kuo-Sen argues that section 2315, under which he is charged, is an example of a proscription duplicitous with 18 U.S.C. § 480. Jen Kuo-Sen asserts that the mandate of the due process clause of the United States Constitution concerning vague statutes and unlimited prosecutorial discretion renders the application of section 2315 to his case improper.

The government argues that section 480 is not applicable to this case because the allegedly false securities were not issued by a bank of a foreign country.

Section 480 provides:

Whoever, within the United States, knowingly and with intent to defraud, possesses, or delivers any false, forged, or counterfeit bond, certificate, obligation, security, treasury note, bill, *392 promise to pay, bank note, or bill issued by a bank or corporation of any foreign country, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (Emphasis added).

Section 2315 provides, in part:

Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, or pledges or accepts as security for a loan any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps, moving as, or which are a part of, or which constitute interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the same to have been so falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited ... [sjhall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

Initially, the government argues that section 480 cannot be used to charge Jen Kuo-Sen because the securities at issue were not “issued by a bank ... of [a] foreign country.” The government explains that, as the indictment states, the bank drafts at issue were purported to be drawn on a United States Bank, namely Citibank of Buffalo, New York. While the account holder at Citibank was the First Commercial Bank of Taiwan, the bank drafts were United States checks, drawn on a United States bank, in United States dollars. The government explains that First Commercial Bank of Taiwan simply maintains an account at Citibank, much like millions of other individuals and business entities.

Jen Kuo-Sen argues that technically the bank drafts were issued by the First Commercial Bank of Taiwan and meet the requirements of section 480 as “issued by a bank ... of any foreign country.” Jen Kuo-Sen cites the definition of “issue” from Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary.

While Jen Kuo-Sen argues that section 480 applies to the charge against him, he does not contend that section 2315 does not apply to the charge against him. Assuming that section 480 applies, there are no grounds upon which to dismiss the indictment.

A criminal statute is invalid if it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.” United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811-12, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). The fact that particular conduct may violate two statutes does not detract from the notice required by each. So long as overlapping criminal provisions clearly define the conduct prohibited and the punishment authorized, the notice requirements of the due process clause are satisfied. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2203-04, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). The conduct proscribed by section 2315 is not unconstitutionally vague.

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Related

United States v. Beacon Brass Co.
344 U.S. 43 (Supreme Court, 1952)
United States v. Harriss
347 U.S. 612 (Supreme Court, 1954)
United States v. Nixon
418 U.S. 683 (Supreme Court, 1974)
United States v. Batchelder
442 U.S. 114 (Supreme Court, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
738 F. Supp. 389, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6864, 1990 WL 72158, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-lee-tai-hsing-ord-1990.