United States v. Lee

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided February 4, 2026·No. Criminal No. 2026-0014·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. Crim. A. No. 26-14 (JDB)

CHANG HOON LEE, also known as “Daniel Lee,”

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Chang Hoon Lee is accused of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to

distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing methamphetamine and cocaine. See 21

U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A) & (b)(1)(C). He was arrested in the Central District of California on

January 28, 2026, where he had his initial appearance before a magistrate judge. The magistrate

judge denied the government’s motion for pretrial detention. This Court granted an administrative

stay of Lee’s release so that the parties could brief the government’s appeal, which is now ripe for

consideration.

LEGAL STANDARD

When a defendant is released by a magistrate judge, the government “may file, with the

court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order or

amendment of the conditions of release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a). That motion must be resolved

“promptly.” Id. The D.C. Circuit has “not squarely decided” the appropriate standard for the

review of such a decision. United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2021). But

every circuit to have done so has held that review should be de novo. See United States v. Chrestman, 525 F. Supp. 3d 14, 23 & n.5 (D.D.C. 2021) (collecting cases). This Court adopts that

view.

Under the Bail Reform Act, defendants must be detained before trial when “no condition

or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and

the safety of any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). “In common parlance,

the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant is a ‘flight risk’ or a ‘danger to the community.’”

United States v. Vasquez-Benitez, 919 F.3d 546, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The government must prove

dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence and/or flight risk by a preponderance of the

evidence. United States v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In making its

determination, the court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged, (2)

the history and characteristics of the defendant, (3) the nature and seriousness of the danger posed

by the defendant’s release, and (4) the weight of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt. See 18

U.S.C. § 3142(g).

ANALYSIS

A defendant charged with a Controlled Substances Act offense with a statutory maximum

sentence of 10 years imprisonment or more faces a rebuttable presumption that there are no

conditions that will assure their appearance in court and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(e)(3)(A). Lee is charged with a Controlled Substance Act offense that carries a mandatory

minimum sentence of ten years and maximum term of life imprisonment. Accordingly, he faces

charges that trigger the presumption of detention.

The rebuttable presumption of detention imposes a burden of production on the defendant

to “offer some credible evidence contrary to the statutory presumption.” United States v. Alatishe,

768 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The “presumption is incorporated into the other factors

2 considered by this Court in determining whether to grant a conditional release and is given

substantial weight.” United States v. Ali, 793 F. Supp. 2d 386, 391 (D.D.C. 2011); United States

v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986). However, it is “not the responsibility of the

[defendant] to carry the Government’s burden of proof or persuasion.” Alatishe, 768 F.2d at 371.

And the presumption of detention must be evaluated alongside the Bail Reform Act’s general

admonition that defendants be “subject to the least restrictive” set of conditions sufficient to assure

safety and appearance. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B).

With the presumption in mind, the Court proceeds to analyze the Bail Reform Act factors.

A. Nature and circumstances of the offense

Lee is accused of an undeniably serious offense—conspiracy to distribute large quantities

of methamphetamine and cocaine. The presumption of detention for such offenses reflects

Congress’s determination that the charged conduct is serious, see Ali, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 391

(explaining that the presumption is “incorporated into the [Bail Reform Act] factors”), as do the

ten year mandatory minimum and the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Regarding the

circumstances of this case, Lee is accused of conspiring to traffic wholesale volumes of

methamphetamine and cocaine—70 kilograms and 55 grams respectively—over a four month

period. The scale of the alleged trafficking operation adds to the seriousness of the charges.

Lee highlights that the government’s complaint and memorandum in support of detention

do not include any allegations that Lee is a violent person or has previously used a firearm. Def.’s

Opp’n [ECF No. 14] 12. That misses the point. Trafficking wholesale volumes of controlled

substances is a dangerous offense, regardless of whether it involves additional allegations of

violence.

3 For its part, government argues that the ten year mandatory minimum sentence and

possibility of a life in prison give Lee an incentive to flee (to South Korea, where he has family).

See United States v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp. 2d 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying bail in part because

of defendant’s “connections overseas”). And again, the presumption of detention reflects

Congress’s judgment that “flight to avoid prosecution is particularly high among persons charged

with major drug offenses.” Alatishe, 768 F.2d at 370 n.13 (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 20

(1983)); see also United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1144 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing the same

Senate Report language).

Lee responds that the cases cited by the government all involve extraordinary

circumstances inapplicable in this case, such as a defendant with access to substantial overseas

assets, Anderson, 384 F. Supp. 2d. at 36, or connections to a non-extradition jurisdiction, United

States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (D.D.C. 2013). He represents that those circumstances

are inapplicable here because the Government has not demonstrated that he has access to overseas

assets and because South Korea has an extradition treaty with the United States. Def.’s Opp’n 10.

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Related

United States v. Moshood F. Alatishe
768 F.2d 364 (D.C. Circuit, 1985)
United States v. Godofredo Martir
782 F.2d 1141 (Second Circuit, 1986)
United States v. Charles A. Simpkins
826 F.2d 94 (D.C. Circuit, 1987)
United States v. Ali
793 F. Supp. 2d 386 (District of Columbia, 2011)
United States v. Anderson
384 F. Supp. 2d 32 (District of Columbia, 2005)
United States v. Hong Vo
978 F. Supp. 2d 41 (District of Columbia, 2013)
United States v. Jaime Vasquez-Benitez
919 F.3d 546 (D.C. Circuit, 2019)
United States v. Eric Munchel
991 F.3d 1273 (D.C. Circuit, 2021)
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289 F. Supp. 3d 55 (D.C. Circuit, 2018)