United States v. Leander Haggan

Eighth Circuit

United States v. Leander Haggan

510 F. App'x 483

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedMay 24, 2013

Docket12-2488

StatusUnpublished

This text of 510 F. App'x 483 (United States v. Leander Haggan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. Leander Haggan, 510 F. App'x 483 (8th Cir. 2013).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

After Leander Haggan pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine base (crack), see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 846, the district court 1 calculated his advisory sentencing range, adding two levels to his base offense level for possessing a firearm in connection with his drug offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l). On appeal, Mr. Haggan challenges the enhancement, contending that the district court relied on witness testimony that lacked credibility and that the evidence at sentencing did not adequately demonstrate that he had “ownership, dominion, or control” of a weapon in connection with his drug crime, see United States v. Molina-Perez, 595 F.3d 854, 862-63 (8th Cir.2010). We review the district court’s factual findings supporting its application of the enhancement for clear error, United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir.2010), and we give great deference to its finding on a witness’s credibility, see United States v. Dentern, 434 F.3d 1104, 1114 (8th Cir.2006).

Mr. Haggan maintains that the two co-conspirators who testified at his sentencing hearing that they had seen him possessing a gun were not credible because they gave testimony “in hopes of benefit-ting themselves” and one of them had been using cocaine when he purportedly saw the weapon. But the district court was aware that both witnesses were testifying against Mr. Haggan pursuant to plea agreements and that one of them was a regular cocaine user when he observed Mr. Haggan with a firearm, and we cannot conclude that the court clearly erred in finding that those witnesses were nevertheless credible.

We likewise conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding, based on the witnesses’ testimony, that Mr. Hag-gan possessed at least one firearm in connection with his drug offense. One witness testified that he saw a firearm on the bed while he and Mr. Haggan were alone in Mr. Haggan’s bedroom using cocaine; the other witness testified that he saw Mr. Haggan carrying a weapon “tucked into his side of his pants like his waistline” while they were completing a drug trans *484 action. This testimony was more than sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Hag-gan possessed a firearm in connection with his drug offense.

Affirmed.

1

. The Honorable John M. Gerrard, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

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PER CURIAM.

After Leander Haggan pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine base (crack), see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 846, the district court 1 calculated his advisory sentencing range, adding two levels to his base offense level for possessing a firearm in connection with his drug offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(l). On appeal, Mr. Haggan challenges the enhancement, contending that the district court relied on witness testimony that lacked credibility and that the evidence at sentencing did not adequately demonstrate that he had “ownership, dominion, or control” of a weapon in connection with his drug crime, see United States v. Molina-Perez, 595 F.3d 854, 862-63 (8th Cir.2010). We review the district court’s factual findings supporting its application of the enhancement for clear error, United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir.2010), and we give great deference to its finding on a witness’s credibility, see United States v. Dentern, 434 F.3d 1104, 1114 (8th Cir.2006).

Mr. Haggan maintains that the two co-conspirators who testified at his sentencing hearing that they had seen him possessing a gun were not credible because they gave testimony “in hopes of benefit-ting themselves” and one of them had been using cocaine when he purportedly saw the weapon. But the district court was aware that both witnesses were testifying against Mr. Haggan pursuant to plea agreements and that one of them was a regular cocaine user when he observed Mr. Haggan with a firearm, and we cannot conclude that the court clearly erred in finding that those witnesses were nevertheless credible.

We likewise conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding, based on the witnesses’ testimony, that Mr. Hag-gan possessed at least one firearm in connection with his drug offense. One witness testified that he saw a firearm on the bed while he and Mr. Haggan were alone in Mr. Haggan’s bedroom using cocaine; the other witness testified that he saw Mr. Haggan carrying a weapon “tucked into his side of his pants like his waistline” while they were completing a drug trans *484 action. This testimony was more than sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Hag-gan possessed a firearm in connection with his drug offense.

Affirmed.

1

. The Honorable John M. Gerrard, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

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